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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation is a systematic study of the 22kV Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality (NMBM) electricity power distribution network reliability evaluation 
and improvements to be applied.  Reliability evaluation of electric power 
systems has traditionally been an integral part of planning and operation.  
Changes in the electricity utility, coupled with aging electrical apparatus, 
create a need for more realistic techniques for power system reliability 
modelling. 
 
This work presents a reliability evaluation technique that combines set 
literature and evaluation criteria.  In analysing system reliability, this research 
takes into account the reasons for many outages and voltage dips and seeks 
to find mitigating approaches that are financially justified. 
 
The study analyses the power system in terms of the methodology developed, 
using power system reliability techniques, power quality evaluation, protection 
analyses and evaluating the network against maintenance interventions and 
programs, manpower availability and weather conditions contributing to the 
outages. 
 
In evaluating the power system various techniques are used to determine if 
the power network operates within the NRS standards, namely, reliability 
calculations, testing of protection equipment, interrogation of power quality 
instruments and modeling the network on Digsilent. 
 
This study will look at all the important factors influencing power system 
reliability, analysing the network in terms of the methodology and recommend 
improvements.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Bay Municipality comprises Port Elizabeth, 
Uitenhage and Despatch.  It covers a geographical area of 3200 square 
kilometres between the Gamtoos River, Sundays River and Winterhoek 
Mountains.  The Metropole supplies electricity to 250 000 domestic, 9500 
commercial and 2100 industrial customers, with an annual sales value of R1,2 
billion for 3700 GWH.  The metropole electricity power network encompasses 
70 HV (22kV to 132kV) substations, 2410 MV (6.6kV to 11kV) substations, 
5406 km of HV and MV overhead lines and 1552 km of HV and MV 
underground cables. 
 
Economic growth is directly proportional to the availability of electricity and 
quality of supply.  The economic, social and political climate in which the 
electricity power supply industry operates in SA has changed considerably 
over the last few decades, especially during the last ten years.  More 
investment and increased development requires more capacity.  The industry 
is not in a position to produce the quality of electricity now demanded by its 
customers.  The power networks are overloaded, infrastructure is old and little 
or no maintenance has been done on the equipment. 
 
Power system reliability has been extensively developed using various 
indices, but no single all-purpose formula exists.  The approach and the 
formula used depends always on the problem presented and the assumptions 
made (Billinton and Wenyuan, 1994). 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Power distribution network systems are important elements for economic 
growth, emergency services, household use, farming et cetera.  Everybody is 
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dependant on power and it is in everybody’s interest that the quality of power 
provided by the utility fulfils the needs of it customers. 
 
Major failures of electric power systems, leaving customers without power, 
have become common in recent years.  The effects of these power failures 
are catastrophic, causing major users of electricity in heavy industrial areas to 
write off millions of rands annually. 
 
Over the last five years approximately 6000 MV and HV outages were 
recorded, giving us an average of 1200 outages per annum.  83% were MV 
and 17% were HV outages.  The rate at which the outages occurred is not 
acceptable and has a negative impact on the NMBM and the customers.  
During the 2006/2007 financial year, the average outage time was 1.9 hours 
per customer per day.  The direct consequences of these outages are related 
to the interconnections between different elements and technical aspects of 
the power system (NMBM Monthly Reports, 2006/2007). 
 
The reality is that power outages have major direct and indirect consequences 
on economic growth and security of supply.  The rate at which power outages 
occur, the number of outages recorded and generally, the performance of the 
power system is beyond the NRS limits.   
 
1.3 SUB-PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Serious network problems occurred over the last five-year period.  The 
causes of many of the persisting outages are often directly related to power 
quality problems.  The following contributory factors to the power supply 
problems in the NMBM are: 
 
 Aging of equipment and poor infrastructure 
 Lack of maintenance of existing equipment and infrastructure 
 Inability to upgrade and reinforce existing networks 
 Protection system failures 
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 Grading of protection relays 
 Failure of communication equipment 
 Voltage imbalances 
 Voltage fluctuation and flickering 
 System harmonics 
 Voltage sag/dip 
 Automation of operations 
 Acute shortage of funds 
 Vandalism and theft of infrastructure 
 Procurement of inferior quality equipment at low cost 
 Manpower shortages 
 Inability to secure skilled workers 
 Inclement weather conditions 
 
1.4 HYPOTHESIS 
 
Power system reliability is an essential factor in the quality of supply.  In the 
NMBM, power system reliability is directly related to the number of outages.   
 
By analysing the power system properly using available methodology, the 
weaknesses will then be identified and improvements can be introduced to 
prevent possible future outages.  A decrease in the outage rate will result in 
an improvement in reliability and quality of supply.  This will improve the 
reliability of the power network, and hence the quality of supply will be 
positively affected. 
 
1.5 DELIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In this project, all the interruptions recorded on the feeders supplying the 
distribution network will be researched.  This includes all feeders and 
substations operating at 22kV.  The interruption data will be recorded, 
analysed and presented using spreadsheets and graphs.  Weaknesses in the 
power network will be identified.  Five case studies will be used to investigate 
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technical aspects and weak components, while various engineering tests and 
investigations will be conducted.  The results will be analysed and 
recommendations will be made to effect improvement on the quality and 
reliability of the power distribution network. 
 
1.6 AIM OF THE RESEARCH      
 
The research project seeks to achieve a more thorough understanding of the 
factors that affect power system reliability, to analyse the power system and 
recommend strategies for improvements.  The power network will be 
systematically studied and analysed in terms of the causes of interruptions.  
The analysis would be conducted using engineering interventions, namely, 
reliability calculations, protection fault analysis, evaluation of power quality 
results against the NRS standards, load flows on Digsilent et cetera. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
 
Research for this project was carried out as described below. 
 
An extensive literature review based on the criteria below was consulted to 
guide the investigation: 
   
 Power System Reliability (Chapter 2);  
 Power Quality (Chapter 3);  
 Power System Protection (Chapter 4);  
 Maintenance and Manpower (Chapter 5), and  
 Weather Conditions (Chapter 6). 
 
Analysis was carried out using text books, published journals, the internet, 
magazines and policy documents. 
 
The impact of the interruptions on the NMBM supply network was assessed 
and evaluated.  Power system reliability was the point of focus.  Power outage 
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data was collected over a period of 5 financial years (2002/2003 to 
2006/2007).  The data was refined and presented on spreadsheets.  Graphs 
were drawn, investigations were conducted and tests done in order to identify 
the weaknesses of the power systems.  From the NMBM power network, 5 
case studies were identified to be examined as case studies, namely: 
 
 Fitches Corner, Blue Horizon Bay (FBH); 
 Summit, Gamtoos Pumps (SGP); 
 Motherwell North (MWN); 
 Kragga Kamma, Greenbushes, and 
 Fitches Corner, Rocklands (FCR).  
 
Causes of outages were identified, durations of outages were quantified and 
equipment testing schedules and preventative maintenance records were 
examined.  Assessing this data provided valuable information on how to 
reduce outage durations. 
 
The following interventions were effected in analysing the case studies: 
 
 Power quality meters were installed at these sites to monitor the quality 
of supply. 
 Reliability calculations based on Reliability Indices were completed to 
determine the failure rate. 
 Protection equipment was tested to ascertain if it was functional.  Re-
calculation of fault levels and protection settings was done. 
 Investigations were conducted to clarify why SCADA was never installed 
in some of the case studies. 
 Power networks were modelled in Digsilent and load flows were 
performed. 
 The maintenance records of power system equipment were investigated. 
 Outage information was captured on the NRS Interruption data analysis 
program to evaluate the power system against the NRS standards. 
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 The impact of weather conditions contributing to power outages was 
linked to these outages. 
 Findings were made after the analysis. 
 Conclusions and recommendations were made to improve power system 
reliability.     
 
1.8 REVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 
Literature pertaining to the reliability of power systems was studied.  The 
focus was on the factors contributing to the increased outages, how they 
impacted on the industry and what the major financial implications were.  The 
literature also investigated possible solutions to the power outage problem 
and new methods of dealing with it. 
 
Chapter 1: Problem and its Setting, covers the problem, aim, setting, 
methodology to be used and the outline of the dissertation and the literature 
survey. 
 
Chapter 2: Power System Reliability covers reliability calculations used 
throughout the dissertation to evaluate the overall performance of the case 
studies.  The reliability calculation results will be compared with the reliability 
indices used internationally to evaluate power systems.  Cost of outages and 
the factors contributing to and influencing power system reliability are 
examined. 
 
Chapter 3: Power Quality investigates problems in the NMBM power network.  
This includes research on voltage dips, considered the main cause of power 
quality problems in NMBM.  An overview of the instruments used to record the 
events is discussed.  Estimation and calculation of voltage dips, and methods 
to reduce them are researched.  Other power quality problems included are 
harmonics, flickering, voltage swells and regulation. 
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Chapter 4: Power System Protection covers the systems utilized in the case 
studies researched.  Types of protection relays, the function of protection, 
factors affecting the severity of a fault and the type of faults causing outages 
are examined.  Protection devices are included: fuses, sectionalizers, auto-
reclosers and how they integrate with each other.  A section on protection for 
transformers from 1 MVA and smaller is also included since it was found that 
many of the rural power lines have distribution transformers installed without 
correct protection measures.  Overcurrent, earth fault, sensitive earth fault, 
current transformers, fault level calculations, fault calculations, discrimination, 
and surge arrestors are reviewed.  A section on the NMBM protection policy is 
also added. 
 
Chapter 5: Maintenance and Manpower highlights maintenance and 
manpower factors in the electrical distribution and transmission industry.  
Maintenance cannot be performed with insufficient and unskilled manpower.  
The little maintenance done cannot keep up with the pace at which the 
equipment deteriorates.  The current practices, their impact on the industry 
and the effect of preventive maintenance are discussed. 
 
Chapter 6: Weather Conditions emphasises the impact of adverse weather 
conditions on the power system.  Overhead lines are significantly affected and 
have countless consequences for the end users, particularly the industry.  
Adverse weather conditions are unavoidable, but mitigation factors need to be 
highlighted as well. 
 
Chapter 7: The summary highlights all the important and pertinent aspects in 
the literature review. 
 
Chapter 8: After the identification of the weak power systems, each was 
analysed to determine why it had underperformed.  The use of graphs, 
spreadsheets and outage data assisted in performing this exercise.  Common 
trends in terms of the factors affecting the under-performance of the power 
system were identified. 
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Chapter 9 – 13: In the case studies, the power systems were analysed and 
evaluated in terms of the following criteria described in the literature review: 
 
 Power System Reliability 
 Power Quality 
 Power System Protection 
 Digsilent Power Factory 
 SCADA 
 Maintenance and Manpower 
 Weather Conditions 
 NRS Data Analysis  
 
The literature review guided the analysis of the case studies.  Test, site 
inspections, interviews with field staff, contractors and customers indicated 
the impact of the outages. 
 
After the analysis and evaluation of the case studies the findings were 
recorded and recommendations introduced.  
 
Chapter 14: The Conclusions are outlined to improve the performance of 
power systems, and hence improve power system reliability. 
 
1.9 SUMMARY 
 
Electricity networks must supply electricity at the lowest cost per unit with an 
acceptable degree of reliability.  To achieve this, the utility must remain within 
electricity supply quality regulations.   
 
Reliability is an essential factor in quality of supply.  The main factors used to 
evaluate the reliability of electricity supply to customers are the: 
 
 Frequency and magnitude of the interruptions; 
 Cost to repair or replace the faulted network or equipment;  
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 Duration of the interruption, and  
 Cost to the customer for the time the supply of electricity was not 
available.    
 
Constraints relating directly to the reliability of electricity supply are the 
frequency variations, equipment ratings and fault levels.  Reliability analysis of 
an electricity power network is an integral part of planning and operation, and 
with the shortfall of engineering staff, utilities are not in a position to perform 
this important function. 
 
In this dissertation the impact of the interruptions on the NMBM supply 
network are assessed and evaluated over a period of 5 years.  Causes of 
outages were identified; the duration of outages was quantified, and 
equipment testing schedules and preventive maintenance records were 
examined.  Assessing the data provided valuable information on how to 
minimise the duration of power outages. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The function of an electricity power system is to provide electricity energy to 
all its customers as economically as possible.  This supply of electricity must 
be of an acceptable quality and degree of reliability.  Contemporary users of 
electricity expect that the supply of electricity is available continuously.  This is 
sometimes impossible because of the malfunctioning of power system 
equipment and other factors outside the control of power system controllers. 
 
Power system reliability refers to the performance of the power system 
measured by the frequency, duration and magnitude of the interruption 
(Kueck, Kirby, Overholt, Markel, 2004).  The reliability of a power system is 
evaluated against the total loss of electricity and the complete loss of voltage; 
it is not just a distortion of the sine wave.  However, it does not include sags, 
swells or harmonics.   
 
Power system outages can cause major inconvenience to users of electricity.  
The financial losses and economic impact are not confined to the utility or the 
major industrial user, but impacts indirectly on the entire community and the 
environment.  Power system outages impact more on businesses than any 
other user of electricity (Short, 2006). 
 
The probability of customers being interrupted by power outages can be 
reduced by increased investment during the planning phase.  It is evident that 
when a power system is designed, the planner designs it at the lowest cost.  
This is done because the customers have to pay for the infrastructure.  Major 
refurbishments and reinforcements are planned on the same principle, as the 
capital investment remains the responsibility of the local authority, hence the 
customers are indirectly paying.  It is therefore obvious that economics and 
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reliability can conflict, leading to difficult decisions.  The capital investment 
also impacts on the operational constraints. 
 
According to Billinton and Wenyaun (1994) the term “reliability” has a wide 
range of meanings, not just a specific meaning.  It is safe to use the term in a 
general rather than specific sense.  Power system reliability can be divided 
into system adequacy and system security as illustrated in Figure 2.1 
(Billinton and Allan, 1994). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Subdivision of System Reliability (Adapted from Billington and Allan, 1994) 
 
2.2 SYSTEM ADEQUACY AND SECURITY 
 
Adequacy is the availability of adequate facilities in terms of equipment and 
infrastructure to supply electricity to the consumer.  The magnitude of the 
power supply is determined by the customer load demand and/or the system 
operational constraints.  The facilities required to ensure system adequacy 
include power stations to generate electricity, transmission lines, transformers 
and downstream substations, all necessary to transport electricity to the 
customer load point (Billinton and Allan, 1994). 
 
Security is the capability of the power system to react to dynamic and static 
disturbances which arise within the power system.  Security relates to the 
manner in which the power system responds to disturbances.  It is difficult to 
access security, hence most probabilistic techniques available are based on 
adequacy assessment.  Consequently, most of the indices available are 
adequacy indices (Billinton and Allan, 1994). 
 
 
system reliability 
system security system adequacy
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2.3 RELIABILITY EVALUATION 
 
Power system reliability was developed and researched based on whether the 
number of interruptions and the duration of the interruption could be 
statistically analysed, but not predicted precisely (Bollen, 2000).  Power 
system reliability evaluation, evaluation techniques and methods have been 
further developed over the last few years.  Through these interventions, a 
broad range of appropriate indices were developed, therefore a single 
technique or method does not exist.  The approach and the formulae that a 
utility will be using depends on the problem and the assumptions.  It is 
therefore clear that power system reliability techniques, methods and 
formulae are hugely dependent on probability.  The basic steps to apply this 
technique are: 
 
 Clarifying how the system and its components operate; 
 Identifying possible causes of failure; 
 Deducing the results of the failures; 
 Deriving one’s own models, and 
 Selecting the evaluation technique or method (Billington and Wenyaun, 
1994). 
 
2.4 REASONS FOR RELIABILITY EVALUATION 
 
Due to the changing political, economic and social conditions of the world, the 
electricity supply industry has been forced to change.  Inflation, the increase 
in the oil price and growth in terms of the economy resulted in an increase in 
domestic, commercial and industrial customers.  This increase creates 
uncertainties in predicting future demand for energy.  Reliability evaluation 
techniques form one method used to keep up with changing political, 
economic and social conditions.  The reliability evaluation techniques can be 
related to these economic aspects and the planners and designers of power 
systems can find this useful for future power system development and 
reinforcements (Billinton and Allan, 1994). 
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2.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY  
 
There are many factors affecting and influencing the smooth operation of a 
power system, hence also affecting power system reliability.  However, certain 
factors are more prevalent in transmission power systems, and others are 
more prevalent in distribution power systems.  
 
2.5.1 Radial Systems 
Most of the case studies in this dissertation are based on radial topology.  In 
radial systems, each equipment or infrastructure failure will result in an 
outage.  Where parallel or meshed systems are utilised, the power system 
would operate normally with an open point elsewhere in the circuit (Bollen, 
2000). 
 
2.5.2 Failure of Protection Equipment 
Power system protection equipment is primarily installed to remove the faulty 
part of the power system in minimum time and to limit the risk of damage to 
the equipment and infrastructure. 
 
Failure of any power system protection equipment can lead to major damage 
and financial losses to the utility.  This will also lead to extended power 
outages for customers (Hewitson, Brown, Balakrishnan, 2007).   
 
2.5.3 Weather Conditions 
Adverse weather conditions namely, strong winds, lightning, rain and storms 
are the most frequent causes of power interruptions.  During normal weather, 
failure of equipment is regarded as an independent event.  During adverse 
weather equipment failures resulting in extended outages can occur at the 
same time (Brown, 2002).   
 
Overhead power lines are more likely to be affected by adverse weather 
conditions.  Approximately 70% of all faults on overhead lines are transient 
faults (Burke, 1994). 
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2.5.4 Duration of Interruption 
The duration of an outage is a major concern in power system reliability 
studies.  The cost of an interruption is also directly linked to the outage 
duration.  According to Bollen (2000) the average outage duration and hence 
the outage cost may vary significantly throughout the power network.  Bollen 
(2000) states that the following contributory factors impact on the outage 
duration: 
 
 Travelling to the affected equipment; 
 Finding the fault, 
 Switching of equipment, and 
 Restoring of power supply. 
 
The obvious approach would be to reduce the number of faults which form the 
source of the interruption.  Due to the duration of interruptions, damaged 
equipment, overtime payments, loss of sales and claims from customers cost 
utilities more (Short, 2006). 
 
2.5.5 Failure Rate    
The failure rate of equipment increases significantly with time, if not 
maintained according to a planned maintenance program in conjunction with 
the supplier’s manuals. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Bathtub curve: component failure rate vs age (Adapted from Bollen, 2000) 
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The Bathtub curve, Figure 2.2 (Bollen, 2000) quantifies the occurrence of 
equipment failure rate through the aging of equipment.  The period 0 to T1 is 
known as the wear-in-period, period T1 to T2 is the useful life of the 
equipment and the time when it is more valuable to the user, and T2 is the 
wear-out period.   
 
In Figure 2.3 (Bollen, 2000) the failure rate increases with time until the 
equipment is maintained.  After maintenance, the failure rate drops to the 
original value.  The dotted line represents the average failure rate. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Failure rate vs time for regular maintenance intervals (Adapted from Bollen, 2000) 
 
2.6 RELIABILITY INDICES 
 
Reliability indices typically consider such aspects as the number of 
customers, the connected load; the duration of the outage measured in 
seconds, minutes, hours, days; the amount of power (kVA) interrupted and 
the frequency of interruptions. 
 
There are many indices for measuring reliability.  The three most commonly 
used indices according to Burke (1994) are SAIDI (82%), SAIFI (76%) and 
ASAI (64%).  He adds that reliability of a power system is really evaluated in 
terms of the outage rate and outage duration.  Thus, the basic formula for 
evaluating radial power systems is as follows: 
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Series Components 
λs  = λ2λ1   λs  = System Outage Rate 
    λ1 = System Outage Rate for component 1 
    λ2= System Outage Rate for component 2  
 
 rs = λ2λ1
λ2r2λ1r1


  rs = System Average Outage duration 
r1 = System Outage Duration for Component 1 
 
r2 = System Outage Duration for Component 2 
 
 
Us = rs λs   Us = System Average Total Outage Time        (2.1) 
 
 
Reliability Indices are also used to evaluate overall power system 
performance.  Useful Reliability Indices, according to Burke (1994), are as 
follows: 
 
SAIDI-  System Average Interruption Duration Index 
 
SAIDI =  
Customers No. Total
Durations onInterrupti Customer of Sum           (2.2) 
 
SAIFI-   System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
SAIFI =  
Customers No Total
onsInterrupti Customer of Number Total                        (2.3) 
 
CAIDI-  Customer Average Interruption Duration Index 
CAIDI =  
onsInterrupti Customer No. Total
Durations onInterrupti Customer of Sum           (2.4) 
 
SAIDI, or System Average Interruption Duration Index, is commonly referred 
to as customer minutes or customer hours of interruption, and is designed to 
provide information on the average time that customers are interrupted.  
SAIDI calculates the average total duration of interruptions.  It quantifies how 
many interruption hours an average customer will experience in one year 
(Brown, 2002; Burke, 1994; Short, 2006).  
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SAIFI, or System Average Interruption Frequency Index, is the average 
frequency of sustained interruptions per customer over a predefined area.  
SAIFI is the average failure rate.  It quantifies how many sustained 
interruptions an average customer experience in one year (Brown, 2002; 
Burke, 1994; Short, 2006).  
 
CAIDI, or Customer Average Interruption Duration Index, is the average time 
needed to restore services to the average customer per sustained 
interruption.  CAIDI is a measure of how long an average interruption lasts.  It 
is used to measure the utility response time to interruptions (Brown, 2002; 
Burke, 1994; Short, 2006).  
 
2.7 COST OF POWER OUTAGES 
 
The inability of a utility to provide electricity to its customers due to a planned 
or an unplanned outage needs to be quantified in the design and planning 
phases of power systems.  Not much in terms of research has been 
completed on this and the likelihood of designers and planners of power 
systems incorporating the cost of interruption into the study is almost zero.  
Bollen (2000), Figure 2.4 uses the graph to compare cost against reliability. 
 
It is apparent from Figure 2.4 that designs incorporating more reliable power 
systems will increase the cost of the power systems.  Therefore, reliable 
power systems are more expensive than less reliable power systems.  The 
total cost curve is a resultant of the two curves and will show a minimum, 
which is an indication of the optimal reliability (Bollen, 2000). 
 
Different methods are used to determine outage costs.  The method 
employed also depends on the type of customer.  An industrial customer 
would use a different method from a domestic customer.  The only accepted 
method according to Bollen (2000) is to conduct a survey among customers.  
The answers given by the customers can be used to determine the average 
cost of an outage. 
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Figure 2.4 - Cost vs Reliability (Adapted from Bollen, 2000) 
 
The cost per interrupted kW can be defined as: 
 
Li
Ci(d)               (2.5) 
 
d  = duration  
Li  = load of customer 
Ci  = cost per kW 
 
Cost can be expressed in Dollar/kW, or in any other currency, for example 
Rand/kW. 
Cost per kWh not delivered, is expressed in Rand/kWh. 
Some utilities use an average cost per kWh for power not delivered for all 
customers (Bollen, 2000). 
 
Reliability 
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Building costs 
Total costs 
Reliability costs 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW: POWER QUALITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The quality of electricity supply affects every consumer, from the homeowner 
to large industry, mining and commercial.  Customer awareness of poor 
quality of electricity supply is increasing due to the more “sensitive” nature of 
modern equipment and to the increasing deployment of non-linear loads 
(Dugan, McGranaghan, Santoso, Beaty, 2003).  Added to this, the harsh 
South African environment, long transmission and distribution lines, high 
lightning occurrence, utility switching, vegetation, animals, birds, insulator 
pollution from coastal and industrial sources all contribute to making quality of 
electricity supply a topical issue. 
 
Good power quality is complicated, because it is measured in terms of the 
equipment or the customer that it supplies.  What is good power quality for a 
motor might not be good for a computer (Burke, 1994).   
 
The electricity supply industry is interested in power quality for economic 
reasons.  There are major financial implications for the utilities and the 
customers, especially the major industrial users of power.  The modernization 
of industrial machinery means more electronic and energy efficient 
equipment.  These are more sensitive to supply voltage variations (Bollen, 
2000). 
 
Power quality problems, particular voltage dips and the factors affecting them 
need analytical research. 
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3.2 VOLTAGE DIPS 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Suppliers of electricity over the years have had to deal with an increasing 
number of complaints relating to poor power quality due to voltage dips and 
interruptions.  The crucial issue is that voltage dips affect sensitive loads.  The 
influx of digital computers and electronic controls and equipment is at the 
heart of the problem.   
 
Voltage dips are the most general power quality abnormality, accounting for 
almost 80% of such problems.  Dips are a common cause of power related 
computer system failures, stalling of motors, reduced motor life and flickering 
of lights (CT Lab Power Quality Recorder Manager User Guide, 2005). 
 
The terminology used to describe the magnitude of voltage dips or sags is 
often confusing.  The recommended international usage is “a sag to 20%,” 
which means that the line voltage is reduced down to 20% of the normal 
value, not reduced by 20%.  This is consistent with other practices and with 
most analysers who report on voltage quality (IEEE Std 1159 - 1995).  In SA 
use of “dip” is more acceptable. 
 
A voltage dip is described as a sudden reduction measured in root mean 
square (RMS) voltage between 20 ms and 3 s of one or all the phase 
voltages.  The duration of the voltage dip is measured from the moment the 
voltage decreases below 0.9 pu up to when the voltage rises above 0.9 pu of 
declared voltage (NRS 048-2:2007).  Figure 3.1 depicts the voltage dip 
parameters.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Measured voltage dip parameters (Adapted from NRS 048-2:2001) 
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Voltage dips are the most common cause of customer complaints on poor 
power quality.  The NRS 048 specifications provide targets for each dip 
category, namely, Y, X, S, T and Z and the utilities are assessed in terms of 
this.  In Table 3.1 the compatibility levels for voltage dips are given in the form 
of the maximum number of voltage dips per annum within defined ranges of 
voltages.    Voltage dips are dependent on different environmental conditions 
which have an effect on power quality.  In the case studies, many of the 
voltage dips were caused by lightning, storms, wind, birds, animals, 
vegetation, ground resistivity and protection malfunctioning.  
 
Table 3.1 – Characteristic values for the number of voltage dips per year for each category of dip 
window (adapted from NRS 048-2:2007). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Network 
voltage 
range 
(nominal 
voltages) 
Number of voltage dips per year
Dip window category 
X1 X2 T S Z1 Z2 
6,6kV to 
44kV 
extended 
overhead 
13 12 10 13 11 10 
6,6kV to 
44kV 7 7 7 6 3 4 
44kV to 
220kV 13 10 5 7 4 2 
220kV to 
765kV 8 9 3 2 1 1 
 
 
3.2.2 Causes of Voltage Dips 
When heavy loads are started, such as large drives, the starting current can 
be many times the normal running current.  Since the supply and the cabling 
of the installation are designed for normal running current, the high initial 
current causes a voltage drop in both the supply network and the installation.  
The initial starting current flowing though the system impedance, causing a 
voltage dip, which causes contactors to drop, dims lights and disrupts 
sensitive electronic equipment.  Figure 3.2 depicts a typical motor-staring 
voltage dip (Dugan et al, 2003). 
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Figure 3.2 – Typical Motor-starting voltage dip (adapted from Dugan et al, 2003)   
 
Arc furnaces generate large voltage dips in power systems.  Arc furnaces 
produce high temperatures and use inductors to regulate the current caused 
by the arc.  A large current is drawn during the initial process for a few 
seconds.  After the arc becomes stable, the current also stabilises.  During the 
starting process, the arc furnace produces voltage dips.  Figure 3.3 depicts 
the current drawn by an arc furnace (Sankaran, 2002).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Typical current drawn by arc furnace at primary transformer (adapted from Sankaran, 
2002) 
 
According to Sankaran (2002), approximately 70% of all power system 
outages occur on overhead lines.  Lightning, vegetation, birds, animals and 
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failure of equipment cause these faults.  The reclosing and sectionalising 
devices used to clear such faults cause voltage dips on the power system. 
 
Both Sankaran (2002) and Dugan et al (2003) confirm that the worse feeders 
in terms of power system reliability indices, voltage dips and interruptions 
were recorded on overhead lines. 
 
EI-Arina, Yousseff, Hendawy (2006) states that abnormal operating 
conditions, namely, heavy loads, frequent starting, large induction motors and 
transmission faults are the main reasons for voltage dips.  To mitigate the 
impact of voltage dips, over saturated transformers and uninterruptible power 
supplies should be installed. 
  
3.2.3 Instruments Used to Measure Voltage Dips 
Four types of power quality instruments are used by the NMBM, namely, 
Impedograph, Vectograph and Provograph.   
 
CT Lab, an electronics company located in SA, currently supplies most of the 
utility’s power quality measuring equipment as per NRS 048:2 requirements.  
These instruments are three-phase voltage quality measurement tools.  They 
quantify quality of supply anomalies over short and long periods.  The 
instruments are capable of measuring all of the quality of supply anomalies as 
prescribed by the NER in the NRS 048:2. 
 
In this study, unreliable sections of the network are identified as per their 
performance, outage data and available statistics and the relevant 
instruments were installed to measure the power quality.  The data retrieved 
from these recorders was analysed and recommendations made to improve 
power system reliability.   
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Table 3.2 – Dip Categories (Adapted from NRS 048-2:2004) 
Dip Category Values of duration and depth 
Y Duration: >20 ms to 3 sec; Depth: 30%, 20%, 15% 
X1 Duration: >20 ms to 150 ms; Depth: 30% to 40% 
X2 Duration: >20 ms to 150 ms; Depth: 40% to 60% 
S Duration: >150 ms to 600 ms; Depth: 20% to 60% 
T Duration: >20 ms to 600 ms Depth: 60% to 100% 
Z1 Duration: >600 ms to 3 sec; Depth: 15% to 30% 
Z2 Duration: >600 ms to 3 sec; Depth: 30% to 100% 
 
3.2.4 Importance of Voltage Dips 
Prior to the introduction of the NRS 048 in 1996, there was no approved 
measuring yardstick for poor power quality in SA.  Customers install 
specialised equipment without being aware of the high number of voltage dips 
measured on the distribution networks.  So the question arises, are the 
number of voltage dips a real problem in SA? 
 
During fault conditions, high current is drawn from the supply and because 
current (I) is proportional to voltage (V) (V = IZ – Ohm’s law) this causes a 
minor drop in the voltage for the duration of high current being drawn as 
impedance (Z) stays constant.  If the fault is not cleared within a short time, as 
determined by protection settings, either a voltage dip or an interruption will 
result.  
 
3.2.5 Factors Influencing Voltage Dips 
The severity of a voltage dip will be determined by the location of the fault in 
the power system in relation to the customer equipment and its sensitivity.  
The frequency of the faults on a utility’s power system depends on the 
weather, maintenance and the age of the equipment.  Further, the protection 
equipment is a critical factor in the determination of voltage dips.  This implies 
that the speed of operation of the protection system will determine if the 
power quality event is a voltage dip or an interruption (Short, 2006). 
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The location of the fault is one factor which will affect voltage dips.  Urban 
substations have many shorter feeders connected to the busbars.  Urban 
power system equipment is mostly enclosed and not exposed to the weather.  
Rural power lines provide power in low-density.  This is done by transporting 
power over extra long overhead lines.  Therefore, many of the faults on the 
rural lines are too far away from the sub to pull down the voltage, while almost 
every fault in an urban substation will result in a voltage dip on the power 
system.  On lower voltage levels, fewer voltage dips occur compared to higher 
voltage levels (Short, 2006). 
 
3.2.6 Reducing Voltage Dips 
According to Short (2006), there are limited options to reducing voltage dips.  
From the utility’s point of view, if these options are available these are hardly 
ever done for the sole purpose of reducing voltage dips. 
 
According to Dugan et al (2003), design and fault clearing practice have a 
tremendous impact on voltage dips and outage frequency within a power 
system.  There are two basic options to reduce the impact of faults, that is, 
prevention of faults and modification of fault-clearing practices.  There are 
benefits to both the utility and the customer in terms of prevention of faults.  
The customer will be more satisfied and the utility will observe a reduction in 
the cost to repair damaged equipment caused by faults. 
 
A voltage dip compensator is amongst the most cost effective methods to 
solve voltage dip problems on sensitive loads.  One important issue to deal 
with is the inrush current which could trigger the overcurrent protection or 
expulsion fuse.  One way to overcome this is to use oversize transformers.  
Obviously this will have a cost implication, but the cost of the voltage dips 
must be compared to the capital investment in order to make an informed 
decision (Cheng et al, 2005). 
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3.2.6.1 Maintenance 
Ensuring that the trees along an overhead line are regularly trimmed is one of 
the most successful techniques.  Insulator washing is critical on the coast and 
in dusty regions.  Routine pole, line and insulator inspections will identify 
possible faulty equipment.  Overhead lines tensions should be inspected and 
re-tensioned to reduce clashing of conductors (Dugan et al, 2003). 
 
3.2.6.2 Birds and Animals 
In SA a minimum of 10 700 animal-related outages, lasting a total duration of 
25 630 hours, were reported on the national power system, affecting 
approximately 136 533 customers over a 16 year period (www.eskom.co.za).  
Birds caused approximately two thirds of these outages. 
 
Birds, especially raptors, are vulnerable to electrocution on certain types of 
structures.  The cause of these electrocutions have been studied in depth by 
several researchers and the broad consensus is that death is a result of the 
physical dimensions of the bird, coupled with the design of the particular 
electricity structure (R. Kruger, “Electrocution of Wildlife”, Eskom report, 
2000). 
. 
The design of certain electricity utility structures can result in bird 
electrocutions.  To understand the electrocution problem, the relationship 
between the body size of birds and the design of structures must be 
considered.  Electrocution of birds is directly related to power line design, and 
more specifically, to the spacing between elements that can result in phase-
to-phase or phase-to-ground contact.  The following are indications that bird 
electrocutions are a problem (Dugan et al, 2003): 
 
 Unexplained auto-reclosing occurring in clear weather conditions and no 
vegetation problem. 
 The presence of large birds in the area where the faults occur. 
 Absence or scarcity of alternative roosting and perching substrate like 
cliffs, trees and buildings. 
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 Agricultural activity, especially irrigation and fallow land. 
 Arid habitat with water reservoirs, coupled with pole transformers in close 
proximity. 
 The presence of bird carcasses lying directly under the pole. 
 
Squirrels, monkeys and baboons are the cause of many outages in SA.  
These outages usually occur in fair weather conditions.  Mo and Taylor (as 
cited in Short, 2006) say that many of these faults caused by animals are 
classified as “unknown.”  According to Short (2006), the following problem 
conditions can lead to animals causing outages: 
 
 Transformer bushings – faults across bushings cause outages and 
voltage dips.  Bushing guard protectors and insulated lead wires provide 
protection. 
 Arrestors – animal guards could protect faults across arrestors mounted 
on tanks. 
 Cutouts – sometimes installed where there is low clearance between 
phase conductor and grounded object. 
 
3.2.6.3 Fuses, Reclosing and Sectionalising 
If more fuses were installed to smaller sections of networks, fewer customers 
would be interrupted.  To reduce outages, it is important that utilities increase 
the number of fuses.  According to Dugan et al (2003) one way of dealing with 
momentary interruption (voltage dips) is to disable fast-tripping or fuse-saving 
features.  Fuse-blowing has the advantage of reduced customer complaints 
about poor power quality, but it also has the disadvantage in that affected 
customers will have to wait until the fuse is replaced.  This will increase the 
reliability indices. 
 
There are many schools of thought regarding fuse-saving and fuse-blowing 
techniques.  According to Dugan et al (2003) customers are more sensitive to 
voltage dips in urban areas than in the rural areas.  They argue that the 
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solution to power quality problems is to eliminate fuse-saving techniques to 
save operating costs and improve the reliability indices. 
 
Fuse-blowing techniques will probably not eliminate all the power quality 
problems faced by industrial customers.  They will reduce the momentary 
voltage dips, but faults on other sections of nearby power system will still have 
an effect on the industrial customer.  Dugan et al (2003) say that as a rule of 
thumb, fuse-blowing will eliminate one-third of the power quality problems of 
industrial customers. 
 
According to Short (2006), one reason for not using the fuse-saving technique 
is the difficulty in making it work.  Fuses generally blow before circuit breakers 
trip.  When the fault current is high and the fuse is installed near a substation, 
then the fuse will blow before the breaker trips. 
 
Fuse-blowing has the disadvantage of taking longer to clear the fault, which 
could result in damage to equipment (Short, 2006). 
 
The best choice in terms of fuse-saving or fuse-blowing depends on the 
application and the type of customers connected to the power network and 
the utility’s philosophy. 
      
Auto-reclosers are used in conjunction with sectionalisers and fuses.  
Normally, sectionalisers would be installed at major lateral lines with many 
customers.  Fuses would be used in minor lateral lines and transformers. 
 
3.2.6.4 Surge Arrestors  
Surge arrestors are usually used to protect power system equipment, but 
utilities are also using them to protect lines against faults, outages and voltage 
dips.  For these purposes, arrestors must be basically installed on each pole 
and on each phase, which could be a costly exercise (Short, 2006).  
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3.2.6.5 Co-ordination of Protection Equipment 
Improving co-ordination of protection equipment is critical for power system 
reliability and the reduction of voltage dips.  More protective devices that can 
assist with sectionalising, automating of operation, faster fault clearing time 
and reduction of outage time should be installed (Dugan et al, 2003).   
 
Some protection devices have been difficult to co-ordinate.  Misco-ordination 
of reclosers, sectionalisers and fuses cause longer outage time and more 
power quality problems for customers.  Electronic reclosers and digital relays 
should be used for easier co-ordination (Short, 2006).      
 
3.3 HARMONICS 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Harmonics are not a new phenomenon on power systems.  Between the 
1930’s and 1940’s there were concerns about harmonics.  The primary 
sources of harmonic problems then were transformers and the interference of 
telecommunication wiring.  If a power system is capable of handling the load 
demand, the possibility of harmonic problems will be negligible but could 
cause telecommunication problems.  The increase in the use of electrical 
equipment that produces harmonics has posed significant problems for 
electrical networks and in power quality.  The problems arise only when the 
capacitance of the system results in resonance at a critical frequency that 
causes abnormal distortion.  This is more likely to happen in industrial power 
systems (Dugan et al, 2003).   
 
Deviations from a perfect sinusoidal waveform are termed a harmonic 
distortion (Burke, 1994).  Harmonics are sinusoidal voltages or currents, the 
frequency of which are a multiple of the fundamental frequency (50 Hz) of the 
power system.  Because electrical devices that act as non-linear loads draw 
current in a non-linear way, they are responsible for injecting harmonic 
currents into the electricity network.  Some problems caused by harmonics 
include cable/conductor failure and the overheating of transformer windings. 
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The impact of harmonics on electrical equipment, especially on sensitive 
electronic equipment, has only become apparent recently.  Interference in 
telecommunication is only one of the undesirable side effects that harmonics 
cause when present in an electricity network.  There is clearly a need to 
investigate the effect of harmonics on electrical power systems. 
 
3.3.2 Cause of Harmonics 
Harmonics are not usually generated by the utility’s power system, but rather 
by loads connected to the power system.  Burke (1994) states that the 
following loads are common sources of harmonics: 
 
 Static power converters; 
 Overexcited transformers; 
 Fluorescent lights, and 
 Solid state devices namely, computers, dimmers, variable speed drives 
 
Harmonics can also arise in the generation of electricity, and in the 
transmission and distribution power systems.  If a generator produces a non-
ideal sinusoidal waveform, the voltage waveform will contain a certain amount 
of harmonics.  In the distribution system, transformers are capable of 
producing harmonics due to magnetic core saturation.  This is more prevalent 
when transformers are lightly loaded.  The greatest production of harmonics is 
via harmonic current generation from non-linear loads. Non-linear loads are 
those in which the load does not draw a sinusoidal current.  With the 
introduction of power electronic devices, there are now many devices that act 
in this manner.  With the introduction of power electronic devices in rectifiers, 
motor drives and power supplies, the increasing level of harmonics has 
become quite a concern (Arrilaga, Bradley and Bodger, 1985).  
 
Research has shown that non-linear loads inject harmonic currents into the 
power system.  These harmonic-producing loads can be treated as current 
sources.  However, the harmonic currents that pass through the power 
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system cause a voltage drop for each harmonic.  This results in voltage 
distortion at the load bus as well as current distortion (Alexander and 
Thompson, 2007).  The power quality instruments are capable of producing 
harmonic data and waveforms.  This research study used power quality 
instruments to retrieve harmonic data.  This will be analyzed and compared to 
the benchmark.  If it is found that the harmonics pose a problem to the power 
network, further investigations will be done in terms of identifying the possible 
causes.   
 
3.3.3 Location of Harmonics 
The common route for harmonic currents to flow is from the harmonic 
producing load into the power system as illustrated in Figure 3.4.  Generally, 
the impedance of the power system is lower than that of the load, thus the 
bulk of the current will flow into the power system.     
 
 
Figure 3.4 – General flow of harmonic currents in a radial power system (Adapted from Dugan et al, 
2003) 
 
Where evidence of harmonics are detected, suitable power quality monitoring 
equipment could be fitted to measure the harmonics to the source (Dugan et 
al, 2003). 
 
3.3.4 Effects of Harmonics 
The most notable effect that harmonics have on a power system is on their 
impact on the quality of the AC voltage waveform as it will become distorted.  
This causes problems with other sensitive loads connected to the same 
supply (Mohan, Undeland and Robbins, 1986).   
 32
 
Generally, harmonic problems surface at capacitor banks.  The capacitor 
bank will experience excessively high distortions during resonance, which will 
result in a high flow of current into the capacitor.  Figure 3.5 depicts the 
current waveform of a capacitor bank in resonance (Dugan et al, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Typical capacitor current from a system in 11th harmonic resonance (Adapted from Dugan 
et al, 2003) 
 
In transformers, harmonic currents cause the RMS current to be greater than 
their capacity, leading to increased conductor power loss and heating.  In 
motors, decreased efficiency, excessive heating and vibration are symptoms 
of harmonic voltage distortion. The tripping of protective relays, telephone 
interference and false meter readings are other consequences of harmonics 
in power systems (Dugan et al, 2003)  
 
3.3.5 Reduction of Harmonics 
According to Lakervi and Holmes, (2003), harmonics can be reduced by 
installing harmonic filters into the MV or LV circuits.  It is more economical to 
install these filters on the MV bars, but since harmonics are generally 
produced from the LV loads, it is probably the best solution to install filter onto 
the LV bars.   
 
Power factor correction capacitors can alter the flow of harmonic currents.  By 
installing a capacitor as per Figure 3.6, a large amount of current would be 
diverted to the capacitor circuit (Dugan et al, 2003). 
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Figure 3.6 – Capacitor can alter the direction of flow (Adapted from Dugan et al, 2003) 
 
Harmonics are not a major power quality concern in the NMBM, but they 
contribute to the power quality problems of the NMBM.  
 
3.4 FLICKERING 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Flickering is not a new phenomenon.  It has gained more attention as power 
users became more aware of power quality.  Power Engineers dealt with 
flickering in 1880 when AC was considered above DC.  The low frequency AC 
voltage caused flickering.  To overcome this problem a higher frequency of 60 
Hz was introduced.  Other synonyms for flickering are voltage fluctuations, 
voltage flickering, light flickering and lamp flickering et cetera (Dugan et al, 
2003). 
 
Dugan et al (2003) state that flickering can be divided into two types, namely, 
cyclic and non-cyclic.  Cyclic is the result of periodic fluctuations and non-
cyclic is the result of occasional fluctuations.  An example of cyclic flicker is 
shown in Figure 3.7.  Flicker is generally identified as a percentage of the 
normal operating voltage.  Percentage voltage modulation is expressed as 
follows: 
 
Percentage voltage modulation = 100%
Vo
Vmin- Vmax       (3.10) 
where, 
Vmax  = Maximum value of modulated signal 
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Vmin  = Minimum value of modulated signal 
Vo  = Average value of normal operating voltage 
 
 
Figure 3.7 – Flicker waveform (Adapted from Dugan et al, 2003) 
 
3.4.2 Causes of Flickering 
Flickering is caused by fast changing loads which impact on the customer’s 
voltage.  Although flickering does not cause any harm to or disruption 
equipment, it irritates users.  Sawmills, irrigation pumps, arc welders, spot 
welders, elevators, laser printer et cetera are all mechanisms in which current 
can change rapidly (Short, 2006). 
 
According to Short (2006), the flicker tendency of different lights differ 
extensively: 
 
 Small incandescent lamps – lamps with small filaments cool fast, 
therefore the light output changes more for a given fluctuation. 
 Dimmers – electronic dimmers significantly increase voltage flicker. 
 Fluorescent lamps – electronic and magnetic ballasted fluorescent lamps 
normally flicker. 
 
Flickering affects mostly lighting, but can also cause television and computer 
monitors to waiver.  Flickering is a human perception and some people are 
more sensitive to it than others.  Flickering is also more visible in low-light 
settings.   
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3.4.3 Eliminating Flickering 
Varying load conditions are responsible for flickering.  One method of 
overcoming flickering is to increase the capacity of the power system.  This 
means a major financial injection, which is not always viable.  Upgrading 
could include reconductoring, replacing of transformers with higher kVA 
ratings and increase the operating voltage (Dugan et al, 2003). 
 
Generally, capacitors are installed in series with the power lines supplying the 
load.  The capacitor in series with an inductor cancels the inductance 
represented in Figure 3.8, resulting in less inductance, therefore less volt 
drops and fewer fluctuations (Short, 2006). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 – Series capacitor (Adapted from Short, 2006) 
 
The advantage of capacitors is that the reaction time for correction to load 
fluctuations is instant.  The disadvantage is that those customers upstream 
from the capacitor do not benefit from the elimination of flickering (Dugan et 
al, 2003). 
 
SVC’s have many roles to play in power systems.  One role is to reduce 
flickering.  The SVC changes its reactance by injecting or absorbing reactive 
power.  This equipment is used in arc furnaces on distribution lines.  The cost 
of SVC’s is high, but sometimes it is the only cost-effective solution for the 
flickering problem (Dugan et al, 2003; Short 2006). 
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Dedicated circuits running to customers affected by flickering could be a 
solution, depending on the cost and the viability.  This will isolate the affected 
customer from the flicker producing load. 
 
Series reactors could be installed to reduce flickering.  This assists in 
stabilising the arc, thus reducing the current during the beginning of the 
melting process.  By using series reactors, the additional reactance reduces 
the current fluctuations. 
 
Step starting of motors is another method of reducing flickering.  This will 
significantly reduce the starting current during start-up. 
 
3.5 VOLTAGE SWELLS 
 
Swells are linked to power system faults, but they are not as common as dips.  
A swell is identified by the RMS voltage magnitude and duration of the power 
quality event.  The impedance, earthing and the magnitude of the fault defines 
the severity of a swell.   
 
On un-earthed power systems with zero-sequence impedance, the phase to 
earth voltage will be 1,73 pu during fault conditions.  Closer to the substation 
on un-earthed power systems, there will be no voltage rise on the unfaulted 
phases.  The reason for this is that a transformer is normally connected in 
delta-wye, thus providing a low-impedance zero-sequence path for the fault 
current.  Faults at different locations on a multi-earthed four-wired power 
system will react differently to voltage swells.  This all depends on the 
distance of the fault.  A 15% swell as per Figure 3.9 is typical (Dugan et al, 
2003).  
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Figure 3.9 – Instantaneous voltage swell caused by fault (Adapted from Dugan et al, 2003)   
 
Voltage increase on the unfaulted phases in a 4-wire multi-earthed power 
system can rise by approximately 30%, and on a 3-wire system by 
approximately 70%.  The duration depends on the protection equipment 
responsible for clearing the fault (Dugan et al, 2003). 
 
3.6 REGULATION  
 
The cause of voltage regulation is that the impedance is too high to properly 
supply the load.  This means that the power system is too weak for the load 
and the voltage drops too low under such load conditions (Dugan et al (2003). 
 
3.6.1 Eliminating Voltage Regulation 
Dugan et al (2003), list options to reduce voltage regulation: 
 
 The addition of shunt capacitors to reduce the current and shift it to 
become more in phase with the voltage. 
 The addition of voltage regulators to boost the voltage. 
 The reconductoring to larger size overhead lines to reduce the 
impedance. 
 The changing of transformers to larger sizes to reduce the impedance. 
 The addition of reactive var compensators. 
 The addition of series capacitors to cancel inductive impedance. 
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The NMBM power network will be analyzed in term of the NRS 048 standards.  
If it is found that voltage regulation poses a problem for the power network 
and the customer, power quality instruments should be installed.  The data 
will be analysed and compared to the benchmark and standards based.  Once 
the problem is established, recommendations will be made based on the 
principles described above.  
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CHAPTER 4 
LITERATURE REVIEW: POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Protection and reliability improvement are significant problems in power 
systems.  Protective devices are used to deal with fuse, recloser, circuit 
breaker, relay and lighting protection device faults.   
 
The operation settings of protective devices require accurate parameters 
appropriate to the characteristic and configuration of power networks.  An 
essential part of the design of a power network is calculation of the currents 
when faults of various types occur.  The magnitude of the fault current gives 
the engineer the current settings for the protection to be used and the ratings 
of the fuses, reclosers, and circuit breakers (Anderson, 1999). 
 
According to Power System Protection: Volume 1 (1990), the purpose of 
protection is not as its name describes: that it prevents something from 
happening.  Protection only takes action after a fault has occurred.  It is the 
ambulance at the foot of the cliff, rather than the fence at the top.  Exceptions 
are Buchholtz relay gas operated devices and surge arresters. 
 
The basic purpose of power system protection is to detect abnormal operating 
or system fault conditions and to prevent any damage to the plant connected 
to a power system.  The basic function of a power system is to ensure that 
sufficient electrical energy is available to all its customers without interruption.  
To safeguard this continuity of supply, the protection system must initiate the 
isolation of faulted sections of the power system as fast and selectively as 
possible (Hewitson et al, 2007; Bollen, 2000). 
 
The demand for power capacity requirements to accommodate industrial and 
domestic growth has resulted in the increase of possible interruptions.  
Interruptions could cause voltage surges and increase the magnitude of the 
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current flowing from the healthy to the faulty components or between any 
faulty equipment and earth.  Most faults on power systems could be controlled 
to limit damage to equipment and improve reliability (Anderson, 1999). 
 
The protection equipment used for protecting 22kV power networks in NMBM 
within this study are differential, over current, earth fault on cable and 
overhead lines, sensitive earth fault, type K fuses, auto-reclosers and 
sectionalisers on overhead lines.  Power system protection equipment could 
increase the reliability of power systems. 
  
4.2 FACTORS AFFECTING THE SEVERITY OF A FAULT 
 
According to Power System Protection: Volume 1 (1990), the factors affecting 
the severity of a fault on a power system can be assessed in terms of the 
damage the fault could cause, the magnitude of the fault current and the 
duration of the fault.  The factors responsible for the severity of faults are as 
follows: 
 
4.2.1 Source Conditions 
These relate to the amount of all connected generation including all other 
power sources such as interconnections with other systems (Power System 
Protection: Volume 1, 1990). 
 
4.2.2 Power System Configuration  
This is determined by the plant, namely, generators, transformers, overhead 
lines, cables and normally open points et cetera.  System configurations might 
change during the fault, resulting in changes in the magnitude and distribution 
of the fault current.  This could result in typical sequential tripping of the circuit 
breakers at the two ends of the faulted transmission line and the clearance of 
multiple fault conditions (Power System Protection: Volume 1, 1990). 
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4.2.3 Nature and Type of fault  
The type of fault and its location within a power system may have a 
considerable effect on the magnitude and distribution of the system fault 
current.  The effects of a fault may be significantly altered by the simultaneous 
presence of other fault conditions.  Another factor to take into consideration is 
the fault impedance.  Three-phase short-circuits are regarded as the most 
severe fault conditions in terms of fault severity, and it is thus the maximum 
possible fault level value which could be used to determine the short-circuit 
current rating of the power system switchgear.  An important factor is the 
maximum value of the single-phase to earth fault current, which, in a solidly 
earthed system, may exceed the maximum three-phase fault current (Power 
System Protection: Volume 1, 1990). 
 
The factors affecting the severity of power system faults cannot be ignored.  
These factors and the understanding of the types of power system faults can 
assist utilities in their attempt to identify power system faults, apply corrective 
measures and hence increase power system reliability. 
 
4.3 CURRENT TRANSFORMERS 
 
Current transformers (CT) are regarded as the most important components of 
a protection system.  The current transformer is responsible for stepping down 
the primary current and isolating the main system from the auxiliary system.  
Current transformers for protection purposes may have small errors or 
operational problems during fault conditions.  During normal conditions, when 
the relay is not required to operate, the accuracy is insignificant (Howritz, 
Phadke, 2008). 
 
Two types of current transformers are available, namely, protective current 
transformers for the use of overcurrent protection and class X transformers for 
the use of differential protection.  Both these current transformers must 
sustain high fault currents.  It is therefore imperative that these transformers 
stay accurate during fault conditions. The accuracy classes of current 
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transformers are 5P and 10P and the standard secondary current ratings are 
1A and 5A (Walker, 2007).  Table 4.1 depicts the maximum error for the 
different classes. 
 
Table 4.1 – Maximum errors for different classes of current transformers (adapted from Walker, 2007) 
 
Class % current error at 
rated primary 
current 
Phase error at 
rated current in 
minutes 
% composite error 
at rated primary 
ALC 
5P ± 1 ± 60 5 
10P ± 3  10 
 
 
Another important specification of a current transformer is the accuracy limit 
factor (ALF), which denotes the maximum current a transformer is to 
withstand to remain accurate (Walker, 2007).  The larger the ALF, the less 
likely the CT is to become saturated.  IEC typical ALF values are 5, 10, 15, 20 
and 30.  Two requirements for a protective CT are that it must have an ALF 
and accuracy class suitable for the application (Prévé, 2006).  Prévé (2006) 
adds that for overcurrent applications a class 10P CT is suitable and for 
differential protection a class 5P is suitable.  Differential protection is fast and 
it requires a CT with a lesser margin of inaccuracy. 
 
The magnetisation curve is a method of determining the accuracy and 
performance of a current transformer.  The method of performing this test is to 
apply an input voltage on the secondary of the current transformer, leaving 
the primary winding open-circuit and increase the voltage on intervals, starting 
from zero.  The resultant current is plotted on a curve against the voltage.  
From the magnetisation curve in Figure 4.1, the saturation region of the 
current transformer can be determined.  This is termed the knee point voltage 
at which a 10% increase in voltage at the secondary will result in a 50% 
increase in excitation current (Hewitson et al, 2007). 
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Figure 4.1 – Typical CT Magnetisation Curve (adapted from Hewitson et al, 2007)  
 
Preventative routine maintenance is very important to ensure that the CT is 
still in a condition that ensures reliability of the power system.  Very often the 
protection system is blamed for outages of unknown cause.  The 
magnetization curve, insulation resistance, saturation and primary injection 
tests are performed to ensure that the CT is in a good condition.  This will be 
applied in the case studies to ensure proper performance of the CT and 
decrease the possibility of unnecessary power outages. 
 
According to Walker (2007), certain factors have to be considered when 
selecting the primary current of a CT.  One method is to determine if the CT is 
still suitable for the application.  The following should be considered: 
 
 The full-load current of the load; 
 The full-load current of the transformer if the power system is supplied by 
a transformer; 
 The maximum fault current calculated; 
 The application of the CT; 
 The primary current should be twice the load current, and 
 The CT must not overload under full-load current conditions. 
 
4.4 FUSES 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Fuses are the oldest and simplest protection methods acting as both 
protective and disconnecting devices.  Fuses are installed in series with the 
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apparatus they protect.  Fuses function through the melting of a fusible 
element fitted in response to the current flowing through it.  A fuse is strictly a 
one-shot protective device, as the fusible element disintegrates on operation.  
The melting time of a fuse is inversely proportional to the current flowing 
through it (Horowitz, Phadke, 2008). 
 
Fuses must allow maximum load current without operating.  Fault current 
through a fuse is limited before the current reaches its maximum value.  In 
selecting a fuse, it is important to provide protection against faults rather than 
to protect the equipment against overload.  Using different time/current 
characteristics, discrimination with other fuses and protective devices can be 
achieved.  The characteristics of a fuse would vary from manufacturer to 
manufacturer (Lakervi, Holmes, 2003). 
 
4.4.2 Application 
According to Hewitson et al (2007), fuses can be used for overload and short-
circuit protection.  In short-circuit protection fuses can be used where: 
 
 The load does not fluctuate much during switching and operating 
conditions.  Resistive loads would demonstrate such characteristics, 
hence fuses for overload and short-circuit protection could be used; 
 The load fluctuates to a great extent compared to the normal rating, for 
example, direct-on-line starters, cranes, rolling mills, welders et cetera.  
In these instances, fuses could be utilised to provide short-circuit 
protection as it would be impossible to determine a fuse for both 
overload and inrush conditions. 
 
Power fuses are more economical, thus these are used instead of oil circuit 
breakers.  Many factors influence the use of fuses, namely, the frequency of 
operation, the speed at which the supply must be restored and the return on 
the investment.  Fuse links are manufactured in two types, namely K and T.  
The difference between the two is the melting time which is measured in 
terms of the speed ratio, which is equal to the melting current at 0.1 s divided 
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by the melting current at 300 or 600 s (Anderson, 1999).  In the case of the 
NMBM, type K drop-out fuse links are normally used.  The type K drop-out 
fuse links are installed at the beginning of lateral lines and sometimes 
between bundle conductors and bare conductors. 
 
4.4.2.1 Protection of Transformers 
Transformers with a capacity rating less than 2500 kVA are normally 
protected by means of fuses (Horowitz, Phadke, 2008).  Step down 
transformers in distribution and industrial sites use fuses to protect both the 
primary and secondary sides of the transformer.  High voltage fuses are 
installed on both the primary and secondary side of 33/11kV transformers 
rated up to 5 MVA (Wright, Christopoulos, 1993).  The standard purpose of a 
fuse on the low voltage side of a transformer is to protect the load connected 
to the secondary windings.  The fuse to be selected in this case must match 
the load and the cabling.  Fuses on the primary side must protect the 
transformer against faults and must be done without causing loss of supply to 
the healthy parts of the network. 
 
According to Wright and Newbery (2004), the following factors are to be 
considered when selecting fuses: 
 
 It is common practice that transformers are deliberately operated above 
their ratings for predetermined periods, often for several hours.  This is 
done due to their relatively long thermal time constant.  To allow for this 
practice, fuses capable of carrying maximum currents must be selected. 
 Transformers draw high transient currents when they are energised.  The 
magnetic core of the transformer may go into saturation over time.  This 
is accompanied by the magnetising inrush current, which forms a wave 
shape as in Figure 4.2.  These surge currents may reach values many 
times the rated current of the transformer even though the normal 
exciting current may only be 2-3% of the rated current.  The actual value 
is determined by the transformer design, maximum system voltage and 
the fault current available.  In practice, the inrush current tends to 
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decrease as the kVA rating increases.  On the other hand, the time 
duration of the inrush current increases as the kVA rating increases.  It 
can therefore be safely assumed that the inrush current of a transformer 
is 10 to 12 times the rated full-load current for a duration of 100 ms.  
 
Figure 4.2 – Magnetising current of transformer (Adapted from Wright and Newbery, 2004) 
 
 To ensure that faults in a transformer are cleared fast, the current 
needed in the 10 s region should be as low as possible. 
 The minimum fusing current of the primary circuit should be as low as 
possible to ensure that many internal faults are cleared.  It must be 
accepted that in some instances interturn faults may cause primary 
currents less than full-load value to flow and will not cause the fuse to 
operate. 
 Correct discrimination between the fuse and other protective devices on 
the network, including the fuse on the secondary windings, should be 
achieved under all conditions. 
 In instances where transformers are supplied by overhead lines it is likely 
that they will be exposed to lightning, resulting in high overvoltages.  The 
fuse on the primary side should ideally withstand the high currents, but 
this normally requires highly rated fuses which cannot provide adequate 
protection for other conditions.  A compromise must be reached and 
some degree of risk must be accepted in these cases.  
 
It is critical that care must be exercised when selecting fuses associated with 
transformers.  The characteristics of a high voltage fuse will differ from a low 
voltage fuse.  Generally, the high voltage fuse will operate at higher current 
levels than that of a low voltage fuse with similar time changes.  Figure 4.3 
 47
below show the different time/current characteristics to be observed when 
selecting and grading fuses (Wright and Newbery, 2004). 
 
Figure 4.3 – Time-Current (TC) Characteristics of transformer (Adapted from Wright and Newbery, 
2004) 
Where:  a  - Full-load current of transformer 
  b - Permissible overload current of transformer 
  c - Magnetising inrush equivalent current 
  d - HV fuse characteristic 
  e - LV fuse characteristic (referred to HV side) 
  f - Characteristic of source circuit breaker relay 
  g - maximum current on HV side with fault on LV side 
 
According to Brown (2002), power transformers with an MVA rating less than 
100 MVA should never exceed 200% of their nameplate rating.  Transformer 
temperatures do not increase instantaneously when subjected to overloads.  
This allows transformers to be overloaded for short durations, provided that 
the temperature remains below the normal rating. 
 
4.5 AUTO-RECLOSERS 
 
Eighty percent of faults in rural power systems are transient and would cause 
no permanent harm to a plant.  Normally, fuses would be used to clear these 
faults, but an interruption of the supply could be long and would 
inconvenience customers.  One method to reduce the outage time and the 
operational cost is to have the supply restored automatically.  Auto-reclosers 
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are the answer to these problems and consequently this equipment is being 
installed more extensively (Dugan et al, 2003). 
 
For successful operation of the device, the speed of operation of the circuit 
breaker is critical.  If the opening of the circuit breaker is delayed for more 
than a few cycles, the heat generated by the fault current may cause more 
serious damage to the equipment and could create a persistent fault (Short, 
2006). 
 
The time interval between tripping and reclosing is called “dead time”.  It may 
vary depending on the characteristics of the circuit breaker, the nature of the 
fault and the load it is supplying.  “Dead time” must always be sufficient to de-
ionise the fault path and to stabilise the circuit breaker.  In certain practices, 
times between 0.4 and 120 s are used, but comments from field staff suggest 
times between 10 and 15 s (Brown, 2002). 
 
Another important characteristic of a recloser is the resetting or reclaim time.  
The resetting times become significant when repetitive faults occur, namely, 
lightning and conductors clashing.  If the resetting time is in excess of the 
intervals between the incidences of successive faults, it may cause 
unnecessary lockouts and outage time.  In practice, a good reset time is 
approximately 5 s (Power System Protection: Volume 3, 1995). 
 
Auto-reclosers are very popular on overhead line transmission and distribution 
power systems.  The devices have time-current characteristics that simplify 
the co-ordination with other equipment, namely, fuses, relays, sectionalisers 
et cetera.  This could be further simplified if all the equipment which has to be 
co-ordinated is from the same manufacturer.  However, this is not always the 
case in practice, thus making co-ordination more difficult.  Co-ordination of 
reclosers is a constructive feature as it allows for flexibility in selection of time-
current characteristic curves from memory.  This includes instantaneous 
tripping and fast tripping.  There are many TC characteristics that are used in 
the field, but Figure 4.4 depicts a typical TC characteristic employed in the 
NMBM power system.  These reclosers are programmed for one 
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instantaneous trip (Curve A) and two delayed operations (Curves B and C) 
(Anderson, 1999). 
 
In some instances, reclosers are designed and developed by arranging the 
source circuit breaker to carry out various tripping and closing by employing 
appropriate relaying.  Sometimes it is not possible to install reclosers at the 
source because the initial section of the circuit is cable.  In these instances, 
the recloser should be installed at the first pole supplying the overhead line 
(Lakervi, Holmes, 2003). 
 
Reclosers are normally designed for fuse-saving technology, therefore a fast 
tripping TC characteristic must be used.  Reclosers are the fastest fault 
interrupters on power systems.  They are valuable in limiting dip durations.  If 
fast tripping is deactivated, the downstream fuse will clear the fault.  In 
instances where lightning is prevalent, four shot reclosers could be utilised 
(Dugan et al, 2003). 
 
Figure 4.4 – TC Characteristics of a Recloser 
 
Policy in terms of the operation of reclosers is not clear.  This creates 
tremendous problems.  From a control and fault analysis point of view, policy 
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is critically needed with respect to operation of reclosers, TC characteristics, 
number of shots and discrimination of other protection equipment.  Co-
ordination of reclosers with other power system protection equipment is 
necessary.   
 
4.6 SECTIONALISERS 
 
Sectionalising is one method of isolating faulty sections on overhead power 
lines.  It could be used instead of fuses or in conjunction with fuses and 
reclosers.  These devices are pole-mounted, but not limited to oil immersed 
disconnecting devices.  A sectionaliser is not capable of breaking fault 
current, but it may be closed onto a fault and used to provide suitable 
protection for lateral lines.  Normally, the lateral lines are not automatically 
monitored through SCADA in the control centre, which may have the 
consequence of extended outage time.  But, if the recloser is monitored 
through SCADA in the control centre, it will be easier to identify the operation 
of the sectionaliser as the number of openings of the reclosers will be 
displayed on the event list (Lakervi and Holmes, 2003).   
 
For power system reliability, outage time and operation of protection 
equipment is a priority, thus the operation of sectionalisers in conjunction with 
reclosers needs to be investigated.  Sectionalisers in the NMBM power 
system are normally installed on lateral lines with reclosers upstream.  The 
possibility of sectionalisers on lateral lines with downstream fuses and 
upstream reclosers thus also needs investigation. 
 
4.7 OVERCURRENT PROTECTION (OC) 
 
Overhead lines are protected by overcurrent, distance or pilot wire protection, 
depending on each individual application or the profile of the overhead line.  
Overcurrent protection is probably the simplest and cheapest, but it is the 
most complicated to apply and requires more setting and replacement as a 
power system change.  It is used for phase and earth fault protection, and for 
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back-up protection on most transmission lines where pilot wire protection is 
used as main protection.  Overcurrent protection should not be confused with 
overload protection.  In practice a compromise is made to cover both 
objectives.  Overcurrent protection is related to the correct and fast clearance 
of faults, while overload protection is related to the thermal capabilities of the 
plant or circuit it is protecting (Anderson, 1999). 
 
Many industries moved to the rural areas which are mainly supplied by 
overhead lines.  The overhead lines are protected with overcurrent and earth 
fault protection.  According to Apostolov (2005) many power quality problems 
can be solved by using advanced protection schemes, particular when a utility 
supply electricity to a manufacturing plant, namely, selective back-up tripping 
and fuse-saving technology.  This means that the infrastructure investment 
will be increased.  
  
Overcurrent protection is well suited for transmission and distribution power 
systems.  Often it is not a requirement that the relays need to be directional, 
so no AC voltage source is required.  Also, two phase relays and one earth 
fault relay as one unit are permissible.  The greatest advantage of overcurrent 
protection is the inverse-time characteristic because the fault current 
magnitude depends mostly on the fault’s location.  Overcurrent relays with 
extremely inverse curves provide the best selectivity with fuses and reclosers.  
However, if earth fault current magnitude is severely limited by neutral earth 
impedance, there is little or no advantage to be gained from the inverse 
characteristic of an earth fault relay (Mason, n.d).  The NMBM use mainly 
inverse-time characteristic curves.  The difficulties to achieve best co-
ordination with fuses form a very important aspect of power system reliability. 
  
Overhead lines are exposed to phase-to-phase and phase-to-earth faults.  
These faults form the basis of damage to other equipment connected to the 
overhead line.  In considering overhead line protection it is imperative to take 
cognisance of the fault current likely to be generated, the impact of the 
connected load, the system configurations and directionality.  The overcurrent 
protection must also be compatible with the protection of the adjacent and 
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other connected elements of the power system.  In order to apply this properly 
one has carefully apply the settings, operating times and characteristics.  It is 
also important to note that in a radial system the fault current is flowing in one 
direction, but in a parallel and an interconnected system the fault current can 
flow from any direction.  It is therefore important that the relay must be able to 
distinguish between the directions (Howoritz, Phadke, 2008). 
 
In terms of TC settings, the general practice is a 0.4 to 0.5 s tolerance 
between relays.  For electronic relays the tolerance is reduced to 0.3 s.  By 
adjusting the current sensitivity of the relay, it can operate at the same time on 
a reduced current (from 100% to 50%).  By adjusting the time setting, the 
operating time of the relay can be varied.  The option of the relay to vary the 
TC settings makes it suitable to co-ordinate with other protection equipment 
(Lakervi, Holmes, 2003). 
 
4.8 EARTH FAULT PROTECTION (EF) 
 
Protection schemes ensure that no fault remains uncleared.  Back-up earth 
fault protection is provided by an IDMT relay, which is set at a longer 
operating time in order to achieve proper co-ordination.  It is also common 
practice to provide HV and LV earth fault protection on transformers (Power 
System Protection: Volume 2, 1995). 
 
Earth fault protection is normally used on the NMBM power network, 
combined with overcurrent protection in an IDMT relay.  Most of the HV 
transmission lines are earthed systems, either solidly or through a resistor or 
a reactor.  According to Anderson (1999), 90% of all transmission faults are 
earth faults and in practice earth faults dominate trips on overhead line power 
systems.  It is also evident that phase-to-phase faults occur, but the earth fault 
relay detects the fault before the phase-to-phase relay.        
 
In multiple earth power systems, any fault between a phase and earth will be 
supplied by a zero-sequence current originating in the earthed neutral of the 
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transformer.  Current flowing to earth has a zero-sequence component and a 
zero-sequence voltage will be measured.  Earth fault relays will detect zero-
sequence currents and voltages as abnormal conditions and will be triggered 
to operate.  Under normal operating conditions, no zero-sequence currents 
should flow apart from those flowing due to imbalances.  It can be safely 
assumed that under normal conditions no zero-sequence currents are 
present.  Polarisation is achieved in the same way as in overcurrent protection 
(Anderson, 1999). 
 
The standard in the NMBM power system in terms of earth fault plug setting is 
20% and the TMS at 0.1 (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV 
Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
4.9 SENSITIVE EARTH FAULT PROTECTION (SEF) 
 
In instances where the ground is of such a nature that it is difficult to make an 
effective earth connection, it sometimes happens that the fault to earth may 
result in a current which is too small to operate the earth fault relay.  This is 
aggravated when continuous earth conductors are not used or cut away.  It 
also happens that phase conductors may fall on trees, hedges, dry ground or 
on road surfaces, so the fault current might be too low to trigger the earth fault 
protection.  This poses a serious danger if the supply is not isolated.  It is not 
possible to lower the settings of a normal earth fault relay to cater for this 
danger as the setting has to be reduced by a factor of 10 or more.  It is also 
difficult to use a current transformer to provide effective settings for this 
purpose.  For this reason a special sensitive earth fault relay is used, based 
on the very sensitive elements of the power network.  This relay is based on a 
definite-time principle and, although it is suitable to grade with other protection 
devices, it is usually graded as an independent system (Power System 
Protection: Volume 2, 1995). 
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The SEF must detect low-level earth faults.  The SEF setting will therefore be 
the greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating and the TM = 10 s  (PEE 
Code of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
4.10 FAULT LEVEL 
 
Fault level is an important parameter of any power system.  Protective 
devices for power systems such as circuit breakers, protective relays and 
fuses provide adequate protection and isolate faulty equipment only if they 
operate within their design short-circuit circuit current values.  It is therefore 
important to recognise the maximum fault current in determining the 
interrupting rating of the devices (Anderson, 1999). 
 
In power networks the maximum fault level occurs at the busbars of the 
source substation.  The fault level is defined as the product of the magnitude 
of the pre-fault voltage at a busbar and the post-fault current, which would 
flow if that busbar is short-circuited.  The fault level or short-circuit capacity is 
a measure of interconnections at any point in the power system.  In the event 
of a short-circuit occurring at a busbar in an interconnected system, the pre-
fault voltage of the busbar is near to the nominal value 1 p.u. and as soon as 
the fault takes place, the voltage of the busbar reduces to almost zero.  The 
voltage of the other busbars will dip during the fault.  The reduction in voltage 
of the various busbars depends on the strength of the network.  The strength 
of a busbar is directly related to the short-circuit level, thus the higher the 
short-circuit level of the busbar, the more it is able to maintain its voltage in 
case of a fault on any other busbar (Prévé, 2006). 
 
The strength of a system indicates the severity of short-circuit stresses.  
Strength is revealed by a quantity known as short-circuit capacity or fault level 
of the busbar in question.  The strength of a busbar refers to the ability of the 
busbar to maintain its voltage when a fault occurs at another busbar.  Also 
revealed is that the higher the short-circuit capacity, the lower the equivalent 
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impedance between the faulted busbar and the zero potential busbar of the 
system (Hewitson et al, 2007). 
 
The fault level is actually the short-circuit MVA that will flow into a fault.  It is 
important to know how to calculate the fault level or short-circuit MVA so that 
equipment can be chosen to withstand and isolate these faults without 
causing major damage.  According to Hewitson et al (2007) the fault level of a 
power system can be calculated by using the following formula: 
 
X%
100
I
sI
(P)MVA  Rated
MVA circuit-Short         
 
Hence, 
 
Short-circuit MVA = 
X%
100P  
 
sI  =  r.m.s.  short-circuit current 
I  = Normal full load current 
P  = Transformer rated power (rated MVA) 
pX  = Reactance per phase 
pE  = System voltage per phase 
And, 
S = FL VI3                (4.1) 
Hewitson et al (2007) state that this formula is based on a few assumptions: 
 
 That the fault occurs very close to the busbar, source or circuit breaker; 
 Arc resistance is ignored; 
 Cable impedance between the transformer secondary and switchgear is 
ignored, and 
 The impact of source impedance is ignored. 
 
Hewitson et al (2007) conclude by stating that if this method is employed, the 
results would be correct within 5%. 
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4.11 FAULT CALCULATIONS 
 
A power system is usually regarded as a balanced symmetrical three-phase 
network.  During fault conditions, the symmetry is disturbed.  The result is 
unbalanced currents and voltages.  The only exception is the three-phase 
fault, which includes all three phases and is described as a symmetrical fault.  
By using symmetrical component analysis and replacing the normal system 
sources with a source at the fault location, it is possible to analyse fault 
conditions.  It is therefore important to know the fault current distribution 
throughout the system and the voltages in different parts of the system.  
According to Lakervi and Holmes, (2003), the information generally required 
for a fault is the following: 
 
 Maximum fault current 
 Minimum fault current 
 Maximum through fault current 
 
The general procedure to analyse three-phase balanced faults is as follows: 
 
 Convert all impedances to common base values; 
 Represent the power system by an equivalent single-phase diagram; 
 Reduce the equivalent single-phase diagram to the equivalent Thevenin 
diagram, and 
 Convert common base per unit values to actual values, (Walker, 2007). 
 
These are useful methods to calculate the fault currents in a power system. 
 
4.12 EARTHING 
 
Power system earthing is very important as the majority of faults involve 
earthing.  Although the primary reason for earthing is the safety of humans, it 
also has a significant effect on the protection of equipment.  For this reason, 
the principle purpose of earthing is to minimise transient overvoltages.   
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4.12.1 Overhead line earthing 
The construction of overhead lines in terms of earthing in the NMBM has to 
comply with the PEE Code of Practice – Overhead Line Earthing.  The 
overhead line earth conductors must be connected to the substation earth 
mat.  A soil resistivity test should be conducted to determine the type of earth 
electrode to use.  All metal part on the overhead lines should be bonded and 
every eighth pole, as well every pole with special equipment, should be 
bonded to an earth electrode in the ground.   
 
According to Dugan et al (2003) 80% of power quality problems relate to 
earthing on the equipment of either the customer or the utility.  Proper 
earthing practice in terms of the operation of protection equipment is critical.  
It is clearly important that required earthing practice is applied and checked 
constantly to ensure proper operation of protection equipment and 
improvement in power quality.  This will maintain the reliability of the power 
system. 
 
4.13 SURGE ARRESTORS 
 
Lightning is one of the main causes of power outages on overhead lines 
(Dugan et al, 2003).  Many times the causes of these outages are recorded as 
“not established”, because the utility has no method to prove that lightning is 
the cause of the outages.  One method of reducing outages on overhead lines 
is the installation of surge arrestors.  Surge arrestors are also called lightning 
arrestors. 
 
Overhead lines with no or a minimum number of surge arrestors could cause 
many flash overs, which could lead to insulation breakdown, and the 
consequence would be an outage.  Installation of surge arrestors will also 
decrease the impact of voltage dips and voltage swells (Dugan et al, 2003). 
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According to Lakervi and Holmes (2003) the closer a surge arrestor is located 
to the equipment it is protecting, the more effective this protection will be.  
Lakervi and Holmes state further that it should not be more than 10 m away 
from the equipment.  If the equipment is far away from the surge arrestor, the 
voltage that would be imposed on the equipment would be much higher.        
 
Dugan et al (2003) are very clear on the installation of surge arrestors.  They 
argue that a surge arrestor should be installed at every second or third pole, 
and in cases where critical loads are supplied, then surge arrestors should be 
installed at every pole.   
 
In Figure 4.5 it is evident that the surge arrestor bleeds off some of the stroke 
current as the current passes along the line.  The earth resistance plays an 
important role in the amount of current the surge arrestors will bleed off.  
Ideally, the surge arrestors must be placed in such a position that the BIL of 
the insulators is not exceeded (Dugan et al, 2003). 
 
Figure 4.5 – Arrestors spaced to prevent flashover (Adapted from Dugan et al, 2003) 
 
Lightning has a major impact on the reliability of power systems.  The 
approaches of Lakervi and Holmes and that of Dugan could be applied to 
reduce outages and increase power system reliability. 
  
4.14 DISCRIMINATION 
 
Discrimination is also called grading or co-ordination.  Time and current 
grading is most easily applied to radial power systems and consist of two 
types, namely, definite time/current and IDMT or Inverse Definite Minimum 
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Time.  IDMT also serves also as backup protection for unit protection 
(Blackburn and Lewis, 1998).  
 
4.14.1 Grading Margin 
In a radial feeder the time that is allowed to pass between the successful 
tripping time on a downstream circuit breaker and its associate upstream 
circuit breaker, is the grading margin between the two sets of protection 
devices.  The grading margin is normally set between 400 and 500 ms for oil 
circuit breakers.  For vacuum and SF6 circuit breakers, it is normally between 
200 and 300 ms (Christopoulos and Wright, 1999). 
 
4.14.2 Time Grading 
Time grading is generally used in calculating earth fault relay settings on a 
power system that is not effectively earthed through a neutral compensator or 
neutral earthing resistor.  All the relays in series will have the same current 
setting and will thus operate simultaneously.  Grading in terms of time is 
based on the selection of progressively lower time settings for each 
successive relay.  The relay upstream from the fault will operate first 
(Christopoulos and Wright, 1999). 
 
4.14.3 Current Grading 
Current grading is based on the diversity of the fault current between the 
successive relaying points, and on the fact that the fault current is inversely 
proportional to the impedance of the system between the point of the fault and 
the source.   
 
Current grading settings are not intended to protect the power system against 
current overload, but to protect the power system only against fault currents.  
The minimum setting used in practice is usually twice the full load current to 
stop operation during overloads (Christopoulos and Wright, 1999). 
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4.14.4 Grading of other equipment 
In a typical recloser protected circuit with downstream fuses, the fuse must 
blow before the recloser operates.  This is also dependant on what technology 
is used, namely, fuse saving or fuse blowing technology.  The fuse blowing 
technology will assist in improving power system reliability, while fuse saving 
technology will clear transient faults.  It is important when selecting the fuse 
size that the fuse permits a range that is adequate to cover the fault current 
co-ordination (Dugan et al, 2003).  
 
Lack of grading is responsible for many outages and power quality problems.  
The NMBM power system also suffers under these conditions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LITERATURE REVIEW: MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Deterioration of electrical equipment is normal and this process begins the 
moment the equipment is installed.  If deterioration is not checked and 
monitored it will lead to malfunctions and electrical failures, which account for 
many of the outages causing inconvenience to customers and financial loss.  
The purpose of preventative maintenance and testing is to identify the factors 
responsible for the deterioration of equipment and provide corrective 
measures.  With an electrical preventative, maintenance and testing program, 
potential hazards which could cause failure of equipment or interruption of 
supply can be discovered and repaired or replaced.  The program can also 
extend the life of the equipment if properly maintained.  The program should 
consist of routine inspections, testing, repair and service of electrical 
equipment (Brown, 2002). 
 
According to Gill (1997) a structured preventative maintenance program 
should at all times be performed as follows: 
 
 Under the control of management; 
 In accordance with the practice and schedule, and 
 By a designated team. 
 
According to Lohmann (n.d), the new approach is to shift from the traditional 
time-based maintenance policy to a condition-based reliability centred 
maintenance policy.  This calls for differentiation among the following four 
types of maintenance policies: 
  
 Predictive or condition based maintenance, namely to monitor if 
something is going to fail. 
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 Preventative maintenance, namely, overhauling items or replacing 
components at fixed intervals. 
 Corrective maintenance, namely, fixing things either when they are found 
to be failing or when they have failed. 
 Detective maintenance, namely to detect hidden failures by means of 
special functional checks and diagnostics.  
 
The type of maintenance policy to select for specific equipment for 
transmission and distribution power networks depends on the reliability of the 
power system, financial implications and the availability of supply to the 
customers (Lohmann, n.d). 
 
With respect to labour, it is a known fact that the engineering industry endures 
tremendous pressure due to the skills shortage in the country.  This has a 
direct impact on service delivery and the supply of electricity. 
 
 5.2 CURRENT PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS 
 
The different sections of the NMBM have personnel dedicated to perform 
maintenance on protection equipment, switchgear, transformers and 
overhead lines.  Although many of these staff members were initially 
employed to perform these dedicated functions, commissioning of new plant, 
fault investigation and isolation of supplies receives preference.  Maintenance 
is not regarded as a priority.  This is probably because the measurable 
difference in cost is not evident when equipment is over or under maintained.  
 
The NMBM maintenance initiative is based on Gill’s (1997) guideline.  
However, the maintenance plans cannot function without the management 
component and designated teams.  The NMBM suffers from an acute 
shortage of staff.  Maintenance plans are in place, but the execution of these 
plans remains a quandary.  The impact of budgetary constraints also limits the 
maintenance programs.  The most important factor that drives maintenance 
plans is skilled workers.  NMBM do not have the staff complement to maintain 
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equipment in accordance with the maintenance plans and schedules and 
guidelines from the suppliers.  The staff complement in the substation section 
was reduced from 18 to 5.  High voltage cable and overhead lines sections 
have only one artisan appointed to maintain them.  The alternative is to 
procure the services of skilled contractors.  Only a few contractors are skilled 
and trained to perform high voltage electrical work and even with their help, 
the maintenance work is still not sufficient.     
 
5.3 THE EFFECT OF PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE 
 
Preventative maintenance is the pre-planned task of inspection and servicing 
to retain the full operational function of electrical equipment.  Many types of 
distribution and transmission equipment require routine inspection and testing, 
namely, protection relays, current transformers, poles, circuit breakers, 
transformers et cetera, to make sure that they function properly and minimise 
the probability of failures, which will result in power outages (Seevers, 1991).   
 
The NMBM predominantly practises the run-to-failure philosophy.  This simply 
means that after the equipment has been installed, it is not inspected or 
maintained until a failure occurs.  This is initially cost effective, but in the long 
term, it will cost the utility more.  The customers suffer the consequences. 
 
The new approach to maintenance is what Gill (1997) and even Brown (2002) 
call reliability centred maintenance.  The maintenance schedules to be 
implemented are decided based on the condition of the equipment and the 
cost to repair or replace it.  The best results are obtained by implementing 
schedules that maximise power system reliability.  This can be achieved by 
replacing or repairing equipment which is likely to fail.  Equipment which 
supplies power to important customers is prioritised.  However, this approach 
is difficult to implement and inspections have to be done more often. 
 
The bathtub curve in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2) gives us an indication as to when 
maintenance is required.  Initially, the equipment is highly likely to fail just 
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after the commissioning phase.  Once this phase has been overcome, the 
equipment can function for a long period, depending on the conditions.  After 
the equipment has been maintained, the failure rate will decrease to its 
original value (Bollen, 2000). 
 
Maintenance cannot be separated from the availability of skilled labour.  All 
the maintenance plans and initiatives can be in place, but without the labour 
to drive it and perform the physical work, all these plans will be futile. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LITERATURE REVIEW: WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Extreme weather conditions can have a dramatic impact on an electric power 
system.  Overhead power lines are devised to withstand the vast range of the 
weather conditions possible.  In case of extreme and infrequent weather 
conditions, outages are unfortunately inevitable.  For economical reasons, 
power systems cannot be designed to withstand all the weather conditions.  
Other factors can contribute to the failure of power systems in adverse 
weather conditions, namely, standard of construction, lack of correct 
maintenance, type of power system selected et cetera.  Power system failures 
are unavoidable, but their frequency and their consequences on the power 
supply can be reduced.  All the factors contributing to the stability of a power 
system must be recognised and, depending on the budget, these factors must 
be included in the design (Bollen, 2000). 
 
Power outages and power quality are major concerns in a power transmission 
and distribution system.  Unacceptable quality leads to customer 
dissatisfaction.  The causes of power outages and voltage dips are 
sometimes weather related.  Hence, it is important to gain an understanding 
of the effects of adverse weather conditions on power interruptions (Brown, 
2002). 
 
6.2 THE IMPACT OF WEATHER ON POWER SYSTEMS 
 
According to Dugan et al (2003) the majority of power outages and voltage 
dips are weather related.  Lightning caused 45% of all the outages recorded.  
Direct lightning strikes generally cause flashovers generating impulsive 
transients and voltage dips.  Lightning also raises the potential of the local 
ground above other nearby grounds.  This causes surges, voltage dips and 
swells which result in the failure of sensitive equipment. 
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According to Bollen (2000), the IEEE standards differentiate among three 
levels of outages: 
 
 Normal weather; 
 Adverse weather, and 
 Major storm disaster. 
 
In the NMBM adverse weather conditions occur frequently, while major storm 
disasters occur rarely.  Table 8.1 depicts the adverse weather condition for a 
typical utility. 
 
Table 6.1 – Contributions of the Outage Rate of Transmission and Distribution Components (Adapted 
from Bollen, 2000) 
 
Cause of Outage Transmission System Distribution System 
Lightning strikes 9% 12% 
Snow/ice on lines 52% 11% 
High winds 32% 7% 
Plant failures 5% 39% 
Line interference 2% 21% 
Animal/bird strikes - 8% 
Adjacent loads - 2% 
 
 
Obviously different utilities will have different tables.  This table allows us the 
opportunity to understand the impact of adverse weather conditions on power 
systems.  Wind can cause overhead line conductors to clash, resulting in a 
phase-to-phase or phase-to-earth fault.  It is also evident that strong winds 
could cause overhead line poles to fall over, causing more damage and 
increasing the outage period.  Branches could be blown onto the overhead 
lines, causing transient and permanent faults and triggering the operation of 
auto-reclosers and other power system protection devices.  This is often the 
cause of unknown voltage dips (Bollen, 2000). 
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Rain impacts on power outages and reliability of supply.  Rain is the cause of 
the malfunction of many cable faults, resulting in extended power outages.  It 
also causes flashovers on overhead lines, causing voltage dips.  Rain not only 
increases the outage time, but it also makes it difficult to repair the faulty 
equipment (Bollen, 2000). 
 
Overhead lines are more vulnerable to adverse weather conditions, thus 
during the design phase of the project the weather conditions must be taken 
into account.  Surge arrestors can improve the reliability and quality of power 
delivered to customers while at the same time lowering maintenance costs by 
reducing the need to replace and repair lightning damaged power system 
equipment (Bollen, 2000). 
 
Wind and rain are the cause of many outages, particularly overhead lines.  
The causes of many of the power outages in the NMBM cannot be 
determined, but most of them are associated with adverse weather conditions.  
Planners need to design specific power networks for areas that are badly 
affected by adverse weather conditions.  
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY 
 
7.1 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
Power system reliability is important as it relates to the performance of the power 
system.  Our industries rely on power for their business, thus it becomes more 
critical to secure reliable power systems.  Power outages impacts on the users of 
electricity and for that reason our power systems must be designed to reduce 
power outages.  The design of power systems depends on the budget available 
and often the budgetary constrains hamper the design of power systems 
resulting in cost effective designs which is not always good for reliability. 
 
Power system reliability is dependent on system adequacy which involves the 
facilities available to supply electricity to customers, and system security which 
relates to the behaviour of the system during fault conditions. 
 
Factors impacting on power system reliability include the following: 
 
 Radial topology; 
 Failure of protection equipment; 
 Weather conditions, and 
 Duration of interruption. 
 
The failure rate of equipment increased with time if it is not maintained regularly 
in accordance with planned maintenance intervals.  After maintenance the failure 
rate of equipment will decrease. 
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Many reliability indices are available, but the most commonly one’s used in South 
Africa is SAIDI, SAIFI and ASAI.  The most basic formula to use for evaluating 
power systems is: 
Us = rs λs . 
 
Not much it terms of research has been done to incorporate the cost of power 
outages (planned and unplanned outages) into the design of power network.  
This opens the door for further research possibilities.  It is however important to 
be able to quantify the cost of an outage. 
 
7.2 POWER QUALITY 
 
Power quality becomes more and more critical because of the increase in 
sensitive electronic equipment and deployment of non-linear loads.  The long 
transmission lines, lightning, vegetation, switching, animal, birds, pollution and 
lack of maintenance all contribute to power quality problems. 
 
Voltage dips are the most common cause of power quality abnormality and 
accounts for approximately 80% of all such problems.  In South Africa the NRS 
standards provide dip categories, namely, Y, X, S, T and Z and the suppliers of 
electricity are assessed in terms of these categories. 
 
Many factors contribute to voltage dip, namely, 
 
 Large drives with high initial starting currents; 
 Arc furnaces; 
 Faults on overhead lines caused by lightning, vegetation, birds and animals, 
and 
 Reclosing and sectionalising equipment. 
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The NMBM used Impedograph, Vectograph and Provograph power quality 
instruments to measure voltage dips in NMBM.  Y-dips in terms of the NRS 048 
are regarded as insignificant and users of power should install dip-proving 
equipment to reduce the dip magnitude on their plant.  The severity of a voltage 
dip depends on the distance of the fault from the customer’s plant.  The 
frequency of voltage dips depends on the weather conditions, maintenance and 
the age of the equipment.  The speed of the operation of the protection 
equipment will determine if the power quality event is a voltage dip or an 
interruption. 
 
There are many ways to reduce voltage dips, which includes the following: 
 
 The design and fault clearing practices; 
 Maintenance of equipment; 
 Installation of bird and animal protection; 
 The use of more fuses, reclosers and sectionalisers; 
 The Installation of more surge arrestors, and 
 Co-ordination of protection devices. 
 
There are research opportunities in terms of fuses, sectionaliser, reclosers and 
particular surge arrestors combined with co-ordination of protection equipment.  
Research in this field will contribute towards the improvement of power quality 
problems associated with voltage dips. 
 
7.3 POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
 
This chapter concentrates on power system protection, particular how it can 
increase the reliability of power systems.  The basic function of protection 
equipment is to detect system faults and to prevent damage to the plant, power 
system equipment and to safeguard human life’s. 
 
 71
The severity of faults can be ascribed to the source conditions, the configuration 
of the power system, the type and the location of the fault.  The function of a CT 
is to step down the current and to isolate the main system from the auxiliary 
system.  Generally two types of CT’s are available, namely, protective CT’s for 
differential protection and class-X CT’s for overcurrent protection.  During fault 
condition these CT’s must sustain high fault currents, thus it is imperative that 
they remain accurate during fault conditions.  Magnetisation curves are used to 
determine the accuracy of CT’s.  It is therefore important that routine 
maintenance is performed to reduce the risk of inoperative and faulty CT’s.  
Magnetisation curve, insulation resistance, saturation and primary injection tests 
are performed to ensure that the CT is in a good working condition.  In order to 
select a CT the following should be considered: 
 
 Full-load current of the load; 
 Full-load current of the power transformer; 
 CT not to be overloaded; 
 The application of the CT; 
 Primary current to be twice the load current, and 
 The maximum fault current. 
 
Fuses are the most simple and the oldest protection method.  It is a one-shot 
protection device and the melting time is inverse proportional to the current.  In 
selecting fuses it is important to provide protection against faults rather than to 
protect the equipment. 
 
Transformers with a capacity rating of less than 2500 kVA are normally protected 
by fuses.  This is not always the practice in the NMBM, but the dissertation 
covers the installation and analysis of the fuses for transformers rated below 
2500 kVA.  The following factors are to be noted when selecting fuses: 
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 Transformers are deliberately operated above their ratings for a short period 
to several hours; 
 Inrush current of a transformer is 10-12 times the rated full-load current.  In 
this dissertation 10 times is applicable; 
 The current in the 10 s region should be as low as possible; 
 The minimum fusing current to be as low as possible to ensure that internal 
faults are cleared; 
 Correct co-ordination should at all times be achieved, although it is not 
always possible, and 
 Fuses on overhead lines exposed to high lightning activity should withstand 
high currents, but this normally requires highly rated fuses which cannot 
normally provide protection to other equipment. 
 
Auto-reclosers can be used in conjunction with sectionalisers and fuses and it is 
important that co-ordination between this equipment is achieved.  This 
dissertation does not cover an in-depth study of this, thus it allows for an 
opportunity for further research.   
 
Overcurrent protection is mainly used as back-up protection on transmission 
power systems.  In distribution power systems as these case studies, overcurrent 
and earth fault protection are used in one unit.  The IDMT relay provides back-up 
earth fault protection.  As depicted by Anderson (1999) 90% of all overhead line 
faults are earth faults and the earth faults dominate the trip.  The earth fault 
element will detect the fault first no matter if it is a phase-to-phase fault.  
Sensitive earth fault relays are used to detect small earth faults which are too 
small to operate the earth fault relay. 
 
Earthing is very important as the majority of faults involve earthing.  It provides 
safety to humans but is also provides a return path to the source.  All metal parts 
of a power system should be bonded and connected to the substation earth mat.  
As depicted by Dugan et al (2003) 80% of all power quality problems relates to 
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earthing of equipment.  Thus, proper earthing practices are very important in the 
correct operation of protection equipment.  It is a shortcoming of this dissertation 
and it creates an opportunity for further research, investigate and analyse 
earthing as a critical component of power system operation, power quality and 
protections. 
  
7.4 MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
Maintenance of power system equipment is very important for the operation of 
power systems.  During preventative maintenance programs defective equipment 
can be identified and replaced.  Maintenance extends the life of equipment.  Gill 
(1997) depicts that maintenance programs should always be performed under 
the control of management, in accordance with the schedules and by a dedicated 
team.  Finances drives maintenance programs and labour must be available to 
perform the maintenance tasks.  Maintenance programs cannot be executed 
because the NMBM do not have the skilled staff.  Budgetary reductions and 
shortfalls also hamper maintenance programs. 
 
Maintenance must be pre-planned and it starts with inspection, then servicing in 
order to retain the full operation of the equipment.  The NMBM practice the run-
to-fail philosophy.  The equipment is installed and by not inspecting and 
maintaining it after a certain period, the equipment will fail resulting in power 
outages. 
 
7.5 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
Adverse weather conditions impacts severely on power systems.  Due to 
budgetary shortfalls power systems cannot be designed to withstand all the 
weather conditions.  Lack of maintenance is another factor contributing to failure 
of power system equipment and during adverse weather the likelihood of failure 
is greater.  The majority of power outages and voltage dips are weather related.   
 74
CHAPTER 8 
AN OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Five case studies have been identified using Annexure A.  They are: 
 
 Fitches Corner Blue Horizon Bay feeder; 
 Summit Gamtoos Pumps feeder; 
 Kragga Kamma Greenbushes feeder; 
 Motherwell North feeder, and 
 Fitches Corner Rocklands feeder. 
  
Historical data was refined and grouped together to determine the weak links 
in the power system.  The Fitches Corner substation has two 22kV feeders, 
which were individually analysed as two case studies.  Recent planning 
developments on the Swartkops feeder resulted in a new line being built from 
the Ditchling substation.  The Swartkops line thus does not exist any longer 
and will not form part of the analysis.   
 
The graphical presentation in Annexure A represents all the outages recorded 
over five financial years from July 2002 to June 2007.  Annexure A represents 
the power outages per financial year and a summary of all the faults.  The 
case studies will be evaluated in terms of the following criteria:  
 
 Power System Reliability 
 Power Quality 
 Power System Protection 
 Digsilent Power Factory 
 SCADA 
 Maintenance and Manpower 
 Weather Conditions 
 NRS Data Analysis 
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In certain case studies, it was not possible to access the network in terms of 
all the criteria above due to their design and deficiency at the time of 
evaluation and analysing.  The assessment and evaluation was done in 
conjunction with available staff and resources.  In certain cases all or some of 
the important information relating to the likely results are omitted because 
they were not available at the time of the investigation.  It became apparent 
that the power system problems and faults in the case studies are more or 
less the same, depending on the construction of the power system.  There 
was a common trend in certain case studies, for example, Fitches Corner 
Blue Horizon Bay (FBH), Summit Gamtoos Pumps (SGP) and Fitches Corner 
Rocklands (FCR).  In these case studies the investigations, tests and results 
will be summarised and not presented separately.  
 
At the end of the assessment and evaluation process, the results will be 
formulated and presented in the form of conclusions and recommendations, 
which will be forwarded to the NMBM.  The results will also be available for 
other utilities to implement in order to improve the reliability of their power 
networks. 
 
8.2 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY 1- FITCHES CORNER 
BLUE HORIZON BAY 
 
The Fitches Corner Blue Horizon Bay 22kV feeder is predominantly an 
overhead line network.  At the end of the overhead line is a 1 MVA 22/6.6kV 
transformer.  The LV windings are connected to a ring main unit with two 
isolators supplying the 6.6kV cable distribution network.  The 6.6kV network 
supplies five distribution substations with 500kVA transformers.  Annexure 1A 
represents a line diagram of the overhead power network and from this line 
diagram it is evident that many lateral lines with transformers at the end are 
connected to the main line. 
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The overhead line is approximately 20km long on H-pole structures 
constructed with Alliance conductor rated at 365 A.  Only the sections from 
FBH 77 downwards are constructed in the delta formation.  A 95 mm2 3-core 
11kV copper cable network approximately 3.7 km long supplies 1800 
customers.  A large section of this network runs along the coast and is 
therefore exposed to extreme weather conditions, namely, mist, rain, strong 
wind and lightning. 
 
Annexure 1B indicates the number of interruptions recorded at the Fitches 
Corner substation over a period of 5 years.  87 interruptions were recorded on 
the Blue Horizon Bay network.  This was much more than the other networks.  
The details of the interruptions will be analysed and discussed in the sections 
below.  
 
At the source substation, Fitches Corner, the Blue Horizon Bay feeder is 
protected by an OCB which is very old (manufactured in 1952), and a Micom 
Alstom relay. 
 
The protection relay provides auto-reclosing functions, overcurrent, earth fault 
and sensitive earth protection.  From the site investigations it is revealed that 
the auto-reclose function of the ARC is not operative. 
 
The 1 MVA transformer and the 6.6kV cable network is not protected.  The 
lateral lines are protected by means of expulsion fuses (drop-out fuses).  In 
the middle of the overhead line, an airbrake switch has been installed to 
isolate the top section from the bottom.      
 
8.3 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY 2- SUMMIT GAMTOOS 
PUMPS 
  
The Summit–Gamtoos Pumps overhead line is a 22 kV line supplying 
electricity to milk and chicken farmers, a critical water pump station and a 
holiday resort at the mouth of the Gamtoos river. 
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The overhead line is approximately 13 kilometres long, constructed with 
70mm2 copper conductor and wooden H-pole structures.  The copper 
conductor makes the line vulnerable to theft and vandalism, resulting in many 
extended outages. 
 
At Summit, the source substation, two 10 MVA 66/22 kV transformers are 
installed.  The feeder supplies 14 pole mounted distribution transformers, 
some with protection at the beginning of the lateral lines.  Most of the lateral 
lines supply single phase distribution transformers.  There are two lateral 
lines, namely, SGP 14 and 30 supplying various distribution transformers.  
SGP 30 supplies one relatively large customer, Gamtoos Mouth.  The feeder 
also supplies an important water pump station with two 750 kVA transformers 
at the end of the line. 
 
The major concern in terms of the power supply is that no adequate system 
protection is provided to clear faults effectively.  Also, the reliability of this 
feeder is questionable as it under-performed in terms of the research criteria 
outlined in this investigation. 
 
A Reyrolle oil circuit breaker is installed at the beginning of the line.  The TJV 
protection relay provides overcurrent and earth fault protection.  No sensitive 
earth fault protection is provided.  The auto-recloser is set at one trip and 
lockout.  Type K lateral fuses are used to protect some of the lateral lines.  At 
the river mouth, a substation is built with equipment identified in Annexure 2A.  
 
8.4 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY 3- MOTHERWELL 
NORTH 
 
The Motherwell North 22kV feeder is approximately 17 kilometres long and 
constructed with 95 mm2 arial bundle conductor (ABC) with a current capacity 
of 265 A on 11m wooden poles.  The lateral lines supply 200 kVA distribution 
transformers, stepping the voltage down to 400 V three phase and 230 V 
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single phase.  On the low voltage side, the transformer provides electricity to 
mainly low cost houses.  The power system is exposed to all weather 
conditions, namely, mist, rain, strong wind and lightning. 
 
Annexure 3A depicts the MWN single-line diagram and Annexure 3B indicates 
the number of interruptions recorded at the source substation and the fault 
types over a period of five years.  85 interruptions were recorded on the 
Motherwell North network, much more than the other networks in this voltage 
category.  The detail of the interruptions were analysed and reviewed. 
 
At the source substation, Motherwell, a SACE BERGAMO OCB is installed.  
The SPAJ140C protection relay provides overcurrent and earth fault 
protection. 
 
The historical fault data recorded in Annexure 3B indicates that many of the 
faults occurred on the lateral lines, namely, MWN 51 and 80 as well as at the 
source, MWN 0. 
 
8.5 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY 4- KRAGGA KAMMA 
GREENBUSHES 
 
The Kragga Kamma Greenbushes (KKG) 22kV power system is 
approximately 15 kilometres long.  The first section of the feeder is 
approximately 7 kilometres 150 mm2 copper cable, which terminates at the 
first H-pole.  The overhead line is approximately 8 kilometres long and 
constructed on 14 metre H-pole structures.    The overhead line is constructed 
in Pine, which has a current capacity of 262 A.  The power system supplies a 
22kV substation transforming the voltage down to 6.6kV.  The 6.6kV system 
supplies electricity to smallholdings.  Along the 8 kilometre main line, a lateral 
line supplies smallholdings and a major low cost housing project (KKG 53).  
KKG 53 is constructed in 185 mm2 Arial bundle conductor with 200 kVA 
transformers, stepping the voltage down to 400 V three-phase and 230 V 
single phase.  Annexure 4A depicts the single-line diagram of the power 
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system.  This part of the power system is exposed to weather conditions, 
namely, mist, rain, strong wind and lightning. 
 
Annexure 4B indicates the number of interruptions recorded at the source 
substation over a period of 5 years.  25 interruptions were recorded on the 
KKG network. 
 
At the source substation, Kragga Kamma, a Reyrolle A OCB is installed with 
over current, earth fault and auto-reclose functions.  The CDG protection 
equipment is outdated and the auto-reclose relay was burnt out.  It is not 
normal practice to install an auto-recloser on a cable network.  
 
The historical fault data recorded indicated that many of the faults occurred on 
the lateral lines.  The OCB is used as a means of isolation, but if an in-line 
ARC is installed, the outage time could be reduced. 
 
8.6 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY 5- FITCHES CORNER 
ROCKLANDS 
 
The Fitches Corner Rocklands (FCR) 22kV power system is approximately 7 
kilometres long on delta pole structures with Pine conductor rated at 262 A.  
Annexure 5A represents a single-line diagram of the overhead power network.  
The power system runs inland towards Uitenhage, supplying electricity to 
farmers, predominantly chicken farmers.  This power system is exposed to 
weather conditions, namely, storms, mist, rain, strong wind and lightning. 
 
Annexure 5B indicates the number of interruptions recorded at the Fitches 
Corner substation over a period of five years.  28 interruptions were recorded 
on the FCR network, much more than in the other networks in this voltage 
category. 
 
At the source substation, Fitches Corner, the FCR network is protected with 
an ARC with overcurrent, earth fault and sensitive earth fault functions.  When 
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faults occur on the lateral lines, the ARC would operate.  This is incorrect, as 
the fuses should blow before the breaker opens.  The auto-reclose function of 
the ARC also does not operate properly.  It was set to 1 shot and lockout. 
 
8.7 COMMON TRENDS IN CASE STUDIES 
 
8.7.1 Power System Reliability 
In three of the five case studies (FCR, FBH and SGP), the power systems are 
constructed with bare overhead conductors, one case study (MWN) is 
constructed with ABC and the other case study (KKG) is constructed with 
bare overhead conductors, ABC and underground cables. 
 
The common trends and commonality are as follows: 
 
 Four of these feeders (FBH, SGP, KKG and FCR) are radial having no 
means of an alternative power supply.  The Motherwell North feeder can 
be alternatively supplied by closing the normally open points.  But, an 
operator must physically close these normally open points, therefore it 
can be treated as a radial until such time the normally open points have 
been closed. 
 All the power systems analysed are not overloaded yet, but with the 
development and industrialisation of rural areas they will soon be 
overloaded in the future.  The n-1 principle does not apply and therefore 
poses a problem in terms of an alternative power supply to cater for 
overloading and back-up. 
 Protection equipment apart from the Motherwell system is very old and 
some of the relays were replaced during the testing phase of the project. 
 Weather conditions pose a problem for any power system, particularly 
the bare overhead conductors. 
 Because the case studies are predominantly rural power systems, the 
outage time will generally be long and extended due to travelling time, 
line patrols, faultfinding, no remote switching et cetera. 
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 Lack of maintenance, coupled with the shortage of skilled workers, 
increases the failure rate of power systems. 
 
Once the customer feeder Reliability Indices has been calculated, they are 
compared to the Customer Based Indices in Table 8.1 (Burke, 1994).  In 
comparing Table 8.1 with the case studies, it is evident that in all of them the 
calculated reliability indices exceed the values represented in Table 8.1.  The 
conclusion that can be drawn from this is that if the duration of the outages 
decrease, SAIDI will decrease; if the number of outages decrease, SAIFI will 
decrease; if SAIDI and SAIFI decrease, consequently CAIDI will decrease.  
This is all linked to the outage cost and average duration, which will eventually 
impact on the reliability of the power network.  
 
Table 8.1 - Customer Based Indices (Adapted from Burke, 1994) 
 
Customer Based Indices 
SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI ASAI 
95.9min/yr 1.18int/yr 76.93min/yr .999375int/yr 
 
 
8.7.2 Power Quality 
 
8.7.2.1 Voltage Dips 
The factors contributing to voltage dips are the following: 
 
 Birds and animals; 
 Faults on the networks as well as neighbouring networks; 
 Lack of maintenance; 
 Vegetation control; 
 Switching operations; 
 Operation of protection equipment; 
 Adverse weather conditions, and 
 Design of the network et cetera. 
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8.7.2.2 Harmonics 
In terms of harmonics, the only commonality is that all the networks analysed 
comply with the NRS 048-2:2003. 
  
8.7.2.3 Flickering 
In terms of flickering, the only commonality is that all the networks analysed 
comply with the NRS 048-2:2003. 
 
8.7.2.4 Voltage Regulation 
The only network that does not comply with the NRS 048-2:2003 is the 
Motherwell North 22kV feeder. 
 
8.7.3 Power System Protection 
In order to comply with the requirements of power system protection in terms 
of selectivity, stability, sensitivity and speed it is paramount that the entire 
protection equipment is tested and adjustments affected to improve the 
system’s reliability. 
 
Many of the faults that occur on power systems are incipient faults.  This is 
due to the lack of maintenance, failure to repair faulty parts and failure to 
effect permanent repairs.  Adverse weather conditions increase this.  Incipient 
faults eventually develop into solid faults causing greater damage to power 
system equipment.  The correct operation of power system protection 
equipment is critical. 
 
Similar protection equipment tests on all the five case studies were 
performed.  Not one of the end results was identical. 
 
Similar methods were used to calculate the CT accurate limit current (ALC), 
ALF, knee-point voltage, VA rating, fault current magnitudes, relay settings 
and fuse sizes.  In the selection and grading of fuses with other protection 
equipment, Tables 8.2 to 8.5 were applied to all the case studies.  Calculating 
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the full-load current, inrush current, permissible overloading of the distribution 
transformers and standard fuse sizes were evaluated.  The values in all the 
case studies were gained from the following methods: 
 
 Determining the MVA/KVA rating of the transformer; 
 Calculating the full-load current using formula (12); 
 Calculating the inrush current at 10 times the full-load current.  The 
inrush current can be between 10 and 12 times the full-load current 
(Wright and Newbery, 2004); 
 The fuse must be able to carry the inrush current for 0.1 second 
(Anderson, 1999; Wright and Christopoulos, 1993); 
 Allow permissible overload of 20% for this application.  It is not clear 
what percentage to use for overloading of transformers.  Wright and 
Christopoulos (1993) state that suitable fuses must be selected to 
sustain this overload and Brown (2002) states that the overload should 
not exceed 200% of the transformer rating.  The 20% will be used in all 
the case studies; 
 Type K fuses will be used and the selection will be done using Tables 8.2 
and 8.5; 
 Co-ordination of fuse will be done as per the description of Anderson 
(1999), and 
 PEE Code of Practice will also be consulted.  
 
Power transformers are deliberately operated above their current rating for 
several hours.  Therefore, the type of fuse selected must withstand these 
overloads.  Fuses must also be able to sustain high overvoltages caused by 
lightning.  Highly rated fuses should be selected.  This is not always possible, 
as highly rated fuses cannot always provide protection to the other equipment 
connected to the network.  A compromise must be reached in terms of the 
grading philosophy (Wright and Christopoulos, 1993).   
 
According to Anderson (1999) a fuse protecting a power transformer should 
be able to carry at least 12 times the rated primary current for 0.1 seconds as 
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depicted in the fuse melting time curve.  Fuses that protect distribution 
transformers are often used, especially for a short line supplying a few 
customers.  Anderson (2009) described two types of fuse links, namely, Type 
K and Type T.  Basically the main difference between the two fuse types is 
that the Type T takes longer to interrupt the current.  In order to verify the 
ability of a fuse to sustain an inrush current of 0.1 seconds the Type K TC 
characteristic in Short (2004) will be consulted.  Table 8.2 can be consulted to 
understand the melting currents of Type K fuses.  It is to be noted that the 
minimum melting current of both fuse types is about twice the rated current of 
the fuse.    
 
For currents above the minimum pickup the Type T fuse link melts slower 
than the Type K.  The speed ratio of a Type K and T range between 6 to 8.1 
and 10 to 13 respectively.  The speed ratio indicates that any fuse within that 
range can co-ordinate with each other and protect the next higher rating fuse 
in that range. 
 
Table 8.2 - Melting Currents for Type K (Fast) Fuse Links (Adapted from Anderson, 1999) 
 
Rated 
Continuous 
Current 
300 or 600 sec 
Melting Current* 
10 sec 
Melting Current 
.01 sec 
Melting Current Speed 
Ratio Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Preferred Ratings 
6 12.0 14.4 13.5 20.5 72.0 86.0 6.0 
10 19.5 23.4 22.5 34.0 128.0 154.0 6.6 
15 31.0 37.2 37.0 55 215.0 258.0 6.9 
25 50.0 60.0 60.0 90.0 350.0 420.0 7.0 
40 80.0 96.0 98.0 146.0 565.0 680.0 7.1 
65 128.0 153.0 159.0 237.0 918.0 1100.0 7.2 
100 200.0 240.0 258.0 388.0 1520.0 1820.0 7.6 
140 310.0 372.0 430.0 650.0 2470.0 2970.0 8.0 
200 480.0 576.0 760.0 1150.0 3880.0 4650.0 8.1 
Intermediate Rating 
8 15.0 18.0 18.0 27.0 97.0 116.0 6.5 
12 25.0 30.0 29.5 44.0 166.0 199.0 6.6 
20 39.0 47.0 48.0 71.0 273.0 328.0 7.0 
30 63.0 76.0 77.5 115.0 447.0 546.0 7.1 
50 101.0 121.0 126.0 188.0 719.0 862.0 7.1 
80 160.0 192.0 205.0 307.0 1180.0 1420.0 7.4 
Ratings below 6 Amperes 
1 2.0 2.4 ^ 10.0 ^ 58.0  
2 4.0 4.8 ^ 10.0 ^ 58.0  
3 6.0 7.2 ^ 10.0 ^ 58.0  
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Type K and T fuses have similar TC characteristics, therefore they will co-
ordinate well together.  A mixture of Type K and T will make co-ordination 
difficult and often impossible.  The Tables are provided by McGraw-Edison 
Power Systems, Cooper Industries.  They take care of the arching time, the 
maximum current for safe co-ordination and the 75% of the minimum melting 
time curves for protected fuse links.   In Table 8.3 the values of the continues 
current capacities of the Type K and T fuse are given.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8.3 - Continuous Current-Carrying Capacity of EEI-NEMA Fuse Links (adapted from Anderson, 
1999) 
 
EEI-NEMA 
K or T 
Rating 
Continuous 
Current 
(amperes) 
EEI-NEMA 
K or T 
Rating 
Continuous 
Current 
(amperes) 
EEI-NEMA 
K or T 
Rating 
Continuous 
Current 
(amperes) 
6 9 20 30 65 95 
8 12 25 38 80 120^ 
10 15 30 45 100 150^ 
12 18 40 60* 140 190 
15 23 50 70* 200 200 
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Table 8.4 – Calculated Full-load and Inrush current for transformers 
 
 IFL Inrush I Perm O/L
(20%) 
Comments 
16kVA/6,6Kv 1,4A 14A 1,68A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
16KVA/22kV 0,42A 4,2A 0,5A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
25kVA/6,6kV 2,19A 21,9A 2,63A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
25KVA/22kV 0,66A 6,6A 0,79A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
50kVA/6,6kV 10,27A 102,7A 5,24A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
50KVA/22kV 1,31A 13,1A 1,57A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
100kVA/6,6kV 8,75A 87,5A 10,5A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
100KVA/22kV 2,62A 26,2A 3,15A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
150kVA/6,6kV     
150KVA/22kV 3,94A 39,4A 4,72A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
200kVA/6,6kV 17,5A 175A 20,99A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
200KVA/22kV 5,25A 52,5A 6,3A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
300kVA/6,6kV 26,24A 262,4A 31,49A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
300KVA/22kV 7,87A 78,7A 9,45A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
315kVA/6,6kV     
315KVA/22kV 8,27A 82,7A 9,92A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
500kVA/6,6kV     
500KVA/22kV 13,12A 131,2A 15,75A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
750kVA/6,6kV     
750KVA/22kV 19,68A 196,8A 23,62A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
800kVA/6,6kV     
800KVA/22kV 20,99A 209,9A 25,19A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
1000kVA/6,6kV     
1000KVA/22kV 26,24A 262,4A 31,49A Use 10K fuse.  Consult tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE CoP. 
 
 87
Note: A 12K fuse link is a non-standard fuse, which is not readily available 
from a maintenance point of view.  Therefore, under fault conditions the 
possibility to replace the blown 12K fuse with a similar one is possible.  A 
more standard fuse is suggested, namely a 10K.  The characteristics of a 10K 
and 12K fuse are exactly the same.  The only major difference is that the 12K 
can sustain 3 amperes more than the 10K fuse and grade a lesser fault 
current with other fuses. 
 
8.7.4 Digsilent Power Factory 
 
All the case studies were built on Digsilent 14.0.  All the simulations performed 
were identical, namely, loadflows, protection and co-ordination simulations et 
cetera.  The Digsilent simulation results were compared to the protection 
calculations.  If any differences were evident, both the protection and Digsilent 
methodologies were revisited.  It must be noted that Digsilent computer-based 
programmes were never initially used in analysing the NMBM power system.  
Therefore, the results obtained from Digsilent will be recommended for 
improvement to the betterment of the power system. 
 
Table 8.5 - Co-ordination between EEI-NEMA Type K Fuse Links (Adapted from Anderson,1999) 
 
Protecting Protected link rating (amperes) 
Fuse Link 8K 10K 12K 15K 20K 25K 30K 40K 50K 65K 80K 100 140 200 
Rating A Maximum fault current at which B will protect A (amperes) 
6K  190 350 510 650 840 1060 1340 1700 2200 2800 3900 5800 9200 
8K   210 440 650 840 1060 1340 1700 2200 2800 3900 5800 9200 
10K    300 540 840 1060 1340 1700 2200 2800 3900 5800 9200 
12K     320 710 1050 1340 1700 2200 2800 3900 5800 9200 
15K      430 780 1340 1700 2200 2800 3900 5800 9200 
20K       500 1100 1700 2200 2800 3900 5800 9200 
25K        660 1350 2200 2800 3900 5800 9200 
30K         850 1700 2800 3900 5800 9200 
40K          1100 2200 3900 5800 9200 
50K           1450 3500 5800 9200 
65K            2400 5800 9200 
80K             4500 9200 
100K             2000 9100 
140K              4000 
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A decision must be made whether to use the Digsilent simulation results or 
that of the protection tests and calculations and this would become the NMBM 
philosophy.  Whichever one is decided upon will result in some form of 
compromise in terms of the equipment to be protected.  
 
The co-ordination Table 8.5 shows the maximum values of the fault current at 
which Type K and T fuse will co-ordinate.  The tables are provided by 
McGraw-Edison Power Systems, Cooper Industries.  The tables will be used 
in the case studies to determine the co-ordination of fuses with each other.  
Table 8.5 will be used in conjunction with the Digsilent simulations and the 
protection calculations. 
 
8.7.5 Scada 
 
No common trends are evident.  In certain case studies, SCADA is non-
existent.  Recommendations to install SCADA at Summit and Fitches Corner 
substations will be forwarded to the NMBM. 
 
8.7.6 Maintenance and Manpower 
 
Routine preventative maintenance is critical for power system reliability and 
for the continuity of supply.  Maintenance is critical and the lack of it will result 
in disaster.  Maintenance tends to be neglected and is the cause of many 
outages, which can be prevented if maintenance is performed regularly. 
 
Manpower is the driving force behind any maintenance programme.  Properly 
trained and skilled staff is critical in the success of any maintenance 
programme.   
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8.7.7 Weather Conditions 
 
The impact of weather conditions on all the case studies is almost identical.  
All the case studies, apart from the Motherwell North feeder, is bare conductor 
and the Kragga Kamma Greenbushes feeder is constructed in cable, bare 
conductor and ABC.  The impact of weather conditions, namely, rain, storm, 
wind is less on arial bundle conductor.  Extensive outage time is evident in 
these case studies.  The extensive outages are mainly caused by adverse 
weather conditions.  
 
8.7.8 NRS Data analysis 
 
It is a necessity that the NMBM power network must fulfil the requirements of 
the NRS in order to keep its licensee status.  No common trends are evident 
in the case studies. 
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CHAPTER 9: ANALYSIS OF FITCHES CORNER BLUE HORIZON 
BAY FEEDER (FBH) 
 
9.1 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
The Blue Horizon Bay network is not a reliable power system.  In terms of 
system adequacy, the network satisfies certain of the criteria to provide power 
to its customers.  All the equipment necessary to provide power is available, but 
the question is: How reliable is it; when was it last maintained and when was 
the equipment repaired or replaced?  In terms of system security, the network 
is not competent to sustain severe disturbances, as the protection equipment 
does not function properly, preventative maintenance have not been done and 
automation devices have not been installed. 
 
The factors influencing the reliability of a network are: 
 
 Weather conditions; 
 Duration of the interruptions; 
 Failure of protection devices; 
 Radial topology, and 
 Failure rate, (Bollen, 2000). 
 
The researcher concurs with Bollen as the statistics on the interruption data 
confirmed the above factors, namely, Annexure 1B equations 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 
below.  The network is a radial power system and the protection devices are 
not functioning properly. 
 
In terms of the duration of an interruption, Bollen argues that the location of 
faults can be assisted by automation of the power system.  The use of SCADA 
will impact on the location of the fault and switching can be done remotely, 
which will all lead to reduced outage time.   
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Calculating the power system average outage time 
 
Us = rs λs           (2.1) 
 = 87 x 352.15 
 = 30637.05/5 yrs 
 = 6127.41 hrs/yr 
 
Calculating the average outage cost 
 
P   = 885.9 kW              (4.15) 
Cost per kW  = 0.363 (Calculated over 5 years) 
 
Outage cost =   
Li
Ci(d)       (2.5) 
  = 
685.9
352.2 X 0.363  
  = R 0.186/kW 
  = 18.6 cents/kW 
 
Calculating Reliability Indices 
 
Calculated SAIDI = 4225.8 min/yr     (2.2) 
Calculated SAIFI = 17.4 int/yr      (2.3) 
Calculated CAIDI = 242.9 min/yr      (2.4) 
 
It is obvious that the calculated reliability data does not comply with the 
standard outlined by Burke (1994) in Chapter 8, Table 8.1.  It means that this 
power system under-performed for the 5 year period the data was collected.  
 
9.2 POWER QUALITY 
 
9.2.1 Voltage Dips 
The Blue Horizon Bay network is predominantly overhead line, therefore the 
majority of faults will be transient faults which could be cleared by an auto-
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recloser.  The expulsion fuses should clear permanent faults on the lateral 
lines.  In rural power systems, it is sometimes very complicated to identify 
faults.  This impacts on the reliability indices and outage times. 
 
The Vectograph voltage dip data recorded over twelve months has been 
summarised in Table 9.1 below. 
 
Table 9.1 – Voltage Dips – Fitches Corner Substation - Jan 08 to Dec 08 
 
 S T X1 X2 Y Z1 Z2 
% 
Not  
avail 
Jan 08 3 0 3 0 24 1 0 13,3 
Feb 08 5 0 19 2 40 2 4 6.6 
Mar 08 1 0 2 1 6 2 0 92 
Apr 08 1 6 1 2 21 3 1 4 
May 08 2 0 2 0 17 3 0 0,4 
June 08 0 0 1 0 10 0 0 45,2 
July 08 3 1 1 1 18 0 0 0,6 
Aug 08 3 1 7 1 14 0 0 66,8 
Sep 08 2 5 1 1 22 1 0 0,5 
Oct 08 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 68,0 
Nov 08 6 0 3 0 37 1 5 0,7 
Dec 08 4 2 3 5 29 1 0 80,6 
Total 30 15 43 13 241 14 10  
 
 
From the Table it can be concluded that Y-dips are the problematic ones.  But, 
according to Table 3.2 the depth of these dips is shallow (15% to 30%) and the 
duration is normally not longer than approximately 100 ms, and since many of 
these dips are caused by neighbouring networks they are regarded as 
insignificant.  The customers are responsible for protecting their equipment 
against Y-dips.  If Table 9.1 is compared to Table 3.1, it is obvious that 
improvement is necessary.  
 
Many factors could influence the voltage dips, namely: 
 
 Maintenance, not being regularly performed; 
 Operation of questionable protection devices; 
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 The age of the equipment which in this case is approximately 40 years; 
 Bird and animal protection, 
 Bad weather conditions as per Annexure 1B, and  
 The omitting of surge arrestors. 
 
9.2.2 Harmonics 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the international benchmark of 5% depicted by Burke (1994) and 
the NRS 048-2:2003, which allows a total harmonic distortion of not more than 
8%.  According to the assessment, no sign of harmonics disorder could be 
determined.  Power quality data recorded indicates that the harmonics 
measured on this power system are within the parameters of the NRS 048-
2:2003. 
   
9.2.3 Flickering 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark of between 0.8% and 1.25% as per NRS 048-
2:2001.  According to the assessment, no signs of flickering could be 
determined.  Power quality data recorded indicates that the flickering measured 
on this power system is within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2001. 
   
9.2.4 Voltage Regulation 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark of ±5% for power systems above 500 V as per 
NRS 048-2:2001.  According to the assessment, no signs of voltage regulation 
irregularities could be determined.  Power quality data recorded indicates that 
the voltage regulation measured on this power system is within the parameters 
of the NRS 048-2:2003. 
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9.3 POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
 
9.3.1 Current Transformers 
Since this is an old power system, it would be wise to check the current 
transformers.  It is important for current transformers to stay accurate because 
they must sustain high fault currents during fault conditions.  If the current 
transformer is inaccurate, the protection equipment will operate incorrectly.   
 
Calculating ALF 
Current rating of overhead line = 365 A; use 400 A 
Load current    = 60 A; use 100A 
FLI      = 262 A; use 300 A             (4.1) 
CT Ratio    = 100/1 
CT Class    = 15T10/7.5T10 
Available tapings on CT are 50% to 200% 
 
At 50% plug setting I  = 0.5 x 100 = 50 A   
At 100% plug setting I  = 1 x 100 = 100 A   
At 125% plug setting I  = 1.25 x 100 = 125 A   
At 150% plug setting I  = 1.5 x 100 = 150 A   
At 200% plug setting I  = 2 x 100 = 200 A   
 
faultI      = 2151 A               (4.2) 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 2119 A – Annexure 1C)  
 
ALF at 50 A    = 43.02              (4.3) 
ALF at 100 A    = 21.51 
ALF at 125 A    = 17.21 
ALF at 150 A    = 14.34 
ALF at 200 A    = 10.76 
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Twice the full load current of the system is approximately 120 A (use 150 A).  
That equates to a plug setting of 150% and an ALF of 14.34 (use ALF of 15) 
(Prévé, 2006).  It also allows for load growth and flexibility in terms of grading. 
 
One other important fact is that the overhead line can carry approximately 400 
A, but the full load current of the transformer is only 262 A.  The transformer not 
only supplies this feeder, but it also supplies one other 22 kV and a 6.6 kV 
network.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that this feeder will be loaded to its full 
capacity.  
 
Determining the knee point voltage 
Assume VA rating   = 15 VA   
Impedance of Burden  = 15               (4.16) 
Assume CT secondary resistance = 0.1   
Total secondary impedance = 15.1              (4.17) 
ALF (Using maximum most downstream fault  -  Annexure 1D  
     = 13.5; use 15                      (4.3) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (15) = 226.5 V             (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (20) = 302 V             (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (30) = 453 V             (4.18) 
 
Using an ALF of 15 and assuming the VA rating of the CT is 15 VA results in an 
emf of 226.5 V.  The values in Annexure 1J indicate that the knee-point voltage 
is approximately 250 V.  According to Table 4.1 (Chapter 4.3) a 10P CT allows 
a 10% error.  Comparing this against the calculated knee point voltage and that 
of Annexure 1E, it is within the required parameters. 
 
The class 10P CT is perfect for this application.  Prévé (2006) states that a 10P 
CT is suitable for overcurrent protection. 
 
S = 15.1 VA                 (4.4) 
Max allowable primary current (ALC) = 1500 A           (4.18) 
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The three phase fault current of 2151 A (2119 A Digsilent) is more than the 
allowable primary current that the CT’s will be able to sustain.  Therefore, these 
CT’s will not be suitable for this application and CT’s with higher ALF should be 
used.     
 
When selecting an ALF of 20, the ALC increases to 2000 A and when selecting 
an ALF of 30, the ALC increases to 3000 A.  This will impact on the emf at the 
secondary, which will increase to 302 V and 453 V respectively as calculations 
show.  These CT’s are old and the class and VA rating are dubious.  It is 
recommended that the current CT’s installed be replaced.  
 
From all of the above, it is evident that the most suitable CT to be used should 
be an 10P30 15 VA.  
 
An alternative solution is as follows: 
Use a 200/1 
At 100% plug setting I   = 1 x 200 = 200 A 
ALF at 200 A     = 13.5 (use 15)            (4.3) 
Max allowable primary current (ALC) = 3000 A           (4.19) 
 
It is evident that the most suitable CT to be used should be a 10P15 15 VA.  
   
A maintenance test was arranged to verify the accuracy of the CT’s in terms of 
primary injection and insulation resistance.  The primary injection test results 
are as follows: 
Note: primary injected current is 100A 
100/1 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 1005 mA 0 mA 0 mA 1008 mA 
Red-White 990 mA 999 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 1004 mA 0 mA 1003 mA 0 mA 
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Comparing the test results to that of Table 4.1 (Chapter 4.3), it is evident that 
the CT's pass the test, but the CT’s will not be able to withstand the fault 
current. 
 
The above analysis confirms that the CT’s must be replaced with 200/1 CT’s. 
  
9.3.2 Fault Calculations 
sourceZ  = 1.22 pu                          (4.5) 
10MVAtrfZ  = 0.972                 (4.6) 
baseZ  = 4.84                  (4.8) 
 
Zact   = R + jXL 
   0.244 + j0.345 
   0.224 + j0.345 
   0.411   57.080Ω 
 
22kVlineZ  = 0.0859 pu                (4.7) 
1MVAtrfZ  = 5.09 pu                (4.6) 
 
faultZ  = 1MVAtrfZ22kVlineA10MVAZsourceZ   
  = 1.22 + 0.972 + 0.085 + 5.09 
  = 7.367 pu 
 
pu faultZ  = 7.36
1  
  = 0.136 pu 
 
b6.6Z  = 8.747 kA                         (4.9) 
b6.6V  = 3.811 kV                         (4.10) 
b22V   = 12.702 kV                         (4.10) 
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Fault current at 6.6 kV busbar: 
faultI   = pu faultI X b6.6I  
= 8.746 x 0.136 
  = 1.19 kA 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 1350 A – Annexure 1D)  
 
Fault current at 22 kV transformer: 
faultZ  = 22kVlineZ10MVAZsourceZ   
  = 1.22 + 0.972 + 0.085 
  = 2.277 pu 
 
pu faultI  = 2.277
1  
  = 0.439 pu 
 
b22I   = 2.624 kA                          (4.9) 
b22V   = 12.102 kV                         (4.10) 
    
 faultI   = pu faultI X b22I  
= 2.624 x 0.439 
  = 1.15 kA 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 1471 A – Annexure 1F )  
 
9.3.3 Relay Settings 
maxI    = 60 A  
min faultI  = 1230 A (minimum most downstream fault current - 
Annexure 1G) 
max faultI  = 1350 A (maximum most downstream fault current-
Annexure 1D) 
CT ratio  = 100:1 
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Plug Setting (PS) = 60%               (4.11) 
Use a plug setting of 100% 
 
PSM (M) at max fault  = 13.5             (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 2.62 sec                                (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (2.623 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.43 sec 
 
TMS     = 0.16             (4.14) 
      Use 0.2 
 
PSM (P) at min fault  = 12.3             (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 2.72 sec                                (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (2.72 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.43 sec 
      
TMS     = 0.16             (4.14) 
      Use 0.2 
 
The relay setting for the above should be 100%, TMS = 0.2 
 
The norm in the NMBM power system is to set the earth fault plug setting at 
20% and the TMS at 0.1. 
 
The SEF must detect low-level earth faults.  The SEF setting will therefore be 
the greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating (PEE Code of Practice 
Number 6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3).  Therefore use 5%, TMS at 
10s. 
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9.3.4 Calculating the Size of the Transformer and Lateral 
Fuses 
fl1MVAI     = 26.24 A                               (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 262.4 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 31.49 A 
 
From above; 
Fault current at 6.6 kV busbar = 1350 A – Annexure 1D  
Fault current at 22 kV busbar = 1471 A – Annexure 1F 
 
The following fuses should be installed at the beginning of the lateral lines 
using the information in Chapter 8.2.3, provided it can grade with other 
equipment.  FBH 4, 52, 58, 64 and 69 – Install 10K fuses. 
 
Grading of lateral lines 
Refer to FBH 24 
 
Install at beginning of the lateral line supplying transformers A 1636, A1393 and 
A1399 10K fuses.   
 
Total load at FBH 24  = 13.11 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 131.1 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 15.73 A 
Use a 20K fuse which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 30 A and 
the inrush current. Table 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted.  
The fuse can sustain an inrush current of approximately 450 A for 0.1 s. 
 
According to Digsilent the fault current is 1595 A if a fault is simulated at the 
primary side of A1349 (Annexure 1H).  According to Digsilent, a 20K fuse 
cannot grade with a 10K fuse at the fault current of 1595 A.  According to Table 
8.5 the only other fuse that can grade is a 50K fuse at 1700 A. Therefore, the 
following fuses should be installed: 
 
 50K fuse at the line side of A1349 
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 10K fuse at the line side of A1635 
 10K fuse at the line side of A1393 and A1399 
 
Refer to FBH 25 
 
Install at beginning of the lateral line supplying transformers A0182 and A0107 
install 10K fuses.  
 
Total load at FBH 25  = 2.62 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 26.2 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 3.15 A 
Use a 10K fuse, which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 15 A and 
the inrush current. Table 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.5 a 10K fuse cannot grade with a 10K fuse.  The only fuse 
that can grade with the downstream 10K fuses at a higher fault current of 1472 
A (Annexure 1I) is a 50K fuse.  This fuse can sustain the inrush current based 
on Table 8.2. 
 
Note: A 10K fuse cannot protect the 100 kVA transformer; it can only protect 
the conductor. 
 
Refer to FBH 24, 25 and 40 
 
Install at the beginning of the lateral line supplying transformers A0309 and 
A0963 10K fuses.   
Install at line side of A0737 using a 10K fuse link 
According to Digsilent, the fault current at A0737 is 1425 A (Annexure 1J).   
 
According to Table 8.5, a 10K fuse cannot grade with a 10K fuse.  The only 
fuse that can grade with the downstream 10K fuses at a higher fault current of 
1425 A is a 50 K fuse.  This fuse can sustain the inrush current based on Table 
8.2.  Therefore, the following fuses should be installed: 
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 50K fuse at the line side of A0737 
 10K fuse at the line side of A0309 
 10K fuse at the line side of A0963 
 
Refer to FBH 77/8 
 
Install at beginning of the lateral line supplying transformers A2168, A2189, 
A1536 and A0766 10K fuses.   
 
Total load at FBH 77/8  = 2.39 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 23.9 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 2.87 A 
Use at the beginning of FBH 77/8 a 10K fuse, which is capable of carrying a 
continuous current of 15 A and the inrush current. Table 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code 
of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.5 a 10K fuse cannot grade with a 10K fuse.  According to 
Digsilent the fault current at A2189 is 1470 A (Annexure 1K). The only fuse that 
can grade with the downstream 10K fuses at a higher fault current of 1470 A is 
a 50K fuse.  This fuse can sustain the inrush current based on Table 8.2.  
Therefore, the following fuses should be installed: 
 
 50K fuse at the start of the spur line 
 10K fuses at the line side of A2168, A2189, A1536 and A0766 
 
Refer to FBH 77/A1 
 
Install at beginning of the lateral line supplying transformer A2170 a 10K fuse.  
 
Total load at FBH 77  = 13.54 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 135.4 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 16.25 A 
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Use at the beginning of FBH 77 a 15K fuse, which is capable of carrying a 
continuous current of 23 A and the inrush current.  Install a 25K fuse protecting 
C0483 capable of carrying a continuous current of 38 A and the inrush current. 
Table 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.5 a 15K fuse cannot grade with a 15K fuse and 10K fuse 
because the fault current of 1453 A is higher than the values in Table 8.5 for 
this particular scenario (Annexure 1L).  The only fuse that can grade with the 
downstream 10K fuse and 15K fuses at a higher fault current is a 50K fuse, 
which grade at 1700 A.  This fuse can sustain the inrush current based on and 
Table 8.2. 
 
9.3.5 Auto-Recloser 
This feeder is predominantly a bare overhead conductor for approximately 20 
kilometres, therefore it would make engineering sense to activate the auto-
reclosing facility of the relay.  The relay is capable of auto-reclosing, but the 
OCB is not capable.  This OCB was installed in 1952 and it cannot auto 
reclose. 
 
Auto-reclosing is a viable solution because a large portion of the overhead line 
is constructed along the coastline and lightning is the cause of many outages.  
Vegetation and animal life along the line also cause problems.  A four shot 
auto-recloser should be considered.   
 
It is critical that the auto-recloser grades with the downstream fuses.  A 
probable solution could be an instantaneous trip to clear transient faults caused 
by lightning, birds, animals and vegetation.  The fuses should clear the 
permanent faults on the lateral lines and the next shots of the auto-recloser 
should clear faults on the main line. 
 
According to PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1, circuit breakers which will be 
used for ARC duties at the beginning of a overhead line should be vacuum or 
SF 6 type rated for cyclical ARC duties.  The circuit breaker panels should be 
equipped with the following protection systems: 
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 2 IDMTL (BS 142 curves) over-current plus high-set elements (OC); 
 1 IDMTL / DTL earth fault element (EF); 
 1 time delayed sensitive earth fault element (SEF), and 
 1 four shot ARC relay. 
 
It is not financially viable to install sectionalisers on this overhead line.  
Therefore, section 2.9 of PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 will apply, which 
states “ARC’s with only fuses downstream are to be set two fast and two 
delayed trips, in order to ensure the rupturing of fuses on faulty sections.” 
 
9.3.6 Sectionalisers 
The installation of sectionalisers at the start of the lateral lines (FBH 77/8, FBH 
77/A1 and FBH 24) was investigated.  This was compared to the installation of 
fuses.  It proved too costly to install sectionalisers for four customers, but the 
recommendation is to rather install more fuses at each customer transformer to 
reduce the outage duration per customer. 
 
The cost of a sectionaliser is R 95 000.00 compared to the cost of expulsion 
fuses at R 15 000.00 each. 
 
9.3.7 Earth Fault Protection 
Since 90% of faults on overhead lines are earth faults, it is imperative that earth 
fault protection is used (Lakervi and Holmes, 2003).  The NMBM on 22kV rural 
lines use earth fault, overcurrent and sensitive earth fault protection as main 
and back up protection in an IDMT relay (NMBM Protection Guidelines). 
 
On the Blue Horizon Bay 22kV overhead line, the Micom relay earth fault 
settings are as follows: 
Plug setting: 20% 
TMS : 0.2 
 
Compare this to the NMBM policy which states the following: 
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Plug setting: 20% 
TMS : 0.1 
 
The difference of 0.1 in the TMS is to grade with the downstream fuses. 
 
9.3.8 Sensitive Earth Fault Protection 
The relay has been programmed at a plug setting of 5% and the TMS = 8 s.  
The SEF must be set to detect low earth faults.  The SEF setting must be the 
greater of 5 A or 3% of the CT primary rating and the TMS = 10 s  (PEE Code 
of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
In many instances, live conductors are found lying on the ground and the earth 
fault current is too low to be detected by the earth fault relay.  The ground is 
also very dry.  This poses a danger to human and animal life.     
 
3% of the CT primary current is 3 A and 5% of the CT primary current is 5 A.  
Therefore 5% is within the standard.  The TMS must change to 10 s, which is 
within the NMBM policy.    
 
9.3.9 Surge Arrestors 
Lightning is one of the main causes of power outages on overhead lines and it 
is difficult to associate power outages with lightning activity (Dugan et al, 2003).  
This is true if the power system is situated in the remote rural areas, making it 
difficult for staff to locate the fault.  Many unknown power outages and voltage 
dips in the NMBM can be attributed to lightning activity along the power lines.  
Flashovers could be reduced, resulting in fewer power quality problems.  From 
the investigations it is evident that not much has been done to increase the 
number of surge arrestors.  It is suggested that more surge arrestors can be 
installed.  The current policy states that surge arrestors should be installed on 
the transformer pole or at the beginning of a lateral line.  From the 
investigations, not all of these poles have surge arrestors installed.    
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Lakervi and Holmes (2003) and Dugan et al (2003) recommend that surge 
arrestors should be allocated close to the equipment they protect and installed 
on every second or third pole.  This is an expensive method to ensure security 
of supply, but this will ultimately reduce the power quality problems and 
unknown power outages.   
 
9.4 DIGSILENT POWER FACTORY 
 
The Fitches Corner – Blue Horizon Bay 22 kV overhead line was modelled on 
Digsilent.  Fault analysis and protection simulation data was compared with the 
protection fault calculations.  The Digsilent and Protection sub-sections should 
be read together. 
 
According to the information in Chapter 8.7.3 a 25K fuse should be installed.  
The analysis below will prove why a 25K fuse cannot be used for this 
application. 
 
Refer to Annexure 1M – determining the fuse to protect the 1MVA transformer 
Fuse 1- 20K  
 This fuse protects the transformer perfectly; 
 It has a reasonable overload duration before damage to the transformer 
can occur; 
 Maintains a reasonable clear margin with the relay at Fitches Corner 
substation, and 
 It grades perfectly with the relay at Fitches Corner. 
 
Fuse 2 – 30K 
 This fuse does not protect the transformer; 
 It protects the cable, and 
 Adjustments to settings at Fitches Corner will increase the delay time. 
 
Fuse 3 – 15K 
 This fuse protects the transformer perfectly; 
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 It has a smaller overload margin than fuse 1, and 
 It discriminates perfectly with the relay at Fitches Corner. 
 
It was discovered that 140 A striker pin fuses are installed to protect the 6.6 kV 
cable network.  This fuse will never blow and actually acts as a solid link.  This 
explains why the source breaker at Fitches Corner trips when a cable fault 
occurs.   
 
As per Annexure 1M, a 15K expulsion fuse will protect both the 1MVA 
transformer and the 6.6 kV cable network.  If a downstream fuse was installed 
to protect the cable network,  the 15K fuse will blow before the downstream 
fuse in the cable network.  If the size of the downstream fuse is reduced to 
grade with the fuse protecting the transformer, the size of the upstream fuse will 
increase.  This will compromise the protection of the transformer.  The 
disadvantage of the latter method is that more sectionalising is required when a 
fault occurs in the cable network.  The advantage of using a 15K or 20K fuse is 
that these fuses will certainly blow during fault conditions.  This method is 
supported by the repair and/or replacement cost of a transformer, which is far 
more expensive.  If compared to the outage time, it is obvious that this is the 
most viable solution.  This is also the only 22/6.6 kV transformer in the power 
network.  A transformer is not readily available as a replacement.   It is 
recommended to install a 20K fuse. 
 
Refer to FBH 40 
According to Annexure 1N, all the 50K fuses grade perfectly with the 10K fuse, 
but they cannot grade with the relay.  The loadflow was run on a three-phase 
fault.    The next larger fuse to grade with the relay is a 30K fuse, but it cannot 
maintain a grading margin of 0.4 s (Annexure 1O).  By using the 30K fuse, the 
protection against the fault current is compromised (30K clears at 1060 A). 
 
Refer to FBH 77/A1 
According to Annexure 1P, the 50K fuse at the beginning of the lateral line 
protects the cable, but it cannot protect the transformer and it does not grade 
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with the relay at a grading margin of 0.4 s.  A 40K fuse grades better with the 
relay, but it still does not maintain a grading margin of 0.4 s (Annexure 1Q), 
thus a 30K fuse operates better.  By using smaller size fuses, the protection 
against fault current is compromised, but the grading margin has improved. 
  
Refer to FBH 77/8 
According to Annexure 1R, the 50K fuse grade well with the 10K, but it does 
not grade with the relay.  Using a 30K (Annexure 1S) as a main fuse improves 
the grading margin, but it still does not maintain a clear grading margin of 0.4 s.  
Protection against fault current is compromised when using smaller fuses. 
  
All the other lateral fuses grade perfectly.  These fuses cannot protect the 
transformer.  They protect the conductor against fault current.  In order to 
protect the transformer with a fuse, the protection of the conductors must be 
compromised.  The alternative would be to protect the transformer with a relay, 
but this makes installation too expensive.  It is more cost effective to replace or 
repair the transformer than protect it. 
 
According to Elmore (2004), it is difficult to grade fuses with relays.  A fuse has 
a more inverse curve than a relay.  It is critical, when grading fuses with relays, 
to observe the maximum time the fuse can carry the fault current without any 
damage to the fuse as well as its melting and clearing time. 
 
9.5 SCADA 
 
The Fitches Corner substation is one of the sites not yet fully commissioned.  
The RTU has been installed but the OCB and the other power system 
equipment is not compatible.  Radio communication in the rural areas is not 
efficient.  This needs to be investigated and additional antennae and/or 
repeaters must be installed. 
 
SCADA systems are primarily installed to improve power system reliability 
(Lakervi, Holmes; 2003).  For this reason, it is important to investigate why the 
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system cannot function properly.  The Fitches Corner substation is situated 
approximately 40 kilometres from Port Elizabeth.  This substation supplies an 
upmarket residential area and many chicken and milk farmers.  The industry is 
extending towards the rural areas probably because it is more cost effective to 
purchase or hire property here.  If the city wants to encourage investment and 
tourism, it is imperative that power system reliability must be improved.     
 
9.6 MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
According to NMBM records, only certain power system equipment has been 
maintained.  The last record  was dated November 2006, which was for 
maintaining the fuse units in the Blue Horizon Bay substation.  The transformer 
at Blue Horizon Bay was last maintained in April 2005, when the silica gel was 
replaced.  At Fitches Corner, the 10 MVA transformer was maintained in 
November 2003 and no detail of any maintenance could be found for the 22/6.6 
kV transformer.  From the site visits it is evident that this transformer is in a bad 
state.  The substation has two battery chargers, namely, a 30 volt and 110 volt.  
The 30 volt battery charger was maintained in September 2005 and the 110 
volt battery charger in November 2002.  The protection relay does not operate, 
because the battery charger was faulty.   
 
No overhead line maintenance records are available.  Line inspectors would 
inspect the overhead line and associated equipment 3 to 4 times annually and 
report faulty equipment to management.  A shutdown would then be arranged 
to repair or replace the faulty equipment.  The shortcoming to this approach is 
that only the equipment on ground level can be inspected.  Many times, the 
equipment on poles fails.  This is what Lohmann (n.d) called detective 
maintenance.  In order to perform this type of maintenance properly on high 
voltage electrical equipment, the plant must be shut down.  A follow-up shut 
down can be arranged for maintenance, repair and replacement of equipment. 
 
The protection maintenance is planned in conjunction with the switchgear 
maintenance program.  If a plant is isolated for maintenance, the protection 
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team will on the same day perform their maintenance.  This is not a good 
practice, because protection equipment and switchgear do not have the same 
maintenance intervals. 
 
Maintenance must be controlled by management and performed in accordance 
with a plan or program by a dedicated team (Gill, 1997).  The problem is that 
the NMBM does not have the necessary manpower to perform preventative 
maintenance.  The plans, programs, schedules and management structure 
might be in place, but the NMBM does not have staff to implement them.  Using 
contractors requires more supervision and inspection.  In the case of high 
voltage equipment, the plant must be isolated and earthed properly by suitable 
qualified staff.  The skills shortage adds to the barriers discussed.     
 
The run-to-fail practice of the NMBM is costing the customers because 
extended outages lead to lost of production and impact negatively on industry.  
This is not only a concern for NMBM, but rather a concern affecting the entire 
electrical industry. 
 
9.7 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
Dugan et al (2003), state that weather conditions cause major power outages, 
especially lightning.  This is confirmed in the case study and Annexure 1B.   
 
From the analysis of the faults, it is apparent that 47% of all the outages in this 
case study are caused by adverse weather conditions.  A large percentage of 
the not established outages can also be associated with adverse weather 
conditions.  From Table 8.1 it is evident that high winds cause many outages 
(32% of outage rate).  The figure for the NMBM is probably higher than 32%. 
 
Weather impacts on power system reliability and increases outage durations, 
reliability indices and power quality statistics.  Solutions must be built in during 
the design of power systems.  It is not always possible to design power 
systems which will not be severely affected by weather conditions.  Budgetary 
 111
constraints prevent this, thus in later years power systems become problematic 
and under-perform.  Routine planned maintenance is critical in rural bare 
conductor lines, namely, vegetation control, conductor tensioning, routine 
inspections of the equipment, the installation of more surge arrestors et cetera.  
 
9.8 NRS DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The NRS spreadsheet provides valuable information with respect to outages, 
equipment failures, planned and unplanned interruptions et cetera.  The 
statistics obtained from the NRS spreadsheet could be used to evaluate the 
performance of the network. 
 
The historical data available at the time of the investigation was retrieved and 
captured into the NRS spreadsheet.  From this it is evident that the Fitches 
Corner – Blue Horizon Bay 22kV power network under-performed in terms of 
restoration times.  Refer to Annexure 1T.  It is a requirement that 30% of the 
supply must be restored in 1.5 hours, 60% in 3.5 hours, 90% in 7.5 hours and 
100% in 24 hours.  The network only complies with the 60% and 100% 
categories.  The major impact on customers is in the first 2 hours without 
supply.   
 
It is evident that fuses, which are hardware equipment, are the main cause of 
outages.  Reasons for the blowing of fuses are transient faults, lack of grading 
with upstream protection equipment, lack of power line maintenance, adverse 
weather conditions, lightning, animals, birds et cetera.  Appropriate action must 
be taken to improve the power system reliability. 
 
9.9  FINDINGS 
 
The findings based on the analysis in terms of the criteria described in the 
literature review: 
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 The FBH overhead line is exposed to weather conditions, namely, storm, 
rain, wind and lightning. 
 The ARC does not operate. 
 The OCB is very old. 
 The calculated reliability data below, does not comply with the standard: 
 SAIDI = 4225.8 min/yr 
 SAIFI = 17.4 int/yr 
 CAIDI = 242.9 min/yr 
 The FBH overhead line meets the requirements in term of system 
adequacy as the conductors can sustain the load requirement. 
 The FBH overhead line does not comply in term of system security as the 
overhead line cannot sustain severe disturbances. 
 Only 1 voltage transformer is available at Fitches Corner substation.  
Therefore the Vectograph dip recording will be the same for both FBH and 
FCR. 
 The FBH overhead line under-performed in terms of voltage dips.  The 
recorded voltage dips exceed the voltage dip category benchmarks. 
 The harmonic, flickering and voltage regulation measurements are within 
the parameters of the standard. 
 Relay and fuses does not grade properly. 
 The class and VA rating of the CT’s are not available. 
 The 10 MVA transformer and the overhead line conductor are capable of 
carrying the load. 
 The 1 MVA transformer is not protected. 
 The calculated specifications for the CT’s are 10P15 15 VA. 
 The calculated fault level is 1.2 kA and the Digsilent simulation is 1.5 kA. 
 The relay settings are calculated as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.2 
 The sensitive earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 5% 
 TMS  = 8 s 
 The earth fault settings are: 
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 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.2 
 Lateral lines FHB 4, 25, 40, 58 and the 1 MVA transformer at Blue Horizon 
Bay are not protected with expulsion fuses.   
 Many pole mounted transformers are not protected with expulsion fuses. 
 SCADA supervisory system is not installed on the FBH overhead line. 
 No maintenance records are available for the overhead line. 
 Maintenance records are available for the transformers and battery 
chargers. 
 The effect of no maintenance being done increases outage durations.  
 The shortage of manpower hampers maintenance programs. 
 Adverse weather conditions have a major impact on the FBH overhead 
line.  47% of all outages are directly linked to adverse weather conditions. 
 Installation of a sectionaliser is not financially viable. 
 Bird and animal life is prevalent along FBH overhead line. 
 Not many surge arrestors were found on the FBH overhead line. 
 The FBH overhead line does not comply with the 30% and 90% NRS 
categories. 
 
9.10  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To improve power system reliability the following points are recommended: 
 
 The OCB should be replaced as it is very old and the technology is 
outdated; 
 Improve maintenance initiatives, namely, inspection, replacement of 
equipment, servicing of equipment, tensioning of conductors, doing 
vegetation control and installing animal and bird guards; 
 Install new OCB/ARC and program for 4 shots (1 instantaneous and 3 
delayed trips); 
 More expulsion fuses should be installed; 
 More surge arrestors should be installed on every second or third pole; 
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 The manpower and skills shortages should be addressed.  This can be 
done by developing the skills of internal staff; 
 The SCADA supervisory system should be commissioned at Fitches 
Corner substation; 
 Fuse blowing technology versus fuse saving technology should be 
investigated.  Fuse blowing will reduce the voltage dips and fuse saving 
reduce the outage time; 
 Replace the CT’s with 10P15 15VA, ratio 100/1; 
 The relay settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.2; 
 The sensitive earth fault settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 5% 
 TMS  = 10 s; 
 The earth fault settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.1; 
 Fuses should be installed as per the Protection and Digsilent sub-
headings as follows: 
 FBH 4 – Install 10K fuse 
 FBH 24 – Install 30K fuse 
 FBH 24 – Install 30K fuse 
 FBH 25 – Install 30K fuse 
 FBH 40 – Install 30K fuse 
 FBH 52 – Install 10K fuse 
 FBH 58 – Install 10K fuse 
 FBH 64 – Install 10K fuse 
 FBH 69 – Install 10K fuse 
 FBH 77/8 – Install 30K fuse 
 FBH 77/A1 – Install 30K fuse 
 A1836 – Install 10K fuse 
 A1393 – Install 10K fuse 
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 A0107 – Install 10K fuse 
 A0309 – Install 10K fuse 
 A0953 – Install 10K fuse 
 A2168 – Install 10K fuse 
 A2189 – Install 10K fuse 
 A1536 – Install 10K fuse 
 A0766 – Install 10K fuse 
 A2170 – Install 10K fuse 
 C0483 – Install 25K fuse 
 Blue Horizon Bay transformer – Install 20K fuse; 
 Automation devices should be installed at critical points in the power 
network, and 
 In the design and planning phase of a network, the weather conditions 
should be taken into consideration. 
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CHAPTER 10: ANALYSIS OF SUMMIT GAMTOOS PUMPS 
FEEDER (SGP) 
 
10.1 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
The Summit-Gamtoos Pumps 22kV feeder is not reliable.  The line tripped 71 
times in 5 years.  This is an average of 14 trips per year and approximately 1 to 
2 times a month.  The average outage duration is calculated at 3576.98 hours 
per year, which amounts to approximately 298 hours per month.  The cost of 
the outages in terms of power not delivered is calculated at 12.71 cents per 
kWh. 
 
In terms of system adequacy, the system meets the minimum requirements, 
namely, the current capacity of conductors can sustain the load requirement 
and is lightly loaded at 17 A, whereas the conductor can be loaded to 202 A.  
The structure is in good condition and the equipment is approximately 20 years 
old.  With a little more maintenance, this can improve.  In terms of system 
security, the power system fails.  The protection equipment is outdated and 
there is no alternative power supply to the system. 
 
Factors influencing the power system: 
 
 The power system is a radial system and there is no possibility of an 
alternative supply when an outage occurs. 
 Weather conditions have a major impact on the power system.  As per 
Annexure 2B, 45 trips could be linked to adverse weather conditions. 
 The duration of the outages is not acceptable in terms of the calculated 
average outage time. 
 The failure rate will decrease if maintenance programs are implemented. 
 The protection relay failed and does not have a SEF facility. 
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Calculating the power system average outage time 
 
Us = rs λs           (2.1) 
 = 71 x 251.9 
 = 17884.9/5 yrs 
 = 3576.98 hrs/yr 
 
Calculating the average outage cost 
 
P   = 720.19 kW      (4.15) 
 
Outage cost =   
Li
Ci(d)       (2.5) 
  = 
720.19
251.9 X 0.363  
  = R 0.12714 per kW 
  = 12.7 cents/kW 
 
Calculating Reliability Indices 
 
Calculated SAIDI = 3023 min/yr      (2.2) 
Calculated SAIFI = 14.2 int/yr          (2.3) 
Calculated CAIDI = 212.89 min/yr     (2.4) 
 
It is obvious that the calculated reliability data does not comply with the 
standard stated by Burke (1994) in Chapter 8, Table 8.1.  This means that this 
power system under-performed for the period when the data was collected.  
 
10.2 POWER QUALITY 
 
10.2.1 Voltage Dips 
The Summit-Gamtoos Pumps power system is an overhead line and therefore 
many of the voltage dips and outages could be ascribed to transient faults.  
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Many of these faults could be cleared by properly co-ordinated protection 
devices, namely, auto-recloser and lateral expulsion fuses. 
  
The Vectograph voltage dip data recorded over 12 months have been 
summarised in Table 10.1 below. 
 
Table 10.1 – Voltage Dips – Summit Substation - Jan 08 to Dec 08 
      
         
Month S T X1 X2 Y Z1 Z2 
% 
Not 
Avail 
Jan 08 2 1 3 0 11 0 0 0 
Feb 08 4 0 1 1 14 0 0 0 
Mar 08 4 3 2 1 44 1 0 0 
Apr 08 2 0 9 14 140 4 0 3 
May 08 8 0 0 0 38 2 0 0 
June 08 2 0 1 0 33 0 0 5 
July 08 8 2 0 1 30 0 0 0 
Aug 08 7 2 12 2 33 2 2 13 
Sep 08 2 1 0 0 17 0 1 0 
Oct 08 3 1 2 1 63 2 1 3 
Nov 08 1 0 2 0 70 1 0 0 
Dec 08 4 1 2 0 37 1 0 0 
Total 47 11 34 20 530 13 4  
 
Many factors could influence the voltage dips, namely: 
 
 Animal and bird life along the overhead line;  
 Poor maintenance; 
 Poor operation of protection devices; 
 The age of the equipment; 
 Weather conditions (which is affecting the network severely, as per 
Annexure 2B), and  
 Omitting of surge arrestors. 
 
Comparing the data in Table 8.1 to that of Table 3.1 (Chapter 3.2.1), it is 
evident that the power system is under-performing.  Only the Z2 dips are within 
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the required limits.  Y dips are regarded as insignificant as they are not used to 
regulate the utility on the basis of the power system performance (NRS 048-
2:2001).  The S and X1 dips are the problematic ones.  By applying the 
interventions mentioned, the number of dips can be reduced.  Improvement is 
essential for a reliable power system. 
 
From the voltage dip data, a majority of their origins cannot be determined.  It 
can only be assumed that the reporting of incidents is incorrect and/or factors, 
namely, bird and animal life along the power line, vegetation, human 
interference and adverse weather conditions are responsible for them.  Many of 
the X, Y and Z dips could also be the result of switching activities, faults and 
voltage dips on neighbouring and other power networks.   
 
10.2.2 Harmonics 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the international benchmark of 5% stated by Burke (1994) and the 
NRS 048-2:2003 which allows a total harmonic distortion of not more than 8%.  
According to the assessment, no signs of harmonics disorders could be 
identified.  Power quality data recorded indicates that the harmonics measured 
on this power system are within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2003. 
 
10.2.3 Flickering 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark of between 0.8% and 1.25% as per NRS 048-
2:2001.  According to the assessment, no signs of flickering could be identified.  
Power quality data recorded indicates that the flickering measured on this 
power system is within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2001. 
 
10.2.4 Voltage Regulation 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark of ±5% for power systems above 500 V as per 
NRS 048-2:2001.  According to the assessment, no signs of voltage regulation 
irregularities could be identified.  Power quality data recorded indicates that the 
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voltage regulation measured on this power system is within the parameters of 
the NRS 048-2:2003. 
 
10.3 POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
 
10.3.1 Current Transformers 
Since the SGP power system is a relatively old power system, it would be 
expected that the current transformers are checked to stay accurate because 
they must sustain high fault currents during fault conditions.  If the current 
transformer is inaccurate, the protection equipment will operate incorrectly. 
 
Calculating ALF 
Current rating of overhead line = 202 A; use 200 A 
Load current = 17 A; use 100A (from annual load test 
report) 
FLI      = 262 A  
CT Ratio    = 400/5 
CT Class    = T10 15 VA 
Available tapings on CT are 50% to 200% 
 
At 50% plug setting I  = 0.5 x 400 = 200 A   
At 100% plug setting I  = 1 x 400 = 400 A   
At 125% plug setting I  = 1.25 x 400 = 500 A   
At 150% plug setting I  = 1.5 x 400 = 600 A   
At 200% plug setting I  = 2 x 400 = 800 A   
 
faultI      = 2670 A              (4.2) 
(Attached see Annexure 2C: fault level = 2665A)  
 
ALF at 200 A    = 13.3              (4.3) 
ALF at 400 A    = 6.7              (4.3) 
ALF at 500 A    = 5.3              (4.3) 
ALF at 600 A    = 4.5              (4.3) 
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ALF at 800 A    = 3.3              (4.3) 
 
Twice the full load current of the system is approximately 34 A.  The minimum 
plug setting must be used, which is 50%.  The calculated ALF is 13.3 (use ALF 
of 15).  This also allows for load growth and flexibility in terms of grading. 
 
The overhead line can carry approximately 200 A, but the full load current of 
the transformer is only 262 A.  This transformer is not only supplying this 
feeder.  It is highly likely that the load will increase in the near future due to new 
developments in the area.  
 
Determining the knee point voltage 
VA rating    = 15 VA 
Impedance of Burden  = 0.6               (4.16) 
Assume CT secondary resistance = 0.1   
Total secondary impedance = 0,7               (4.17) 
ALF (Annexure 2D: fault level  =  1323A)    
     = 3.3 use 5            (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (5) = 17.5 V                       (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (10) = 35 V                       (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (15) = 52.5 V              (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (20) = 70 V              (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (30) = 105 V             (4.18) 
 
If an ALF of 30 is used, the resultant emf is 105 V.  This, in terms of Annexure 
2D, is correct.  Prévé (2006) states that if the ALF is large, the CT is less likely 
to become saturated.  Therefore, the installed CT should have an ALF of 30, 
which is within Prévé’s parameters.  The graph in Annexure 2E indicates that 
the knee-point voltage is approximately 105 V. 
 
The class 10P CT is perfect for this application.  Prévé (2006) states that 10P is 
suitable for overcurrent protection, as in this case. 
 
S = 17.5 VA                 (4.4) 
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Max allowable primary current (ALC)  = 12000 A          (4.19) 
 
The maximum allowable primary current of 12000 A exceeds the maximum 
fault current of 2670 A (Digsilent 2665 A – Annexure 2C). 
 
A maintenance test was arranged to verify the accuracy of the CT’s in terms of 
primary injection and insulation resistance.  The primary injection test results 
are as follows: 
Note: primary injected current is 100A 
Core 1: 400/5 Red White Blue Neutral 
Red-Neutral 0 mA 1250 mA 0 mA 1250 mA 
Red-White 0 mA 1250 mA 1250 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 1250 mA 1250 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
 
Core 2: 400/5 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 1250 mA 0 mA 0 mA 1250 mA 
Red-White 1250 mA 1250 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 1250 mA 0 mA 1250 mA 0 mA 
 
Comparing the test results to that of Table 4.1 (Chapter 4.3), it is evident that 
the CT's pass the test.  From all of the above, it is evident that the most suitable 
CT to be used should be a 10P30 15 VA.  The tests conducted are proof that 
the CT is in perfect working order.  
 
10.3.2 Fault Calculations 
sourceZ   = 0.99 pu                                            (4.5) 
baseZ   = 4.84                 (4.8) 
 
ACTZ   = R + jXL 
    0.356 + j0.3662 
    0.511   45.810Ω 
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22kVlineZ   = 1.106 pu               (4.7) 
 
Fault current at 22 kV system: 
faultZ   = 22kVlineZsourceZ   
   = 0.99 + 0.106 
   = 1.096 pu 
 
pu faultI   = 1.096
1  
   = 0.912 pu 
 
b22I    = 2.624 kA               (4.9) 
 
faultI    = pu faultIb22I   
= 2.624 x 0.912 
= 2.638 kA (According to Annexure 2C, Digsilent 
simulation indicates 2.665 kA). 
 
10.3.3 Relay Settings 
min faultI   = 1323 A (minimum most downstream fault current-  
Annexure 2D) 
max faultI   = 1420 A (maximum most downstream fault current-  
Annexure 2F) 
CT ratio  = 400:5 
maxI    = 213 A                (4.1) 
 
Plug Setting (PS) = 65.61%              (4.11) 
Use a plug setting of 100% 
 
PSM (M) at max fault  = 3.55             (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 5,46 sec                                (4.13) 
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Relay operating time  = (5.46 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.45 sec 
 
TMS     = 0.08             (4.14) 
      Use 0.1 minimum 
 
PSM (P) at min fault  = 3.31             (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 5.78 sec                                (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (5.78 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.46 sec 
 
TMS     = 0.08             (4.14) 
      Use 0.1 minimum 
 
The standard for the NMBM power system is to set the earth fault plug setting 
at 20% and the TMS at 0.1 (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of 
MV Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
The SEF must detect low-level earth faults.  The SEF setting will therefore be 
the greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating (PEE Code of Practice 
Number 6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3).  It is recommended to use 
3% and TMS = 10 sec. 
 
10.3.4 Calculating the Fuse Size of the Transformer 
The following fuses should be installed at the beginning of the lateral lines 
using the information in Chapter 8.2.3, provided it can grade with other 
equipment.  SGP 7, 8, 14A, 17, 38 and 43A – Install 10K fuses. 
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Grading of lateral lines 
Refer to SGP 14 
 
Install at beginning of the lateral line supplying transformers A 3572, A3288, 
A3287 and A4120 10K fuses.   
 
Total load at SGP 14  = 10.49 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 104.9 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 12.59 A 
Use a 10K fuse, which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 15 A and 
the inrush current.  Tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all 
consulted. 
 
According to Annexure 2G  the maximum fault current at SGP 14/48 is 2118 A.  
According to Table 8.5 a 10K fuse cannot grade with a 10K fuse.  Only a 65K 
fuse can grade with a 10K fuse at a fault current of 2200 A.  The 65K fuse can 
sustain the inrush current depicted in Table 8.2 and is capable of sustaining the 
permissible overload as per Table 8.2.   
 
Refer to SGP 30 
 
Install at beginning of the lateral line supplying transformers A 2169, A1537, 
A1476, A1506 and A1858 10K fuses.  Install a 15K fuse to protect the Gamtoos 
Mouth feeder.   
 
Total load at SGP 30  = 20.54 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 205.4 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 24.65 A 
 
According to Annexure 2I the maximum fault current on the SGP 30 lateral line 
is 1766 A.  According to Table 8.3, install a 20K fuse capable of sustaining a 
continuous current of 30 A.  According to Table 8.5 a 20K fuse cannot grade 
with a 10K fuse at 1766 A.  The only fuse capable of sustaining this fault 
current is a 65K, fuse which grades perfectly with a 10K and 15K fuse at a 
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maximum fault current of 2200 A.  However, a 65K cannot be used at the 
beginning of the lateral line as well as a downstream fuse.  Therefore, install 
the next higher size fuse, an 80K which can grade with all the downstream 
fuses.   
 
Refer to SGP 30/31 
 
Total load at SGP 30/31  = 16.19 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 161.9 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 19.43 A 
 
According to Annexure 2H, the maximum fault current on the SGP 30/31 lateral 
line is 1764 A.  According to Table 8.3, install a 15K fuse capable of sustaining 
a continuous current of 23 A and according to Table 8.5 a 15K fuse cannot 
grade with a 10K fuse at 1764 A.  The only fuse capable of sustaining this fault 
current is a 65K fuse which grades perfectly with a 10K and 15K fuse at a 
maximum fault current of 2200 A.         
 
Gamtoos Pump Substation 
 
fl750kVAI     = 19.68 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 196.8 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 23.62 A 
 
According to Table 8.3, a 20K fuse can be used as it can sustain a continuous 
current of 30 A.  According to Annexure 2F, the maximum fault current 
simulated at Gamtoos Pump substation is 1420 A.  According to Annexure 2J 
the 20K fuse grades with the relay providing a 0.4 s grading margin, but it 
compromises the protection of the transformer.  However, a 15K fuse at a 
continuous current of 23 A will be able to grade with the upstream relay at a 
grading margin of 0.4 s.  The fuse is also capable of protecting the transformer.  
Annexure 2K confirms this. 
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The permissible overload of the transformer is a fraction more than the 
continuous current of 23 A of the fuse link.  It is suggested that a 15K fuse is 
used to protect the transformers at Gamtoos Pump station.  The 15K fuse, 
according to Table 8.2, can sustain the inrush current. 
 
10.3.5 Auto-Recloser 
The Summit-Gamtoos Pumps 22kV overhead line is constructed with copper 
conductors on wood H-pole structures.  The line is approximately 13 kilometres 
long.  Many traces of dead monkeys were found along the line.  Bird life is also 
prevalent.  The vegetation is relatively dense and the line runs towards the 
coastline.  Due to these factors, it would be to the advantage of the customers 
and the utility in terms of power quality to install an auto-recloser at the 
beginning of the line.  On inspection of the site, it was determined that the TJV 
relay does not provide auto-reclose facility. 
 
Due to the factors mentioned above, auto-relosing is a good option, as it will 
eliminate many unnecessary trips and outages and will impact positively on 
power system reliability.  A four shot auto-recloser should be considered (PEE 
Code of Practice Number 6.1).  But, at the end of the power system is an 
important water pump station supplying water to the city.  It would not be good 
to auto-reclose on these pumps, which will result in stop start.  Therefore ARC 
should be set to one shot and lockout.    
 
10.3.6 Sectionalisers 
The cost of a sectionaliser is R 95 000.00.  The cost of expulsion fuses is R 15 
000.00 each.  A sectionaliser could be installed at SGP 30/1.  This lateral line 
supplies 5 customers and the Gamtoos Mouth Holiday Resort.  The overcurrent 
rating of the sectionaliser should be 80% of the rating of the controlling ARC 
(PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1). 
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10.3.7 Earth Fault Protection 
Since most faults on overhead lines (90%) are earth faults, it is imperative that 
earth fault protection is used.  The NMBM on 22kV rural lines use earth fault, 
overcurrent and sensitive earth fault protection as main and back up protection 
in an IDMT relay (NMBM Protection Guidelines). 
  
On the Summit 22kV overhead line, the ABB REF 610 relay earth fault settings 
are as follows: 
Plug setting: 20% 
TMS: 0.1 
 
Compare this to the NMBM policy, which states the following: 
Plug setting: 20% 
TMS: 0.1 
 
The relay settings are within the NMBM policy. 
 
10.3.8 Sensitive Earth Fault Protection 
On investigation it was found that the TJV protection relay does not have 
sensitive earth fault facilities.  Live conductors in this area were found lying on 
the ground and the earth fault current was too low to be detected by the earth 
fault relay.  This line is targeted by thieves because it is constructed with 
copper conductors.  Copper thieves cut the live conductors using insulated 
tools, or they cut the wooden poles.  The ground is also very dry, thus the earth 
fault does not sense this.  Therefore SEF is a very good option for this line.  
The SEF setting must be the greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating 
and the TMS = 10 s (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV 
Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
On the Summit 22kV overhead line, the ABB REF 610 relay the SEF settings 
are as follows: 
Plug setting: 5% 
TMS : 10 s 
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3% of the CT primary current equals to 12 A.  Therefore 3% is acceptable.  
Therefore 3% and TMS = 10 s are within the NMBM policy. 
  
10.3.9 Surge Arrestors 
According to Dugan et al (2003) lightning is one of the main causes of power 
outages on overhead lines.  Many of the unknown power outages and voltage 
dips could be attributed to lightning activity.  It is evident that not much has 
been done to use more surge arrestors.  The current policy states that surge 
arrestors should be installed on the transformer pole or at the beginning of a 
lateral line.    
 
Lakervi and Holmes (2003) and Dugan et al (2003) state that surge arrestors 
should be allocated close to the equipment they protect and installed on every 
second or third pole.  This will reduce the number of voltage dips and power 
outages and ultimately, the number of unknown power quality events.  This is 
an expensive method to ensure security of supply, but it ultimately reduces 
power quality problems and unknown power outages.  It is strongly 
recommended that more surge arrestors be installed as this power system 
provides power to an important pump station which supplies water to Port 
Elizabeth.  
 
10.4 DIGSILENT POWER FACTORY 
 
The Summit-Gamtoos Pumps 22 kV overhead line was modelled on Digsilent.  
Fault analysis grading and protection simulation was done.  This was compared 
to the protection fault calculations.  The Digsilent and Protection sub-sections 
should be read together. 
 
Refer to Annexure 2J and 2K – determining the fuse to protect the two 750 kVA 
transformers at the Gamtoos Pump Station 
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Fuse 1- 20K  
 This fuse does not protect the transformer well against the maximum fault 
current of 1420 A and thus the transformer will be damaged before the 
fuse blows. 
 It has a reasonable overload duration 
 It is slower than fuse 2. 
 It maintains a clear grading margin of 0.4 s with the relay at Summit 
substation. 
 
Fuse 2 – 15K 
 This fuse protects the transformer better against the maximum fault 
current of 1420 A. 
 It has a smaller overload margin than fuse 1. 
 It is faster than fuse 1. 
 It maintains a clear grading margin of 0.4 s with the relay at Summit 
substation. 
 
Based on the above, it is evident that the 15K fuse will protect the transformer 
better than the 20K fuse.  
 
Refer to SGP 7 
According to Annexure 2L a three-phase fault was simulated.  The fault current 
produced by this fault is 2535 A.  Annexure 2M is a simulation of the grading of 
the 10K fuse and the relay.  It grade reasonably well with the relay at a grading 
margin of 0.35 s.  Annexure 2M reveals that the fuse cannot protect the 
transformer, but protects the cable well. 
 
Refer to SGP 14 
According to Digsilent simulation, Annexure 2N the 10K fuse and 65K fuse 
grade perfectly with each other.  However, the 65K fuse cannot grade with the 
upstream relay.   
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The largest fuse that will grade with the relay according to Annexure 2O is a 
40K fuse with a 0.35 s grading margin.  By changing the fuse size, the fault 
current and the overload margin are compromised.  The 40K fuse will still be 
able to protect the conductor against overload, but the grading margin on the 
downstream fuse would have been reduced.  
 
Refer to SGP 30 
According to the initial calculation in 12.4.4, a 80K fuse should be installed at 
the beginning of the lateral line.  This proves to be correct in terms of the 
calculations and the tables mentioned above.  In terms of Digsilent, it is evident 
that the 80K fuse cannot grade with the upstream relay.  The next option is to 
install a 40K fuse (Annexure 2O).  By changing the fuse size, the fault current 
and the overload margin are compromised.  The 40K fuse will still be able to 
protect the conductor against overload, but the grading margin between the 
downstream fuse would have been reduced. 
 
10.5 SCADA 
 
Summit-Gamtoos Pumps 22kV overhead line is not on the NMBM SCADA 
network.  According to Lakervi and Holmes (2003) it is of utmost importance to 
have a SCADA system in order to improve the reliability of the power system.  
This will reduce outage time and cause fewer losses to the farmers connected 
to this network.  It is important to install SCADA equipment at the Summit 
substation.  This substation is situated approximately 70 kilometres from Port 
Elizabeth.  It provides electricity to farmers, an important pump station and a 
holiday resort.  The industry is extending towards the rural areas because it is 
more cost effective to purchase or hire property in the rural areas.  If the city 
wants to encourage investment and tourism, it is imperative that an 
improvement in terms of power system reliability must be maintained.     
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10.6 MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
Maintenance must be controlled by management and performed in accordance 
with a plan or program and by a dedicated team (Gill, 1997).  The NMBM is in a 
crisis in that the maintenance programs cannot be implemented because of the 
skills shortage and the unproductivity of staff.  There are no dedicated teams 
responsible for maintenance.  Most of the maintenance work is contracted out.  
This in itself poses a problem as Contractors use unqualified staff with limited 
skills and training.  This results in poor workmanship and more supervision is 
required to check and inspect the work.   
 
According to the maintenance database, the two major 66/22 kV transformers 
were last serviced in March 1994.  Apart from minor oil leaks, these two 
transformers are still in a good state.  The battery charger was maintained in 
2005.  No records could be found for maintenance done on the switchgear and 
the protection equipment.  The protection relay was tested in 2009 and it failed 
the test.  Subsequently, the relay was replaced with a numerical relay. 
 
No overhead line maintenance records are available.  Line inspectors would 
inspect the overhead line and associate equipment 3 to 4 times yearly and 
report faulty equipment to management.  A shutdown would then be arranged 
to repair or replace the faulty equipment.  The shortfall of this approach is that 
only the equipment on ground level can be inspected.  Many times, the 
equipment on top of poles fails.  This is what Lohmann (n.d) called detective 
maintenance.  In order to perform this type of maintenance properly in terms of 
high voltage electrical equipment, the plant must be shut down.  Unfortunately, 
the NMBM do not shut down the plant because it will affect continuity of supply 
to customers.  After this inspection, a follow-up shut down should be arranged 
for maintenance, repair and replacement of equipment. 
  
Many of the outages on this power line are caused by bridges, which are burnt 
off.  On investigation it was determined that the clamps used to join the 
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conductors fail during high load conditions.  Ferrule crimp lugs were introduced 
and they seem to be the solution to the problem.  
 
According to investigations done and discussions with staff members, animal 
interference is also a major problem, resulting in many outages and voltage 
dips.  On inspection, traces of skeletons of monkeys were found along the 
power line.  More guards could be used to keep animals away from the 
equipment.   
 
Protection maintenance is planned in conjunction with the switchgear 
maintenance program.  In other words, if a plant is isolated for maintenance, 
the protection team will on the same day perform their maintenance.  This is not 
a good practice, because protection equipment and switchgear do not have the 
same maintenance intervals.  Protection equipment maintenance should be 
planned separately. 
 
The run-to-fail practice of the NMBM is costing the customers because 
extended outages lead to production down-time and impact negatively on the 
ordinary person in the street.  This is not only a NMBM concern, but rather an 
electrical industry concern. 
 
10.7 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
Dugan et al (2003) found that weather conditions are the cause of major power 
outages, especially lightning.  This is also true in terms of the evidence 
supported by Annexure 2B.   
 
From the analysis of the faults, it is apparent that 63% of all the outages in this 
case study are caused by adverse weather conditions.  It is also certain that a 
large percentage of the not established outages can also be attributed to the 
adverse weather conditions.  Table 8.1, shows that high winds are a further 
cause.  From Table 8.1 it is evident that high winds cause many outages (32% 
of outage rate).  The figure for the NMBM could probably higher than 32%. 
 134
 
Weather impacts on power system reliability and affects outage durations, 
reliability indices and power quality.  Care must be taken during the design of 
power systems.  It is not always possible to design power systems which will 
not be severely affected by weather conditions.  Budgetary constraints prevent 
this.  In later years, power systems become problematic and under-perform.  
Routine planned maintenance is critical on rural bare conductor lines, namely, 
vegetation control, conductor tensioning, routine inspections of the equipment 
et cetera.  
 
10.8 NRS DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The NRS spreadsheet was designed to provide statistical data for the utility and 
produce a report for the NER.  This program provides valuable information on 
outages, equipment failure, causes of outages, restoration time, planned and 
unplanned interruptions et cetera.  The statistics obtained from the spreadsheet 
can be used to evaluate the performance of the network. 
 
The historical data available at the time of the investigation was retrieved and 
captured onto the NRS spreadsheet.  The Summit-Gamtoos Pumps 22kV 
overhead line under-performed in terms of restoration times and according to 
Annexure 2P.  It is a requirement that 30% of the supply must be restored in 
1.5 hours, 60% in 3.5 hours, 90% in 7.5 hours and 100% in 24 hours.  The 
network complies in the 60%, 90% and 100% categories.  It is evident that only 
7.1% of all customer supplies are restored within the first 90 minutes.  This is 
the most critical stage of any outage.  The major impact on customers is during 
the first 1 to 2 hours.  A survey conducted in Blue Horizon Bay proves that 
customers feel more inconvenienced during this phase.   
 
It is conclusive that equipment failure is the main cause of outages.  The 
reasons for equipment failures are addressed in the other sub-headings, but 
many of them can be ascribed to adverse weather conditions as per Annexure 
2B.  Appropriate action to address these failures has to be taken. 
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10.9  FINDINGS 
 
The findings based on the evaluation in terms of the criteria described in the 
literature review: 
 
 The SGP overhead line is exposed to weather conditions, namely, storm, 
rain, wind and lightning. 
 The ARC is set to 1 shot and lockout. 
 The TJV protection relay provides overcurrent and earth fault protection 
and does not have SEF facility.  
 The TJV protection relay was tested and failed the tests. 
 The calculated reliability data below, does not comply with the standard: 
 SAIDI = 3023 min/yr 
 SAIFI = 14.2 int/yr 
 CAIDI = 212.89 min/yr 
 The SGP overhead line meets the requirements in term of system 
adequacy as the conductors can sustain the load requirement. 
 The SGP overhead line does not comply in term of system security as the 
overhead line cannot sustain severe disturbances. 
 The SGP overhead line under-performed in terms of voltage dips.  The 
recorded voltage dips exceed the voltage dip category benchmarks.  Only 
the Z2 dips are within the required limits. 
 The S and X1 dips are the problematic ones. 
 The harmonic, flickering and voltage regulation measurements are within 
the parameters of the standard. 
 Relay and fuses does not grade properly. 
 The 10 MVA transformer and the overhead line conductor are capable of 
carrying the load. 
 The calculated specifications for the CT’s are 10P30 15 VA. 
 The calculated fault level is 2.6 kA and the Digsilent simulation is 2.7 kA. 
 The relay settings are calculated as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
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 TMS  = 0.1 
 The sensitive earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 5% 
 TMS  = 10 s 
 The earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
 Lateral lines SGP 7, 14, 14A, 17, 20, 38, 43 and the two 750 kVA 
transformer at Gamtoos Pump Station are not protected with expulsion 
fuses.   
 Many pole mounted transformers are not protected with expulsion fuses. 
 SCADA supervisory system is not installed on the SGP overhead line. 
 No maintenance records are available for the overhead line. 
 Maintenance records are available for the 2 transformers and battery 
chargers. 
 The effect of no maintenance being done increases outage durations.  
 The shortage of manpower hampers maintenance programs. 
 Adverse weather conditions have a major impact on the SGP overhead 
line.  63% of all outages are directly linked to adverse weather conditions. 
 SGP overhead line is constructed with copper conductor which makes the 
line vulnerable to theft and vandalism, resulting in many extended 
outages.  
 Installation of a sectionaliser is not financially viable. 
 Bird and animal life is prevalent along SGP overhead line. 
 Not many surge arrestors were found on the SGP overhead line. 
 The SGP overhead line does not comply with the 60%, 90% and 100% 
NRS categories. 
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10.10 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In order to improve power system reliability, it is recommended that the points 
following be considered: 
 
 Improve preventative maintenance initiatives, namely, inspection, 
replacement of equipment, servicing of equipment, tensioning of 
conductors, doing vegetation control and installing animal and bird guards; 
 Preventative maintenance programs should be initiated under strict control 
of management; 
 Outdated protection equipment should be replaced with new ABB REF 
601 relays (some has already been completed); 
 More expulsion fuses should be installed.  Fuses should be installed as 
per the Protection and Digsilent sub-headings as follows: 
 SGP 7 – Install 10K fuse 
 SGP 8 - Install 10K fuse 
 SGP 14 - Install 40K fuse 
 SGP 14A - Install 10K fuse 
 SGP 17 - Install 10K fuse 
 SGP 30 - Install 40K fuse 
 SGP 30/31 - Install 30K fuse 
 SGP 38 - Install 10K fuse 
 SGP 43A - Install 10K fuse 
 Transfomers A3572, A3288, A3287, A4120, A 2169, A1537, A1476, 
A1506 and A1858 – Install 10 fuses; 
 The Gamtoos Pumps transformers should be protected with two 15K 
fuses; 
 The auto-reclose facility should be activated to one shot and lock out due 
to the pump station which is supplied by the SGP overhead line; 
 Replace the CT’s with 10P30 15VA, ratio 400/5; 
 The relay settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.1; 
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 The sensitive earth fault settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 3% 
 TMS  = 10 s; 
 The earth fault settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.1; 
 The manpower and skills shortages should be addressed.  More staff 
should be trained and employed; 
 More surge arrestors should be installed on every second or third pole; 
 A SCADA supervisory system should be installed for monitoring and 
operation;  
 Automation devices should be installed at critical points in the power 
network;  
 In the design phase of a network, the weather conditions should be 
considered; 
 More animal protection measures should be installed; 
 An alternative power supply (n-1) should be provided; 
 Fuse blowing technology versus fuse saving technology should be 
investigated.  Fuse blowing will reduce the voltage dips and fuse saving 
reduce the outage time, and 
 Copper conductors should be replaced with ABC conductors. 
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CHAPTER 11: ANALYSIS OF MOTHERWELL NORTH FEEDER 
(MWN) 
 
11.1 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
The Motherwell North Blue power network is not a reliable power system.  In 
terms of system adequacy, the network satisfies certain of the criteria to 
provide power to customers.  All the equipment necessary to provide power is 
available, but how reliable is the network?  When was it maintained, repaired 
or equipment replaced?  In terms of system security, the network is not 
competent to sustain severe disturbances.  The protection equipment does 
not function properly and preventative maintenance has not been done 
regularly.   
 
Bollen (2000) outlines the factors that influence the reliability of a network: 
 
 Weather conditions; 
 Duration of the interruptions; 
 Failure of protection devices; 
 Radial topology, and 
 Failure rate. 
 
Bollen’s (2000) factors were confirmed by the statistics of the interruption data 
available.  Refer to Annexures 3B, and equations 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below.  
The network configuration is in a ring topology and the protection devices do 
not function properly, in particular the grading between the circuit breaker and 
the expulsion fuses.  The ring has open points, which have to be closed 
manually; therefore the power system can be regarded as radial. 
 
In terms of the factors influencing the power system, the following is noted: 
 
 The power system can be regarded as a radial system with normally 
open points for an alternative supply when an outage occurs. 
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 Weather conditions have a major impact on the power system.  
Annexure 3B reveals that 52% of the outages can be directly linked to 
adverse weather conditions. 
 The duration of the outages described do not fall within the NRS 
requirements. 
 The failure rate will decrease if maintenance programs are implemented. 
 
Calculating the power system average outage time 
 
Us = rs λs           (2.1) 
 = 858 x 334.1 
 = 28398.5/5 yrs 
 = 5679.7 hrs/yr 
 
Calculating the average outage cost 
 
P   = 4108.49 kW             (4.15) 
Cost per kW  = 0.363 (Calculated over 5 years) 
 
Outage cost =   
Li
Ci(d)       (2.5) 
  = 
4108.49
334.1 X 0.363  
  = R 0.0295 per kW 
  = 2.95 cents/kW 
 
Calculating Reliability Indices 
 
Calculated SAIDI = 4009.6 min/yr     (2.2) 
Calculated SAIFI = 17 int/yr          (2.3) 
Calculated CAIDI = 235.86 min/yr     (2.4) 
 
It is obvious that the calculated reliability data does not comply with the 
standard described by Burke (1994) in Chapter 8, Table 8.1.  This evidently 
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means that this power system under-performed for the period that the data 
was being collected.  
 
11.2 POWER QUALITY 
 
11.2.1 Voltage Dips 
The voltage dips on this network are fewer than those in the other case 
studies.  This is probably because the network is constructed in ABC.  Many 
factors could influence the voltage dips, namely, maintenance, varying loads, 
switching, operation of protection devices which are questionable, the age of 
the equipment, and weather conditions et cetera.  These impact on the 
reliability indices and power quality benchmarks.  The Vectograph voltage dip 
data recorded over twelve months are summarised in Table 11.1 below.  
 
Table 11.1 – Motherwell Voltage Dips – Dec 08 to Nov 09 
         
Month  S T X1 X2 Z1 Z2 Swells
%  
Not 
Avail 
Dec 08 0 1 3 0 0 0 6 83 
Jan 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 93 
Feb 09 1 0 1 0 0 0 619 57 
March 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
April 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
May 09 1 4 0 0 0 0 235 72 
June 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
July 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Aug 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Sept 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
Oct 09 1 1 9 0 1 0 33 88 
Nov 09 0 0 1 1 0 0 139 77 
Total 3 6 14 1 1 0 1039 49 
 
The Y-dips have been omitted as they are regarded as insignificant and 
customers have to provide equipment to reduce them.  Utilities are not 
required to report on the number of Y-dips (NRS 048-2:2001). 
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From Table 11.1, it is evident that the network complies with the requirements 
of NRS 084-2:2007. 
 
11.2.2 Harmonics 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared with the international benchmark of 5% identified by Burke (1994) 
and the NRS 048-2:2003, which allows a total harmonic distortion of not more 
than 8%.  According to the assessment, no sign of harmonics disorders could 
be found.  Power quality data recorded indicates that the harmonics 
measured on this power system are within the parameters of the NRS 048-
2:2003. 
 
11.2.3 Flickering 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared with the benchmark of between 0.8% and 1.25% as per the NRS 
048-2:2001.  According to the assessment, no signs of flickering could be 
found.  Power quality data recorded indicated that the flickering measured on 
this power system was within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2001. 
 
11.2.4 Voltage Regulation 
Voltage swells pose a problem.  In terms of the assessment and the 
parameters described in the NRS 048-2:2003, only voltage swells during 
February, May and November 2009 were not within the parameters.  In 
February the non-compliance was 84%, May 63%, and November 27%.  
Voltage swells can be reduced by lowering the tapping on the transformer.  
 
11.3 POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
 
11.3.1 Current Transformers 
Current transformer and switchgear are approximately 17 years old, so they 
are relatively new.  However, it is important for current transformers to stay 
accurate because they must sustain high fault currents during fault conditions.  
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If the current transformer is inaccurate, the protection equipment will operate 
incorrectly. 
 
Calculating ALF 
Current rating of ABC  = 265 A; use 300 A 
Load current    = 73 A; use 100 A 
FLI      = 1050 A; use 1100 A          (4.1) 
CT Ratio    = 400/1 
CT Class    = 10P20 15 VA 
Available tapings on CT are 50% to 200% 
 
At 50% plug setting I  = 0.5 x 400 = 200 A   
At 75% plug setting I  = 0.75 x 400 = 300 A   
At 100% plug setting I  = 1 x 400 = 400 A   
At 125% plug setting I  = 1.25 x 400 = 500 A   
At 150% plug setting I  = 1.5 x 400 = 600 A   
At 200% plug setting I  = 2 x 400 = 800 A   
 
faultI      = 8850 A              (4.2) 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 8848 A – Annexure 3C)  
 
ALF at 200 A    = 44.2             (4.3) 
ALF at 300 A    = 29.5             (4.3) 
ALF at 400 A    = 22.1             (4.3) 
ALF at 500 A    = 17.7             (4.3) 
ALF at 600 A    = 14.7             (4.3) 
ALF at 800 A    = 11.1             (4.3) 
 
Twice the full load current of the system is approximately 150 A.  That 
equates to a plug setting of 50% and an ALF of 44.2 (use 30 maximum ALF) 
(Prévé, 2006).  This plug setting also allows for load growth and flexibility in 
terms of grading. 
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The overhead line can carry approximately 300 A, but the full load current of 
the transformer is 1050 A.  This transformer not only supplies this feeder, but 
also the other 22 kV feeders in the network.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely 
that this feeder will be loaded to its full capacity. 
 
Determining the knee point voltage 
VA rating    = 15 VA 
Impedance of Burden  = 15             (4.16) 
Assume CT secondary resistance = 0.1   
Total secondary impedance = 15.1            (4.17) 
ALF (Using most downstream fault- Annexure 3D)    
     = 5.4 use 10            (4.3) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (5) = 75.5 V           (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (10) = 151 V           (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (15) = 227 V           (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (20) = 302 V           (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (30) = 453 V           (4.18) 
 
The calculated ALF is 5 and it does not exceed the installed CT parameters.  
Prévé (2006) states that if the ALF is large, the CT is less likely to become 
saturated.  The installed CT has an ALF of 20, which is within Prévé’s 
parameters.  
 
The class 10P CT is perfect for this application.  Prévé (2006), states that a 
10P CT is suitable for overcurrent protection. 
 
S = 15.1 VA                (4.4) 
 
The VA rating is also within the specifications of the nameplate data as a 15 
VA CT is used. 
 
According to Table 4.2 (Chapter 4.3) a 10P CT allows a 10% error.  When 
compared with the calculated knee point voltage and that of Annexure 3E, it is 
within the required parameters.  
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A maintenance test was completed in order to verify the accuracy of the CT’s.  
The primary injection and insulation resistance tests were conducted.  The 
primary injection test results are as follows: 
Note: primary injected current is 100A 
Core 2: 400/1 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 250 mA 0 mA 0 mA 250 mA 
Red-White 249 mA 250 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 249 mA 0 mA 250 mA 0 mA 
 
Core 3: 400/1 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 250 mA 0 mA 0 mA 250 mA 
Red-White 250 mA 251 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 250 mA 0 mA 251 mA 0 mA 
 
Comparing the test results to that of Table 4.1 (Chapter 4.3), it is evident that 
the CT's pass the test, but the CT’s will not be able to withstand the fault 
current. 
 
The most suitable CT to be used should be a 10P20 15 VA.  The tests 
conducted prove that the CT is in perfect working order.  
 
Max allowable primary current (ALC)  = 8000 A        (4.19) 
 
The maximum allowable primary current of 8000 A does not exceed the 
maximum fault current of 8850 A (Digsilent 8848 A).  Using an ALF of 30, the 
ALC increases to 12000 A.  This indicates that the CT will not be able to 
withstand the maximum allowable fault current in the network.  Therefore, this 
CT is not suitable and should be replaced with a 10P30 15 VA CT. 
 
11.3.2 Fault Calculations 
sourceZ  = 0.12 pu               (4.5) 
baseZ  = 4.84                 (4.8) 
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lineactZ  = R + jXL 
   3.97 + j0.536 
   4   0.1340Ω 
 
lineZ   = 0.826 pu               (4.7) 
 
cableactZ  = R + jXL 
   1.26 + j0.388 
   1.318   0.290Ω 
 
cableZ  = 0.272 pu               (4.7) 
 
faultZ   = lineZcableZsourceZ   
   = 0.12 + 0.272 + 0.826 
   = 1.218 pu 
 
pu faultI   = 1.218
1  
   = 0.821 pu 
 
b22I    = 2.624 kA              (4.9) 
 
faultI    = pu faultI X b22I  
= 2.624 x 0.821 
= 2151 A 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 2172 A – Annexure 3D)  
 
11.3.3 Relay Settings 
maxI    = 265 A  
min faultI   = 1659 A (minimum most downstream fault current -  
Annexure 3F)    
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max faultI   = 2172 A (maximum most downstream fault current 
    Annexure 3D)    
CT ratio  = 400:1 
 
Plug Setting (PS) = 66.25%            (4.11) 
Use a plug setting of 100% 
 
PSM (M) at max fault  = 5.43           (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 4.07 sec                             (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (4.07 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.441 sec 
 
TMS     = 0.08           (4.14) 
      Use 0.1 
 
PSM (P) at min fault  = 4.15           (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 4.85 sec                             (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (4.85 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.448 sec 
      
TMS     = 0.09           (4.14) 
      Use 0.1 
 
The relay setting for the above should be 100%, TMS = 0.1 
 
The norm in the NMBM power system is to set the earth fault plug setting at 
20% and the TMS at 0.1. 
 
The SEF must detect low-level earth faults.  The SEF setting should therefore 
be the greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating (PEE Code of 
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Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3).  5% should be 
used, with TMS at 10s. 
 
11.3.4 Calculating the Fuse Size of the Transformer 
Fuses should be installed at the beginning of the lateral lines, provided they 
can grade with other equipment.  Refer to calculations in Chapter 8.2.3 
 
All the transformers are 200 kVA, except those otherwise indicated on 
Annexure 3A.  Use 10K fuses for these 200 kVA transformers, which are 
capable of carrying a continuous current of 15 A and the inrush current.  
Tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted.  At MWN 
26/23/16, 32, 51/38/72 and 51/38/67, 10K fuses can be installed at the 
beginning of the lateral lines using the information in Chapter 8.2.3, provided it 
can grade with other equipment.    
 
Refer to MWN 26 
 
The selected fuse must be able to protect the ABC conductor.  Connected to 
the lateral line are six transformers with an apparent power capacity of 200 
kVA each.  Total capacity at MWN 26/23 is 1200 kVA.  The selected fuse 
must also be able to grade with the 10K fuse at MWN 26/23/16. 
 
FLI     = 31.49 A            (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 37.79 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 314.9 A 
Use 25K fuse at MWN 26/23 
 
Total load at MWN 26 
S = (13 x 200) + 500 = 3100 kVA  
FLI     = 81.35 A             (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 97.62 A 
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InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 813.5 A 
Use a 65K fuse at MWN 26 
 
For transformer 2279 (500 kVA) use 12 or 10 K fuse. 
 
Grading 
A 65K fuse grades with a 20K, 15K and 10K fuse.  All these fuses can sustain 
the inrush currents as per the above Tables, Figures and standards.   
 
Refer to MWN 51/38 
 
S = (15 x 200) + (2 x 500) + 3000 = 4000 kVA 
 
FLI     = 104.97 A             (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 125.97 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 1049.7  A 
Use a 80K fuse at MWN 51/38 
 
Refer to MWN 51 
 
S = 7 x 200   = 1400 kVA 
FLI     = 36.7 A              (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 44.09 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 367 A 
 
Total load at MWN 51 = 1400 + 4000  
    = 5800 kVA 
 
FLI     = 141.71 A             (4.1) 
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FLI  at 120%   = 170.06 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 1417.1 A 
Use a 140K fuse at MWN 51 
 
Grading 
A 100K fuse cannot grade with a 80K fuse.  A 140K fuse can grade with a 
80K fuse at a fault current of 4500 A.  This fuse fulfils all the requirements 
above. 
 
Refer to MWN 66 
 
S = (11 x 200) + 500 = 2700 kVA 
FLI     = 70.86 A             (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 85.03 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 708.6 A 
Use a 65K fuse at MWN 66 
This fuse fulfils all the requirements above. 
 
Refer to MWN 80/38 
 
S = 4 x 200   = 800 kVA 
FLI     = 20.99 A             (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 25.19 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 209.9 A 
Use a 15K fuse at MWN 80/38 
This fuse fulfils all the requirements above. 
 
 
 151
Refer to MWN 80/33 
 
S = 500 + 200  = 700 kVA 
FLI     = 18.37 A             (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 22.04 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 183.7 A 
Use a 15K fuse at MWN 80/33 
This fuse fulfils all the requirements above. 
 
Refer to MWN 80 
 
S = (13 x 200) + 500 = 3100 kVA 
FLI     = 81.35 A             (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 97.62 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI   
    = 813.5 A 
Use a 65K fuse at MWN 80 
This fuse fulfils all the requirements above. 
 
Refer to MWN 89 
 
S = 7 x 200   = 1400 kVA 
FLI     = 36.74 A             (4.1) 
FLI  at 120%   = 44.09 A 
InrushI    = 10 x FLI  
    = 367.4 A 
Use a 30K fuse at MWN 89 
This fuse fulfils all the requirements above. 
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11.3.5 Auto-Recloser 
The Motherwell North 22kV overhead line is constructed with ABC conductors 
on wooden poles.  The line is approximately 17 kilometres long, running 
through a residential area.  One factor affecting this line is vandalism.   
 
To benefit the customers and utility in terms of power quality, an auto-recloser 
should be installed at the beginning of the line.  It eliminates many 
unnecessary trips and outages and will impact positively on power system 
reliability.  But, unfortunately ABC is treated as a cable network on poles.  The 
majority of faults on ABC networks are permanent faults which should be 
cleared by the relay or the lateral expulsion fuse.  Therefore ARC is not an 
option for this network. 
 
In order to solve the power system reliability problem, more expulsion fuses 
should be installed.  These fuses should grade with the other protection 
equipment, namely, relays and fuses. 
 
11.3.6 Sectionalisers 
The cost of a sectionaliser is R 95 000.00 and the cost of expulsion fuses is R 
15 000.00 each.  Sectionalisers are not an option as they are normally used 
with an ARC.  
 
11.3.7 Earth Fault Protection 
The NMBM on 22kV rural lines use earth fault, overcurrent and sensitive earth 
fault protection as main and back up protection in an IDMT relay (NMBM 
Protection Guidelines).  On the Motherwell North 22kV overhead line, the 
settings in terms of earth fault are as follows: 
Plug setting: 20% 
TMS: 0.1 
 
Compare this to the NMBM policy which states the following: 
Plug setting: 20% 
TMS: 0.1 
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These settings above are correct. 
 
11.3.8 Sensitive Earth Fault Protection 
Since this line is constructed in ABC, no SEF is required.  
 
11.3.9 Surge Arrestors 
According to Dugan et al (2003), lightning is one of the main causes of power 
outages on overhead lines.  It is evident from the investigations that not much 
has been done to increase the number of surge arrestors.  The current policy 
states that surge arrestors should be installed on the transformer pole or at 
the beginning of a lateral line.  
 
Lakervi, Holmes (2003) and Dugan et al (2003) confirm that surge arrestors 
should be allocated close to the equipment they protect and installed on every 
second or third pole.  This is expensive, but will ensure security of supply.  
This will ultimately reduce the power quality problems and unknown outages.   
 
11.4 DIGSILENT POWER FACTORY 
 
The Motherwell North 22 kV overhead line was modelled on Digsilent.  Fault 
analysis and protection simulation and co-ordination were performed by the 
researcher.  This was compared with the protection fault calculations.  The 
Digsilent and Protection sub-sections should be read together. 
 
Refer to MWN 26 
 
According to Annexure 3G, grading between the 65K, 25K, 15K and 10K 
fuses can be achieved.  All these fuses can grade with the relay at the source 
substation.  By simulating a fault at MWN 26/23/15, the fuse should  clear the 
fault in 0.01 s allowing a grading margin of 0.229 s.  This proves that the 
selection of the fuses was correct in terms of grading.  The fuses can protect 
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the conductor, but cannot protect the transformer.  65K, 25K, 15K and 10K 
fuses are recommended for use. 
 
Refer to MWN 51 
 
According to Annexure 3H, the 140K, 80K, 10K fuses grade well with each 
other, but the 140K fuse cannot grade with the relay.  According to Annexure 
3I, a 100K fuse grades better.  Simulating a fault at MWN 51/38/43, a grading 
margin of 0.313 s is achieved.  By installing a 100K fuse, the maximum 
loading on the line is compromised and the current capacity is reduced to 150 
A.  The 100K fuse will still be able to sustain the inrush current in terms of 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3.  100K, 80K and 10K fuses are recommended. 
 
Refer to MWN 66 
 
According to Annexure 3J, the 65K and the 10K fuses grade well with each 
other and also with the relay.  The fuses cannot protect the transformer, but 
they protect the conductor well.  Under fault conditions the fuse clears the 
fault in 0.029 s allowing a good grading margin of 0.487 s.  The fuses cannot 
protect the transformer, but does protect the conductor.  65K and 10K fuses 
are recommended. 
 
Refer to MWN 80 
 
This argument will be the same as MWN 26 as the lateral line has a 65K, 15K 
and 10K fuses installed.  65K, 25K, 15K and 10K fuses are recommended for 
use. 
 
Refer to MWN 89 
 
According to Annexure 3K the 30K and 10K fuses grade perfectly with each 
other and with the relay.  Under fault conditions, the fuse clears the fault on 
0.01 s, leaving a grading margin of 0.396 s.  The fuses cannot protect the 
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transformer, but do protect the conductor.  30K and 10K fuses are 
recommended. 
 
11.5 SCADA 
 
The Motherwell North 22kV feeder is part of the broader Motherwell 132/22kV 
substation and reticulation network.  Full SCADA operation is available on this 
network, so it possible to view the trends, current and voltage analogue 
readings, receive alarms and the ability to open and close the OCB. 
 
Lakervi and Holmes (2003) state that automation improves power system 
reliability and secures supply to customers.  The outage durations are 
relatively shorter.  This is evident in studying the NRS interruption data and 
Annexure 3L.  Although the number of interruptions over the study period was 
relatively more than in some of the other case studies, the NRS interruption 
data improved. 
  
The SCADA information is brought back to the master station via radio 
communication.  During adverse weather conditions and when many events in 
terms of SCADA operations are performed the data tends to be delayed for a 
few minutes, sometimes for even up to 30 minutes.  The gateway cannot 
manage the traffic.  The radio communication system is also limited as it does 
not comply with OSI standards.  The SCADA master station and the radio 
network are from different suppliers, hence the difficulties receiving data.  
Alternative solutions are needed.   
 
11.6 MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
Poor maintenance and manpower deficiencies are common causes of 
outages.  From annexure 3B it is evident that lack of maintenance is 
responsible for many outages.  These are failure of conductors, insulator 
flashovers, broken fuse holders, failure of lightning arrestors, failure of 
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transformers et cetera.  No overhead line maintenance records could be 
found. 
 
The MWN 0 OCB opened 25 times.  Only 9 times the protection operated.  
The protection did not operate for the remaining 16 operations.  Downstream 
faults are responsible for the 16 operations of the OCB.  This is due to the 
lack of grading between the OCB and the downstream expulsion fuses. 
 
Overhead lines would normally be inspected 3 to 4 times a year.  The line 
inspectors would report faulty equipment and subsequent shutdowns should 
be arranged to repair or replace the faulty equipment.  The shortcoming to this 
approach is that only the equipment on ground level can be inspected.  Many 
times, the equipment on poles fails.  This is what Lohmann (n.d) called 
detective maintenance.  In order to perform maintenance properly on high 
voltage electrical equipment, the plant must be shut down.  A follow-up shut 
down can be arranged for maintenance, repair and replacement of equipment.     
 
Brown (2002) states that preventative maintenance can extend the life of 
equipment and Seever (1991) states, that routine maintenance reduces the 
probability of failures.  This will guarantee fewer power outages and will 
impact positively on power system reliability.  But the shortage of manpower 
hampers routine maintenance programs.  According to Lohmann (n.d) 
maintenance programs should be performed under the close supervision of 
management.  A dedicated team must be responsible for planned 
maintenance and it must be done in accordance with a schedule.  It is 
impossible for the NMBM to adhere to this requirement as it does not have the 
skilled labour to perform maintenance. 
 
The run-to-fail practice of the NMBM is costing the customers because 
extended outages lead to production down-time and impact negatively on the 
ordinary person in the street.  This is not only a NMBM concern, but rather an 
electrical industry concern. 
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11.7 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
Adverse weather conditions are common in all the case studies.  From 
Annexure 3B it is evident that adverse weather conditions have a major 
impact on the MWN overhead line.  Fifty two percent (52%) of the faults on 
MWN line were directly related to adverse weather conditions.  The end result 
of this is that power system reliability indices, outage durations and power 
quality performance suffer. 
 
11.8 NRS DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The NRS spreadsheet provides valuable information on outages, equipment 
failure, planned and unplanned interruptions et cetera.  The statistics obtained 
from the spreadsheet could be used to evaluate the performance of the 
network and also to report to the NER. 
 
The historical data available at the time of the investigation was retrieved and 
captured onto the NRS spreadsheet.  The Motherwell North 22kV power 
network performed well in terms of restoration times (refer to Annexure 3L).  It 
is a requirement that 30% of the supply must be restored in 1.5 hours, 60% in 
3.5 hours, 90% in 7.5 hours and 100% in 24 hours.  The network complies in 
all these categories.  
 
The primary cause of outages was equipment failure, namely incorrect 
operation of fuses.  Proper grading and fault clearing should solve this 
problem. 
 
11.9  FINDINGS 
 
The findings based on the evaluation in terms of the criteria described in the 
literature review: 
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 The MWN overhead line is exposed to weather conditions, namely, 
storm, rain, wind and lightning. 
 The SPAJ140C protection relay provides overcurrent and earth fault 
protection. 
 No SEF facility is provided on the protection relay.  
 The SPAJ140C protection relay was tested and passed the tests. 
 The protection relay and fuses does not grade properly. 
 The relay settings are calculated as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
 The earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
 No SEF is required as the MWN overhead line is constructed in ABC. 
 The calculated specifications for the CT’s are 10P30 15 VA. 
 The calculated fault level is 2.2 kA and the Digsilent simulation is 2.2 kA. 
 MWN is a radial overhead line. 
 The calculated reliability data below, does not comply with the standard: 
 SAIDI = 4009.6 min/yr 
 SAIFI = 17 int/yr 
 CAIDI = 235.86 min/yr 
 The MWN overhead line meets the requirements in term of system 
adequacy as the conductors can sustain the load requirement. 
 The MWN overhead line does not comply in term of system security as 
the overhead line cannot sustain severe disturbances. 
 The MWN overhead line complies in terms of voltage dips.  The recorded 
voltage dips does not exceed the voltage dip category benchmarks. 
 The harmonic and flickering measurements are within the parameters of 
the standard. 
 The MWN overhead line does not comply in terms of voltage regulation. 
 Many of the lateral lines and pole mounted transformers are not 
protected with expulsion fuses. 
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 SCADA supervisory system is fully commissioned on the MWN overhead 
line. 
 No maintenance records are available. 
 The effect of no maintenance being done increases outage durations.  
 The shortage of manpower hampers maintenance programs. 
 Adverse weather conditions have a major impact on the MWN overhead 
line.  52% of all outages are directly linked to adverse weather 
conditions. 
 Installation of a sectionaliser is not financially viable. 
 Not many surge arrestors were found on the MWN overhead line. 
 The MWN overhead line complies with all the NRS categories. 
 
11.10 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To improve power system reliability the following points are recommended: 
 
 Lowering the tapings on the HV transformer can reduce the voltage to 
comply with NRS 048-2:2003; 
 Replace CT with 10P30 15VA, ratio 400/1; 
 The relay settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.2; 
 The earth fault settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.1; 
 Fuses should be installed as per the Protection and Digsilent sub-
headings as follows: 
 All 200 kVA transformer - Install 10K fuses 
 MWN 26 – Install 65K fuse 
 MWN 26/23 - Install 20K fuse 
 MWN 26/23/16 - Install 10K fuse 
 MWN 32 - Install 10K fuse 
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 MWN 51 - Install 100K fuse 
 MWN 51/38/72 - Install 10K fuse 
 MWN 51/38/67 - Install 10K fuse 
 MWN 66 - Install 65K fuse 
 MWN 80 - Install 65K fuse 
 MWN 80/38 - Install 10K fuse 
 MWN 80/33 - Install 15K fuse 
 MWN 89 - Install 30K fuse; 
 More intense and structured maintenance should be done, namely, 
vegetation control, routine inspections, et cetera; 
 More surge arrestors should be installed on every second or third pole; 
 Preventative maintenance should be performed regularly under the 
control of management to reduce the failure of equipment, and 
 The manpower and skills shortages should be addressed.  This can be 
done by developing the skills of internal staff. 
 161
CHAPTER 12: ANALYSIS OF KRAGGA KAMMA GREENBUSHES 
FEEDER (KKG) 
 
12.1 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
The KKG power network is not a reliable power system.  In terms of system 
adequacy, it satisfies most of the criteria to provide power to its customers.  All 
the equipment necessary is available, but how reliable is it?  When was it 
maintained, repaired or replaced?  In terms of system security, the network is not 
competent to cope with severe disturbances as the protection equipment does 
not function properly.  The technology is outdated, preventative maintenance has 
not been done and automation devices have not been installed to optimise the 
power system. 
 
Bollen (2000) lists the factors influencing the reliability of a power network as: 
 
 Weather conditions; 
 Duration of the interruptions; 
 Failure of protection devices; 
 Radial topology, and 
 Failure rate. 
 
The statistics of the interruption data available confirmed the validity of the above 
factors, namely, Annexure 4B equations 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below.  The KKG 
network is a radial power system to Greenbushes substation.  Greenbushes 
substation is supplied with two other 22kV feeders from Rowallan Park and 
Fitches Corner substations.  This can be regarded as a ring network with open 
points at Greenbushes. 
  
Bollen (2000) argues that the location of faults can be assisted by automation of 
the power system.  The use of SCADA will identify the location of a fault, and 
switching can be done remotely.  This will lead to reduced outage time.  
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Calculating the power system average outage time 
Us = rs λs           (2.1) 
 = 25 x 81.6 
 = 2040/5 yrs 
 = 408 hrs/yr 
 
Calculating the average outage cost 
 
P   = 6491.97 kW             (4.15) 
Cost per kW  = 0.363 (Calculated over 5 years) 
 
Outage cost =   
Li
Ci(d)       (2.5) 
  = 
6491.97
81.6 X 0.363  
  = R 004563/kW 
  = 0.456 cents/kW 
 
Calculating Reliability Indices 
 
Calculated SAIDI = 979 min/yr      (2.2) 
Calculated SAIFI = 5 int/yr      (2.3) 
Calculated CAIDI = 195.8 min/yr      (2.4) 
 
It is obvious that the calculated reliability data does not comply with the standard 
depicted by Burke (1994) in Chapter 8, Table 8.1.  This evidently means that this 
power system under-performed for the period during which the data was 
collected.  
 
12.2 POWER QUALITY 
 
12.2.1 Voltage Dips 
The KKG feeder is a combination of bare overhead conductor, ABC and 
underground cable.  A power quality recorder has been installed at Greenbushes 
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substation.  Its reads the power quality events on this feeder and on all the other 
outgoing feeders.  Many factors could influence the voltage dips, namely, 
maintenance, varying loads, switching, operation of protection devices, age of 
equipment, weather conditions, and the presence of bird and animal life.  These 
factors affect reliability indices and power quality benchmarks.  The Vectograph 
voltage dip data recorded over twelve months has been summarised in Table 
12.1 below.  
 
Table 12.1 – Voltage Dips – Greenbushes Substation – Sept 08 to Aug 09 
 
Month S T X1 X2 Z1 Z2 Swells
% 
Avail 
Sept 08 3 0 1 0 3 0 0 62 
Oct 08 23 0 0 2 2 3 0 98 
Nov 08 13 0 2 1 2 0 0 99 
Dec 08 6 3 2 0 1 0 0 87 
Jan 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 
Feb 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 
March 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
April 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 
May 09 12 8 4 0 0 0 0 35 
June 09 6 0 2 1 0 0 0 41 
July 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Aug 09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 
Total 63 11 11 4 8 3 0 48 
  
 
The Y-dips have been omitted because they are regarded as insignificant and 
customers have to provide equipment to reduce them.  Utilities are not regulated 
on the bass of the number of Y-dips (NRS 084-2:2001). 
 
From Table 12.1, it is evident that the S and T dips are the problematic ones.  
Both these dips are relatively long.  The S-dip is not too deep, but the T-dip is 
very deep, up to 100%.  These dips cause major disturbances to power 
electronic equipment utilised by the manufacturing industry.  KKG also supplies a 
newly developed industrial area, so good power quality is critical for efficient 
production.  The performance in terms of voltage dips can be improved by 
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installing dip improving equipment, protection equipment that grade properly, 
maintaining this equipment and using animal and bird guards.      
 
12.2.2 Harmonics 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the international benchmark of 5% described by Burke (1994) and 
the NRS 048-2:2003, which allows a total harmonic distortion of not more than 
8%.  According to the assessment, no signs of harmonics disorder could be 
identified.  Power quality data recorded indicates that the harmonics measured 
on the KKG power system are within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2003. 
 
12.2.3 Flickering 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark of between 0.8% and 1.25% as per NRS 048-
2:2001.  According to the assessment, no signs of flickering could be identified.  
Power quality data recorded indicates that the flickering measured on this power 
system is within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2001. 
 
12.2.4 Voltage Regulation 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark of ±5% for power systems above 500 V as per NRS 
048-2:2001.  According to the assessment, no signs of voltage regulation 
irregularities could be identified.  Power quality data recorded indicates that the 
voltage regulation measured on the KKG power system is within the parameters 
of the NRS 048-2:2003. 
 
12.3 POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
 
12.3.1 Current Transformers 
The protection equipment and switchgear of the KKG power system are very old 
and the technology is outdated.  Current transformers should always be checked 
for accuracy because they have to sustain high fault currents during fault 
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conditions.  If the current transformer is inaccurate, the protection equipment will 
operate incorrectly. 
 
Calculating ALF 
Current rating of overhead line (PINE) = 262 A 
Current rating of underground cable = 298 A 
Current rating of ABC   = 265 A 
Load current     = 213 A 
Make minimum primary current 300 A 
CT Ratio    = 300/5 
CT Class    = 15D 
Available tapings on CT are 50% to 200% 
 
At 50% plug setting I  = 0.5 x 300 = 150 A   
At 75% plug setting I  = 0.75 x 300 = 225 A   
At 100% plug setting I  = 1 x 300 = 300 A   
At 125% plug setting I  = 1.25 x 300 = 375 A   
At 150% plug setting I  = 1.5 x 300 = 450 A   
At 200% plug setting I  = 2 x 300 = 600 A   
 
faultI      = 11850 A               (4.2) 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 11854 A – Annexure 4C)  
 
ALF at 150 A    = 79              (4.3) 
ALF at 225 A    = 52.7              (4.3) 
ALF at 300 A    = 39.5              (4.3) 
ALF at 375 A    = 31.6              (4.3) 
ALF at 450 A    = 26.3              (4.3) 
ALF at 600 A    = 19.8              (4.3) 
 
The maximum current loading on the KKG power line is 189.3 A (from 2005 
annual load test report).  At a load growth of 3% per year, the loading is 213.1 A.  
At twice the load current, a plug setting of 150% equates to an ALF of 26.3, 
therefore use 30.   
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Determining the knee point voltage 
Assume VA rating   = 15 VA 
Impedance of Burden  = 0.6                (4.16) 
Assume CT secondary resistance = 0.1   
Total secondary impedance = 0.7       (4.17) 
ALF (Using most maximum downstream fault- Annexure 4D)    
     = 9.2 use 10    (4.3) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (10) = 35 V     (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (20) = 70 V     (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (30) = 105 V     (4.18) 
 
The calculated ALF is 10 assuming the VA rating of the CT is 15 VA.  This results 
in an emf of 35 V, which is below the values in the graph in Annexure 4E.  If an 
ALF of 30 is used, the emf increases to 105 V.  If an ALF of 20 is used, the 
results are better and the emf increases to 70 V.  Prévé (2006) states that if the 
ALF is large the CT is less likely to become saturated.  The installed CT should 
have an ALF of 20, which is within Prévé’s parameters.  According to Table 4.2 
(Chapter 4.3) a 10P CT allows a 10% error.  This falls within the parameters of 
the calculated knee point voltage and that of Annexure 4E.  The class 10P CT is 
perfect for this application.  Prévé (2006) states that a 10P CT is suitable for 
overcurrent protection. 
 
A maintenance test was arranged to verify the accuracy of the CT’s in terms of 
primary injection and insulation resistance.  The primary injection test results are 
as follows: 
Note: primary injected current is 100A 
Core 1: 300/5 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 1710 mA 0 mA 0 mA 1710 mA 
Red-White 1680 mA 1680 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 1690 mA 0 mA 1740 mA 0 mA 
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Core 2: 300/5 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 1700 mA 0 mA 0 mA 1711 mA 
Red-White 1725 mA 1722 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 1680 mA 0 mA 1680 mA 0 mA 
 
Comparing the test results to that of Table 4.1 (Chapter 4.3), it is evident that the 
CT's failed the test.  It is evident that the most suitable CT’s to be used should be 
a 10P20 15 VA.  The tests conducted are proof that the CT’s should be replaced.  
These CT’s are old and not all the data is available. 
 
S = 17.5 VA                 (4.4) 
Max allowable primary current (ALC)  = 6000 A           (4.19) 
 
The maximum allowable primary current of 6000 A does not exceed the 
maximum fault current of 11850 A (Digsilent 11854 A Annexure 4C).  Using an 
ALF of 30, the ALC increases to 8000 A, which is still below the ALC.  In this 
case, the CT should be changed to a 400/5 CT with an ALF of 30.  The resultant 
ALC of 12000 A is more than the fault level.  Therefore, this CT is not suitable 
and should be replaced with a 10P30 15 VA CT. 
 
An alternative solution is as follows: 
Use a 400/5 
At 125% plug setting I   = 1.25 x 400 = 500 A 
ALF at 500 A     = 23.7 (use 30)            (4.3) 
Max allowable primary current (ALC) = 12000 A            (4.19) 
 
The most suitable CT to be used should be a 10P30 15 VA 400/5 CT.  
 
12.3.2 Fault Calculations 
sourceZ   = 0.221 pu                                                    (4.5) 
baseZ  = 4.84                  (4.8) 
 
line actZ  = R + jXL 
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   0.462 + j0.7558 
   0.885   58.650Ω 
 
22kVlineZ  = 0.183 pu                (4.7) 
 
cable actZ  = R + jXL 
   1.38 + j0.372 
   1.429   0.260Ω 
 
22kVlineZ  = 0.295 pu                (4.7) 
 
faultZ  = 22kVlineZ22kVcableZsourceZ   
  = 0.221 + (0.295 x 2)972 + 0.183 
  = 0.994 pu 
 
pu faultI  = 0.994
1  
  = 1.006 pu 
 
b22I   = 2.624 kA                            (4.9) 
 
faultI   = pu faultI X b22I  
= 2.624 x 1.006 
= 2638 A  
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 2749 A – Annexure 4D)  
 
12.3.3 Relay Settings 
max faultI   = 2749 A (maximum most downstream fault  
Current- Annexure 4D) 
min faultI   = 2290 A (minimum most downstream fault current-  
Annexure 4F) 
CT ratio  = 300:1 
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maxI    = 262.43 A               (4.1) 
 
Plug Setting (PS) = 87.48%               (4.11) 
Use a plug setting of 100% 
 
PSM (M) at max fault  = 9.16              (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 3.09 sec                                 (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (3.09 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.43 sec  
 
TMS     = 0.14              (4.14) 
      Use 0.1 minimum 
 
PSM (P) at min fault  = 7.63                (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 3.38 sec                                 (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (3.38 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.43 sec 
 
TMS     = 0.13              (4.14) 
      Use 0.1 minimum  
 
The standard in the NMBM power system is to set the earth fault plug setting at 
20% and the TMS at 0.1 (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV 
Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
The SEF must detect low-level earth faults.  The SEF setting will therefore be the 
greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating (PEE Code of Practice Number 
6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3), therefore use 3% TMS = 10 sec. 
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12.3.4 Calculating the Fuse Size of the Transformer 
The following fuses should be installed at the beginning of the lateral lines using 
Case studies general information, provided they can grade with other equipment.  
This was calculated in Chapter 8.2.3.  Install 10K fuses at KKG 35, 49, 49A, 50, 
51, 52, 53A, 53/8, 53/12, 53/21, 53/32/7, 53/42, 53/46, 53/46/16, 53/46/22, 
53/46/24, 53/46/33, 53/46/42/7, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 63 and 65    
 
Refer to KKG 53/2 
 
Total load at KKG 53/2  = 76.11 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 760.1 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 91.33 A 
Use a 65K fuse, which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 95 A and 
the inrush current.  Tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.5 a 65K can grade with a 10K, 15K, 25K and a 40K fuse at 
a fault current of 2200 A.  This fuse can sustain the inrush current based on 
Table 8.2. 
 
Refer to KKG 53/32 
 
Total load at KKG 53/32  = 49.86 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 498.6 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 59.83 A 
Use a 40K fuse, which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 60 A and 
the inrush current.  Tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.5 a 40K fuse can grade with a 10K and 15K fuses at a fault 
current of 1340 A and with a 25K at 660 A.  This fuse can sustain the inrush 
current based on Table 8.2. 
 
Refer to KKG 53/32 towards left 
 
Total load at KKG 53/32  = 10.5 A                                    (4.1) 
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Inrush current   = 105 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 12.6 A 
Use a 10K fuse, which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 15 A and 
the inrush current.  Tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.2 a 10K fuse cannot grade with a 10K fuse.  This fuse can 
sustain the inrush current based on Table 8.2. 
 
Refer to KKG 53/46/13 towards left 
 
Total load at KKG 53/46/13 = 26.24 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 262.4 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 31.49 A 
Use a 25K fuse, which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 38 A and 
the inrush current.  Tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.5, a 25K can grade with a 10K fuse at a fault current of 840 
A.  This fuse can sustain the inrush current based on Table 8.2. 
 
Refer to KKG 60 
 
Install at beginning of the lateral line supplying transformers A0078 and A1316 
install 10K fuses.  
 
Total load at KKG 60  = 0.66 A                                    (4.1) 
Inrush current   = 6.6 A 
Permissible overload (20%) = 0.79 A 
Use a 10K fuse, which is capable of carrying a continuous current of 15 A and 
the inrush current.  Tables 8.2, 8.3 and PEE Code of Practice were all consulted. 
 
According to Table 8.5, a 10K cannot grade with a 10K fuse.  The next fuse that 
can grade with a 10K fuse is a 15K at a fault current of 300 A.  This fuse can 
sustain the inrush current based on Table 8.2.  
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12.3.5 Auto-Recloser 
The KKG 22kV feeder is approximately 15 km long.  The first section of the 
feeder is 7 kilometres of 150 mm2 copper cable which terminates on the first H-
pole.  A lateral ABC line is connected to the main line, which supplies 
smallholdings and low-cost houses. 
 
At the main substation, a Reyrolle A OCB is installed with over current, earth fault 
and auto-reclose functions.  The CDG protection equipment is very old and the 
auto-reclose relay was not functioning.  It is also not normal practice to install an 
ARC on a cable network.  In this case study, the network consists of bare 
conductors, underground cable and ABC.  An ARC should be installed at the first 
pole (KKG 1) supplying the overhead line.  This ARC must grade with the 
upstream OCB and the downstream fuses.  The Reyrolle A OCB is very old and 
cannot perform auto-reclose operations; therefore auto-reclose operations were 
disabled on the new ABB REF 610.  If this is accepted, then section 2.9 of PEE 
Code of Practice Number 6.1 will apply, which states “ARC’s with only fuses 
downstream are to be set two fast and two delayed trips, in order to ensure the 
rupturing of fuses on faulty section.” 
 
12.3.6 Sectionalisers 
The only place to install a sectionaliser on this power system is at KKG 53, but 
the KKG 53 lateral line is constructed in ABC, which is treated as cable, so a 
sectionaliser would not be recommended.  Also the cost of a sectionaliser is R 95 
000.00 and the cost of expulsion fuses is R 15 000.00 each, therefore the 
sectionaliser is too expensive.  Currently an on-load airbrake switch is installed at 
KKG 53, which assists with sectionalising under fault conditions. 
 
 
12.3.7 Earth Fault Protection 
Since most faults on overhead lines (90%) are earth faults, it is imperative that 
earth fault protections is used.  The NMBM on 22kV rural lines use earth fault, 
overcurrent and sensitive earth fault protection as main and back up protection in 
an IDMT relay (NMBM Protection Guidelines). 
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On the KKG 22kV overhead line the ABB Ref 610 relay earth fault settings follow: 
Plug setting: 30% 
TMS: 0.3 
 
Compare this to the NMBM policy which states the following: 
Plug setting: 20% 
TMS: 0.1 
 
This deviation is not critical, but in terms of the construction of the line, the 
geographical area the line supplies, and the number of faults recorded, a TMS of 
0.1 is a better option. 
 
12.3.8 Sensitive Earth Fault Protection 
The SEF relay has been programmed at a plug setting of 5% and a TMS of 10 s.  
The SEF must be set to detect low earth faults.  The SEF setting must be the 
greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating and the TMS = 10 s (PEE Code 
of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
Live conductors were found lying on the ground and the earth fault current was 
too low to be detected by the earth fault relay.  The ground is also very dry and 
many trees are found in this are, thus it is likely that the earth fault does not 
sense this.  SEF is a good option for the KKG overhead line. 
 
On the KKG 22kV power network the ABB relay the SEF settings follow: 
Plug setting: 5% 
TMS: 10 s 
   
3% of the CT primary current equals to 3 A.  5% of the CT primary current equals 
to 5 A.  5% and 10 s are within the NMBM policy.    
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12.3.9 Surge Arrestors 
According to Dugan et al (2003) lightning is one of the main causes of power 
outages on overhead lines.  Many of the unknown power outages and voltage 
dips could be attributed to lightning activity along the power line.  If flashovers 
can be reduced, fewer power quality problems would arise.  In Terms of the 
investigations not many surge arrestors were installed.  The current policy states 
that surge arrestors should be installed on the transformer pole or at the 
beginning of the lateral line. 
  
Lakervi and Holmes (2003) and Dugan et al (2003) state that surge arrestors 
must be allocated closely to the equipment they protect.  They should be 
installed on every second or third pole.  This will reduce the number of voltage 
dips and power outages, and ultimately, the number of unknown power quality 
events.  This is an expensive method to ensure security of supply, but this will 
ultimately reduce the power quality problems and unknown power outages. 
 
12.4 DIGSILENT POWER FACTORY 
Refer to KKG 53/2 
According to Annexure 4G, a 65K fuse can grade with 10K, 15K, 25K and a 40K 
fuse, but the 40K and 65K fuses cannot grade with the relay.  These fuses 
cannot protect the transformer, but they protect the conductor well against fault 
current.  The clearing time between the fuse and the relay is approximately 0.4 s 
(Annexure 4H).  Only 30K fuses and lower can grade with the relay (Annexure 
4I).  Installing a 30K at the beginning (KKG 53/2) of the lateral line will 
compromise the maximum current capabilities of the line, reducing it from 95 A to 
65 A.  Reducing the 65K fuse to 30K will mean that the 40K fuse at KKG 53/32 
has to be reduced to 25K and the 25K fuse at 53/46/13 to 20K.  This will also 
allow a grading margin of 0.413 s (Annexure 4I). 
 
KKG 53 Analysis 
Refer to Annexure 4J. 
The fuses at 53/46/16, 53/46/13, 53/2 and the relay were graded.  A fault was 
created on high voltage winding of the transformer.  The fault was cleared by the 
relay at 0.422 s.  This proves that the selection of the fuses was correct in terms 
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of grading, but in terms of loading the fuse might blow (Refer to the protection 
calculations above).  
 
KKG 60 
Install a 15K fuse at the beginning of the lateral line and a 10K fuse on the high 
voltage winding of the second transformer as depicted in Annexure 4K.  This 
confirms that the relay can grade with the 15K fuse at a grading margin of 0.394 
s and the 15K fuse can grade with the 10K fuse. 
 
12.5 SCADA 
 
According to Lakervi and Holmes (2003) a SCADA system improves the 
reliability of the power system.  This will reduce outage time and cut losses to the 
customers connected to the network. 
 
At Kragga Kamma 22kV substation, full SCADA operation is available through 
the ABB master station.  The communication medium used is pilot wires.  The 
NMBM is in the process of installing a fibre optic network connecting all the major 
substations. 
 
The SCADA system assists in control, monitoring and viewing, thus reducing 
outage time, increasing response time and allowing opportunities for improved 
power system optimisation.  
 
12.6 MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
The power system equipment, namely, OCB, protection n relays are old and the 
technology is outdated.  This means that these equipment needs more servicing 
and calibration.  No maintenance records could be found.  According to Gill 
(1997), maintenance must be controlled by management and performed in 
accordance with a plan or program by a dedicated team.  The NMBM does not 
have the necessary manpower to perform preventative maintenance.  This is the 
cause of many outages that could have been avoided if proper planned 
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maintenance was done.  The run-to-fail practice of the NMBM is costing the 
customers because extended outages lead to lost of production and impact 
negatively on industry.   
 
12.7 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
Dugan et al (2003), comment that weather conditions are the causes of major 
power outages, with lightning being very common.  This is supported by data in 
Annexure 4B.   
 
From the analysis of the faults it is apparent that 93% of all the outages in KKG 
are caused by adverse weather conditions.  Table 8.1 reveals that high winds 
cause many outages.  Bollen (2002) confirmed a figure of 32%.  Weather 
impacts on power system reliability affecting outages, outage durations, reliability 
indices and power quality.  Power system reliability measures should be 
integrated in the design of power systems.  Routine planned maintenance is 
critical on rural bare conductor lines, namely, vegetation control, conductor 
tensioning, routine inspections of the equipment et cetera.  This will reduce 
outages drastically. 
 
12.8 NRS DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The NRS spreadsheet was designed to provide statistical data for the utility and 
at the same time produce a report for the NER.  It provides valuable information 
on outages, equipment failures, causes of outages, restoration time, planned and 
unplanned interruptions et cetera.  The statistics could be used to evaluate the 
performance of the network. 
 
The historical data available at the time of the investigation was captured onto 
the NRS spreadsheet.  It revealed that the KKG 22kV overhead line slightly 
under-performed in terms of restoration times (Refer to Annexure 4L).  It is a 
requirement that 30% of the supply must be restored in 1.5 hours, 60% in 3.5 
hours, 90% in 7.5 hours and 100% in 24 hours.  The network complies in the 
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30% and 60% categories, but in the 90% category it is slightly below the NER 
standard.  The most critical stage of any outage is the first two hours.  
Restoration of supply usually takes more than 2 hours. 
 
12.9  FINDINGS 
 
The findings based on the evaluation in terms of the criteria described in the 
literature review: 
 
 The Reyrolle A OCB is old and outdated. 
 The KKG overhead line is exposed to weather conditions, namely, storm, 
rain, strong wind and lightning. 
 The ARC is not operational and the relay has been burnt out. 
 The CDG protection relay provides overcurrent and earth fault protection 
and does not have SEF facility. 
 The protection relay and fuses does not grade properly. 
 The calculated reliability data below, does not comply with the standard: 
 SAIDI = 979 min/yr 
 SAIFI = 5 int/yr 
 CAIDI = 195.8 min/yr 
 The KKG overhead line meets the requirements in term of system adequacy 
as the conductors can sustain the load requirement. 
 The KKG overhead line does not comply in term of system security as the 
overhead line cannot sustain severe disturbances. 
 The KKG overhead line does not comply in terms of S and T voltage dips 
categories. 
 The harmonic, flickering and voltage regulation measurements are within 
the parameters of the standard. 
 The calculated specifications for the CT’s are 10P30 15 VA, 400/5. 
 The calculated fault level is 2.6 kA and the Digsilent simulation is 2.7 kA. 
 The relay settings are calculated as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
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 The sensitive earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 5% 
 TMS  = 10 s 
 The earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 30% 
 TMS  = 0.3 
 Lateral lines KKG 13, 40, 50, 51, 53, 53A, 55, 56, 57, 60, 60A, 61, 63 and 
65 are not protected with expulsion fuses.   
 Many pole mounted transformers are not protected with expulsion fuses. 
 SCADA supervisory system is installed at the Kragga Kamma and 
Greenbushes substations. 
 The Reyrolle A OCB is not compatible for SCADA. 
 No maintenance records are available for the overhead line. 
 The effect of no maintenance being done increases outage durations.  
 The shortage of manpower hampers maintenance programs. 
 Adverse weather conditions have a major impact on the KKG overhead line.  
48% of all outages are directly linked to adverse weather conditions. 
 Installation of a sectionaliser is not financially viable. 
 Bird and animal life is prevalent along KKG overhead line. 
 Not many surge arrestors were found on the KKG overhead line. 
 The KKG overhead line does not comply with the 90% NRS categories. 
 
12.10 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To improve power system reliability the following points are recommended: 
 
 Replace old/outdated relays with ABB Ref 610 relays (some have already 
been implemented); 
 Program ABB Ref 610 for overcurrent and earth fault only.  SEF and ARC 
facilities not to be used as the first section of KKG power network is 
underground cable; 
 Install ARC on KKG 1 and grade with OCB and downstream fuses; 
 Replace outdated OCB’s to be compatible for SCADA supervisory system; 
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 Design power networks to withstand adverse weather conditions; 
 Reduce faults and voltage dips by providing dip-proofing equipment on the 
customer-side and installing animal and bird protection devices; 
 Maintain power system equipment as per maintenance schedules, namely, 
do vegetation control, routine inspections and tensioning of conductors; 
 Replace CT with 10P30 15V A; CT Ratio = 400/5; 
 Fuses should be installed as per the Protection and Digsilent sub-headings 
as follows: 
 KKG 13 – Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 35 – Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 40 – Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 45 – Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 49 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 49A - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 50 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 51 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 52 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53A - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/2 - Install 30K fuse 
 KKG 53/32 - Install 25K fuse 
 KKG 53/46/13 - Install 20K fuse 
 KKG 53/8 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/12 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/21 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/32/7 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/42 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/46 - Install 15K fuse 
 KKG 53/46/16 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/46/22 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/46/24 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/46/33 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 53/46/42/7 - Install 10K fuse 
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 KKG 54 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 55 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 56 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 57 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 60 - Install 15K fuse 
 KKG 61 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 62 – Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 63 - Install 10K fuse 
 KKG 65 - Install 10K fuse; 
 The manpower and skills shortages should be addressed.  More staff 
should be trained and employed; 
 More surge arrestors should be installed on every second or third pole, and 
 The relay settings are calculated as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
 The earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
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CHAPTER 13: ANALYSIS OF FITCHES CORNER ROCKLAND 
FEEDER (FCR) 
 
13.1 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
The Rockland 22kV feeder is not reliable, in terms of the outage duration and 
the number of power quality events.  28 outages were recorded over 5 years.  
This equates to an average of 5,6 outages per year.  The average outage 
duration is calculated at 510.16 hours per year, which adds to approximately 
42.5 hours per month.  That is approximately 1.4 hours per day.  The cost of 
the outages in terms of power not delivered is calculated at 3.84 cents per kW. 
 
In terms of system adequacy, the system meets the minimum requirements, 
namely, the current capacity of conductors can sustain the load requirement.  
The 2005 load test report indicates that the maximum loading recorded was 25 
A.  If a load growth of 20% is allowed, this equates to 30 A, whereas the 
conductor can be loaded to 262 A.  The structures are in good condition and 
the equipment is reasonably new.  If preventative maintenance is done, the 
power system reliability can improve.  In terms of system security, the power 
system fails.  The protection equipment is not reliable as the ARC on 
investigation was switched off and there is no alternative power supply to the 
system. 
 
Factors influencing the power system, are: 
 
 The power system is a radial system and there is no possibility of an 
alternative supply when an outage occurs. 
 Annexure 5B reveals that at least ten of the twenty-eight outages can be 
directly linked to adverse weather conditions. 
 The duration of the outages are not acceptable in terms of the calculated 
average outage time. 
 The failure rate will decrease if maintenance programs are implemented. 
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Calculating the power system average outage time 
 
Us = rs λs           (2.1) 
 = 28 x 94.5 
 = 2646/5 yrs 
 = 529.2 hrs/yr 
 
Calculating the average outage cost 
 
P   = 860.8 kW       (4.15) 
Cost per kW  = 0.363 (Calculated over 5 years) 
 
Outage cost =   
Li
Ci(d)       (2.5) 
  = 
860.8
94.5 X 0.363  
  = R 0.0399 per kW 
  = 3.99 cents/kW 
 
Calculating Reliability Indices 
 
Calculated SAIDI = 1133.4 min/yr     (2.2) 
Calculated SAIFI = 5.6 int/yr          (2.3) 
Calculated CAIDI = 202.4 min/yr      (2.4) 
 
The calculated reliability data does not comply with the standard identified by 
Burke (1994) in Chapter 8, Table 8.1.  This means that FCR power system 
under-performed for the period the data was collected.  
 
13.2 POWER QUALITY 
 
13.2.1 Voltage Dips 
The same power quality instrument used to measure power quality events for 
the FBH network is used to measure the power quality events on the FCR 
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network.  There is only one voltage transformer at the source substation, 
therefore the voltage dips will be exactly the same.  Only two of the recorded 
voltage dips are directly linked to the FCR feeder. 
 
The FCR power network is predominantly overhead line; the majority of faults 
thus are transient faults, which could be cleared by auto-reclosers.  The 
expulsion fuses should clear permanent faults on the lateral lines.  However, 
because the ARC setting was set to one instantaneous operation and lockout, 
the expulsion fuses could not clear permanent faults on the lateral lines.  In 
rural power systems, it is sometimes very complicated to identify faults.  This 
impacts on the reliability indices and outage times. 
 
The Vectograph voltage dip data recorded over twelve months are summarised 
in Table 13.1 below.  
 
Table 13.1 – Voltage Dips – Fitches Corner Substation - Jan 08 to Dec 08 
 
 S T X1 X2 Y Z1 Z2 
% 
Not  
avail 
Jan 08 3 0 3 0 24 1 0 13,3 
Feb 08 5 0 19 2 40 2 4 6.6 
Mar 08 1 0 2 1 6 2 0 92 
Apr 08 1 6 1 2 21 3 1 4 
May 08 2 0 2 0 17 3 0 0,4 
June 08 0 0 1 0 10 0 0 45,2 
July 08 3 1 1 1 18 0 0 0,6 
Aug 08 3 1 7 1 14 0 0 66,8 
Sep 08 2 5 1 1 22 1 0 0,5 
OCT 08 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 68,0 
Nov 08 6 0 3 0 37 1 5 0,7 
Dec 08 4 2 3 5 29 1 0 80,6 
Total 30 15 43 13 241 14 10  
 
From the Table, it can be concluded that Y-dips are the problematic ones.  The 
magnitude of these dips is shallow and the duration is normally no longer than 
approximately 100 ms.  Many of these dips are caused by neighbouring 
networks, therefore they are regarded as insignificant.  The customers are 
responsible for protecting their equipment against Y-dips.  No dip improvement 
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equipment has been installed on the customer equipment.  If Table 13.1 is 
compared to Table 3.1 (Chapter 3.2.1), it is obvious that improvement is 
desired.  
 
Many factors could influence the voltage dips, namely, irregular maintenance, 
operation of protection devices, protection against bird and animal life, adverse 
weather conditions and the absence of surge arrestors. 
 
13.2.2 Harmonics 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the international benchmark of 5% identified by Burke (1994) and 
the NRS 048-2:2003, which allows a total harmonic distortion of not more than 
8%.  According to the assessment no signs of harmonics disorders could be 
identified.  Power quality data recorded indicated that the harmonics measured 
on this power system are within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2003. 
 
13.2.3 Flickering 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark between 0.8% and 1.25% as per NRS 048-2:2001.  
According to the assessment no signs of flickering could be identified.  Power 
quality data recorded indicated that the flickering measured on this power 
system is within the parameters of the NRS 048-2:2001. 
 
13.2.4 Voltage Regulation 
The recorded data was retrieved from the power quality instrument and 
compared to the benchmark of ±5% for power systems above 500 V as per 
NRS 048-2:2001.  According to the assessment no signs of voltage regulation 
irregularities could be determined.  Power quality data recorded indicates that 
the voltage regulation measured on FCR power system is within the 
parameters of the NRS 048-2:2003. 
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13.3 POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
 
13.3.1 Current Transformers 
Although this is a relatively new power system, it is essential to check the 
current transformers.  Current transformers need to stay accurate because they 
sustain high fault currents during fault conditions.  If the current transformer is 
inaccurate, the protection equipment will operate incorrectly. 
  
Calculating ALF 
Current rating of overhead line = 262 A; use 300 A 
Load current    = 30 A; use 100A 
FLI      = 262 A; use 300 A             (4.1) 
CT Ratio    = 300/1 
Available tapings on CT are 50% to 200% 
 
At 50% plug setting I  = 0.5 x 300 = 150 A   
At 100% plug setting I  = 1 x 300 = 300 A   
At 125% plug setting I  = 1.25 x 300 = 375 A   
At 150% plug setting I  = 1.5 x 300 = 450 A   
At 200% plug setting I  = 2 x 300 = 600 A   
faultI     = 2151 A             (4.2) 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 2167  – Annexure 5C)  
 
ALF at 150 A    = 14.3              (4.3) 
ALF at 300 A    = 7.2              (4.3) 
ALF at 375 A    = 5.7              (4.3) 
ALF at 450 A    = 4.8              (4.3) 
ALF at 600 A    = 3.6              (4.3) 
 
Twice the full load current of the system is approximately 60 A.  The minimum 
plug setting must be used, which is 50%.  The ALF to be used is 14.3 (use 15).  
This allows for load growth.  Proper grading can still be achieved as the 
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maximum primary current of the CT’s is 300 A and 50% is 150 A.  The class 
and VA rating of the CT’s installed are not available. 
 
The overhead line can carry approximately 262 A, and the full load current of 
the transformer is 262 A.  This transformer not only supplies this feeder but also 
another 22 kV feeder and the 6.6 kV network.  It is highly unlikely this feeder 
will be loaded to its full capacity. 
 
Determining the knee point voltage 
VA rating    = 10 VA 
Impedance of Burden  = 10                (33) 
Assume CT secondary resistance = 0.1   
Total secondary impedance = 10,1                        (34) 
ALF (Using most downstream fault of 1417 A - Annexure 5D)  
     = 4.7 use 5             (4.3) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (5) = 50.5 V             (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (10) = 101 V              (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (15) = 151.5 V            (4.18) 
Emf at secondary at ALF (20) = 202 V             (4.18) 
According to Annexure 5E an ALF of 15 is approximately correct. 
 
Assuming the ALF is 10 and the VA rating of the CT is 10 VA.  This results in 
an emf of 101 V, which is below the values of Annexure 5E.  If however an ALF 
of 15 is used, the emf increases to 151.5 V.  This is within the values of 
Annexure 5E.  Prévé (2006) states that if the ALF is large, the CT is less likely 
to become saturated.  Assuming the ALF is 15 than the is within Prévé’s 
parameters. 
 
The class 10P CT is perfect for this application.  Prévé (2006) states that 10P is 
suitable for overcurrent protection, which is the case in this instance. 
 
S = 10.1 VA                 (4.4) 
Max allowable primary current (ALC)  = 4500 A          (4.19) 
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The maximum allowable primary current of 4500 A exceeds the maximum fault 
current of 1407 A as simulated on Digsilent without the transformer.  
 
Table 4.2 (Chapter 4.3) a 10P CT allows a 10% error.  When compared with 
the calculated knee point voltage, the test is within the parameters. 
 
A maintenance test was arranged to verify the accuracy of the CT’s in terms of 
primary injection and insulation resistance.  The primary injection test results 
are as follows: 
Note: primary injected current is 100A 
Core 1: 300/1 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 331 mA 0 mA 0 Ma 329 mA 
Red-White 328 mA 328 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 327 mA 0 mA 327 mA 0 mA 
 
Core 2: 300/1 Red White Blue Neutral 
Phase-Neutral 330 mA 0 mA 0 mA 330 mA 
Red-White 330 mA 330 mA 0 mA 0 mA 
Red-Blue 329 mA 0 mA 328 mA 0 mA 
 
The results compared to that of Table 4.2 (Chapter 4.3), indicate that the CT 
passed the test.  From all the above it is evident that the most suitable CT to be 
used should be a 10P15 10 VA.   
 
13.3.2 Fault Calculations 
sourceZ  = 1.22 pu                                             (4.5) 
10MVAtrfZ  = 0.972                 (4.6) 
baseZ  = 4.84                  (4.8) 
 
actZ   = R + jxL 
   0.462 + j0.7558 
   0.885   58.650Ω 
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22kVlineZ   = 0.183 pu               (4.7) 
 
Fault current at 22 kV system: 
faultZ   = 22kVlineZ10MVAZsourceZ   
   = 1.22 + 0.972 + 0.183 
   = 2.375 pu 
 
pu faultI   = 2.375
1  
   = 0.421 pu 
 
b22I    = 2.624 kA               (4.9) 
 
faultI    = pu faultI X b22I  
= 2.624 x 0.421 
= 1105 A 
(Digsilent simulation confirmed fault level of 1305 A – Annexure 5F)  
 
13.3.3 Relay Settings 
max faultI   = 1407 A (maximum most downstream fault current- 
Annexure 5G) 
min faultI   = 1305 A (minimum most downstream fault current-  
Annexure 5F) 
CT ratio  = 300:1 
maxI    = 262.43 A               (4.1) 
 
Plug Setting (PS) = 87.48%              (4.11) 
Use a plug setting of 100% 
 
PSM (M) at max fault  = 4.69             (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 4.46 sec                                (4.13) 
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Relay operating time  = (4.46 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.44 sec  
 
TMS     = 0.099             (4.14) 
      Use 0.1  
 
PSM (P) at min fault  = 4.35             (4.12) 
t at TM = 1    = 4.69 sec                                (4.13) 
 
Relay operating time  = (4.69 x 0.01) + 0.4 
     = 0.45 sec 
 
TMS     = 0.095             (4.14) 
      Use 0.1  
 
The standard in the NMBM power system is to set the earth fault plug setting at 
20% and the TMS at 0.1 (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV 
Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
The SEF must detect low-level earth faults.  The SEF setting should therefore 
be the greater of 5 amps or 3% of the CT primary rating (PEE Code of Practice 
Number 6.1 Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3), therefore 3% and 10 sec 
TMS is recommended. 
 
13.3.4 Calculating the Size of the Transformer and Lateral 
Fuses 
The following fuses should be installed at the beginning of the lateral lines 
provided they can grade with other equipment.  The fuse sizes were calculated 
in Chapter 8.2.3. 
 
FCR 45 – Install 15K fuse 
FCR 58 - Install 10K fuse 
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FCR 70 - Install 10K fuse 
FCR 72/4 - Install 20K fuse 
FCR 74 - Install 25K fuse 
FCR 75 - Install 10K fuse 
 
13.3.5 Auto-Recloser 
The FCR 22kV overhead line is constructed with copper conductors on wooden 
H-pole structures.  The line is approximately 7 kilometres long.  Many traces of 
animals, namely, monkeys and bird life were found along the line.  The 
vegetation is relatively dense.  Due to these factors, it would be advantageous 
to install an auto-recloser at the beginning of the line.  On inspection of the site, 
it was found that the TJV relay does not provide auto-reclose facility.  Auto-
reclosing will eliminate many unnecessary trips and outages and will impact 
positively on power system reliability.  A four shot auto-recloser should be 
considered (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1).  The PEE Code of Practice 
Number 6.1 policy should be used. 
 
13.3.6 Sectionalisers 
The cost of a sectionaliser is R 95 000.00 and the cost of expulsion fuses is R 
15 000.00 each.  All the lateral lines supply only one customer each, so it would 
not be financially viable to install sectionalisers on the FCR power system. 
 
13.3.7 Earth Fault Protection 
Since 90% of faults on overhead lines are earth faults, it is imperative that earth 
fault protection is used (Lakervi and Holmes, 2003).  On 22kV rural lines the 
NMBM use earth fault, overcurrent and sensitive earth fault protection as main 
and back up protection in an IDMT relay (NMBM Protection Guidelines). 
 
On the Rockland 22kV overhead line, an ARC has been installed and the 
settings in terms of earth fault are as follows: 
Plug setting: 10% 
TMS: 0.1 
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Compare this to the NMBM policy, which states the following: 
Plug setting: 20% 
TMS: 0.1 
 
This deviation is not critical, in fact it is a better setting.  Considering the 
construction of the line and the geographical area the line supplies, 10% would 
be better. 
 
13.3.8 Sensitive Earth Fault Protection 
The ARC has SEF and during the testing exercise it was found that the plug 
setting is 3% and the TMS is 5 s.  The SEF must be set to detect low earth 
faults.  The SEF setting must be greater than 5 A or 3% of the CT primary 
rating and the TMS = 10 s (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 Protection of MV 
Overhead Lines, 2.3). 
 
Live conductors were found on the ground, posing danger to humans and 
animals.  The ground is also very dry and many trees are found here.  It is likely 
that the earth fault current is too low to be detected by the earth fault relay.  
SEF is therefore a good option for this line. 
 
On the FCR 22kV overhead line, the ARC SEF settings are as follows: 
Plug setting: 3% 
TMS: 5 s 
 
3% of the CT primary current equals 9 A.  Therefore 3% is acceptable.  5 s is 
faster than 10 s.  Changing the TMS to 10 s should be considered in terms of 
the standard. 
 
13.3.9 Surge Arrestors 
Lightning is one of the main causes of power outages on overhead lines.  It is 
difficult to associate power outages with lightning activity (Dugan et al, 2003).  
This is true if the power system is situated in remote rural areas, making it 
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difficult for staff to locate the faults.  Many unknown power outages and voltage 
dips in the NMBM are attributed to lightning activity along the overhead lines. 
 
Not many surge arrestors were found on the FCR overhead line.  The current 
policy states that surge arrestors should be installed on the transformer pole or 
at the beginning of the lateral line.    
 
Lakervi and Holmes (2003) and Dugan et al (2003) suggest that surge arrestors 
shall be allocated closely to the equipment they protect and installed on every 
second or third pole.  This is probably an expensive method to ensure security 
of supply, but it will reduce the power quality problems and unknown outages. 
 
13.4 DIGSILENT POWER FACTORY 
 
The FCR 22 kV overhead line was modelled on Digsilent.  Fault analysis, 
grading and protection simulation were conducted.  This was compared to the 
protection fault calculations.  The Digsilent and Protection sub-sections should 
be read together. 
 
Grading of lateral lines 
FCR 45 
Refer to Annexure 5H and Annexure 5I 
Although a 12K fuse maintains a grading margin of 0.4 s with the relay, it does 
not protect the transformer.  According to Annexure 5I, a 10K fuse is a better 
solution in terms of protecting the transformer.  The grading margin is the 
same.  A 10K fuse, according to Table 8.3, can carry a continuous current of 15 
A.  This is slightly less than the permissible overload of the transformer.     
 
FCR58 
Refer to Annexure 5J 
The 10K fuse protects the transformer and the conductor well and maintains a 
grading margin of 0.4 s between the fuse and the relay. 
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FCR70 
Refer to Annexure 5K 
A 10K fuse cannot protect the transformer.  The fuse will blow at a fault current 
of 20 A in 20 s.  By then the transformer would be already damaged.  The fuse 
protects the conductor and the system against overloads, leaving a grading 
margin of 0.4 s between the fuse and the relay.  By reducing the size of the 
fuse, the protection of the transformer improves but the fault current effects and 
loading are compromised. 
 
FCR72/4 
Refer to Annexure 5L and Annexure 5M 
A 20K fuse does not protect the transformer as recorded in Annexure 5L.  
When the fuse blows the transformer is already damaged.  According to 
Annexure 5M, the 15K fuse protects the transformer and allows a grading 
margin between the fuse and the relay of 0.4 s.  If the fuse fails to clear the 
fault, the transformer will be damaged before the relay operates.    
 
FCR74 
Refer to Annexure 5N and Annexure 5O 
A 25K fuse does not protect the transformer as recorded in Annexure 5N.  
When the fuse blows the transformer is already damaged.  According to 
Annexure 5O, the 20K fuse protects the transformer and allows a grading 
margin between the fuse and the relay of 0.398 s.  If the fuse fails to clear the 
fault, the transformer will be damaged before the relay operates.  The 20K fuse 
will be a better fuse to protect the transformer Annexure 5O. 
 
FCR75 
Refer to Annexure 5P 
Although the 10K fuse grades reasonably well with the relay, it does not protect 
the transformer.  By decreasing the fuse size, the overload margin and the 
grading margin will decrease marginally and the transformer could be protected 
depending on the size of the fuse.  A possible solution to protect the 
transformer is to reduce the size of the fuse.  The problem is that the NMBM 
policy states that the minimum fuse size to be used on 22kV overhead power 
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networks should not be lower than 10K (PEE Code of Practice Number 6.1 
Protection of MV Overhead Lines, 2.3).     
 
13.5 SCADA 
 
The Rockland 22kV feeder, which is part of the Fitches Corner network, is one 
of the feeders which has SCADA facilities.  This substation is situated in the 
remote rural areas of the NMBM.  SCADA makes it possible to view the trends, 
current and voltage analogue readings, receive alarms and to open and close 
the OCB.  The ARC can also be switched off or on remotely.   
 
SCADA information is brought back to the master station via radio 
communication.  During adverse weather conditions, and when many 
operations in SCADA are performed, the data tends to be delayed for a few 
minutes, sometimes even up to 30 minutes.  This is due to the traffic that the 
gateway can manage.  The radio communication system is also limited, as it 
does not comply with the OSI standards.  The SCADA master station and the 
radio network are from different suppliers, hence the difficulties with receiving 
the data.  SCADA staff is investigating an alternative to this problem.  A solution 
would be to use only equipment which complies with OSI, but this will have 
financial implications for NMBM.   
 
Lakervi and Holmes (2003) recommend automation to improve power system 
reliability and to secure constant supply.  Key customers, namely, chicken 
farmers, and factories are supplied by the FCR overhead line.  SCADA ensures 
identification of faults and restoration of supply to customers.  This is faster and 
better than other customers in the rural areas.  The outage durations are 
shorter.  With more improvement in alternative communication systems, the 
service can improve.  This can be done by installing more RTU’s for rural 
networks.  
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13.6 MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
Maintenance and manpower are trends for the FCR line is almost the same as 
the FBH line.  No more maintenance records could be traced other than those 
valid for FBH.  The 10 MVA transformer was maintained in November 2003 and 
from the site visit it is evident that this transformer is in a bad state.  The 
substation has two battery chargers, namely, a 30 volt and 110 volt.  The 30 
volt battery charger was maintained in September 2005 and the 110 volt battery 
charger in November 2002. 
 
Protection maintenance should be planned in conjunction with the switchgear 
maintenance program.  If a plant is isolated for maintenance, the protection 
team will on the same day perform their maintenance.  This is not a good 
practice, because protection equipment and switchgear do not have the same 
maintenance intervals. 
 
No overhead line maintenance records are available.  Line inspectors would 
inspect the overhead line and associated equipment 3 to 4 times annually and 
report faulty equipment to management.  A shutdown would then be arranged 
to repair or replace the faulty equipment.  The shortcoming to this approach is 
that only the equipment on ground level can be inspected.  Many times, the 
equipment on poles fails.  This is what Lohmann (n.d) called detective 
maintenance.  In order to perform this type of maintenance properly on high 
voltage electrical equipment, the plant must be shut down.  A follow-up shut 
down can be arranged for maintenance, repair and replacement of equipment.   
 
The shortage of manpower hampers maintenance programs.  Maintenance 
programs should be performed under the supervision of management by a 
dedicated team in accordance with a schedule (Lohmann, n.d).  This is not 
possible for the NMBM as it does not have the skilled labour to perform 
maintenance.  All equipment deteriorates over time and needs to be repaired or 
replaced in order to provide good quality power to customers.  Brown (2002) 
states that preventative maintenance can extend the life of equipment and 
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Seever (1991) states, that routine maintenance reduces the probability of 
failures.  This will guarantee fewer power outages and will impact positively on 
power system reliability. 
 
The run-to-fail practice of the NMBM is costing the customers because 
extended outages lead to lost of production and impact negatively on industry.  
This is not only a concern for NMBM, but rather a concern affecting the entire 
electrical industry.  Annexures 5B display the lack of maintenance.  By 
performing maintenance the outages on FCR could be reduced by 33%.  
 
 13.7 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
Adverse weather conditions have a major impact on the FCR overhead line.  
75% of faults were directly caused by adverse weather conditions.  Power 
system reliability indices, outage durations and power quality performance thus 
suffer.  Routine planned maintenance is critical in rural bare conductor lines, 
namely, vegetation control, conductor tensioning, routine inspections of the 
equipment et cetera. 
 
13.8 NRS DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The NRS spreadsheet provides valuable information with respect to outages, 
equipment failures, planned and unplanned interruptions et cetera.  The 
statistics obtained from the spreadsheet could be used to evaluate the 
performance of the network and also to report to the NER. 
 
The historical data available at the time of the investigation was captured onto 
the NRS spreadsheet.  The FCR 22kV power network under-performed in 
terms of restoration times (Refer to Annexure 5Q).  It is a requirement that 30% 
of the supply must be restored in 1.5 hours, 60% in 3.5 hours, 90% in 7.5 hours 
and 100% in 24 hours.  The network only complies in the 90 and 100% 
categories.  The major impact on customers is during the first two hours without 
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supply, therefore the 21% and 57% in the 30% and 60% categories 
respectively should improve. 
 
13.9  FINDINGS 
 
The findings based on the evaluation in terms of the criteria described in the 
literature review: 
 
 The FCR overhead line is exposed to weather conditions, namely, storm, 
rain, wind and lightning. 
 The ARC does not operate properly as it is set to 1 shot and lockout. 
 The calculated reliability data below, does not comply with the standard: 
 SAIDI = 1133.4 min/yr 
 SAIFI = 5.6 int/yr 
 CAIDI = 202.4 min/yr 
 The FCR overhead line meets the requirements in term of system 
adequacy as the conductors can sustain the load requirement. 
 Only 1 voltage transformer is available at Fitches Corner substation.  
Therefore the Vectograph dip recording will be the same for both FCR and 
FBH. 
 The FCR overhead line under-performed in terms of voltage dips.  The 
recorded voltage dips exceed the voltage dip category benchmarks. 
 The harmonic, flickering and voltage regulation measurements are within 
the parameters of the standard. 
 The class and VA rating of the CT’s are not available. 
 The 10 MVA transformer and the overhead line conductor are capable of 
carrying the load. 
 The calculated specifications for the CT’s are 10P15 10 VA. 
 The calculated fault level is 1.1 kA and the Digsilent simulation is 1.3 kA. 
 The relay settings are calculated as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
 The sensitive earth fault settings are: 
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 Plug setting = 3% 
 TMS  = 5 s 
 The earth fault settings are: 
 Plug setting = 10% 
 TMS  = 0.1 
 All the lateral lines are protected with expulsion fuses, but the sizes are 
incorrect. 
 Installation of a sectionaliser is not financially viable. 
 Bird and animal life is prevalent along FCR overhead line. 
 Not many surge arrestors were found on the FCR overhead line. 
 Relay and fuses does not grade properly. 
 SCADA supervisory system is functional on the FCR overhead line, but 
during adverse weather conditions the data is delayed. 
 No maintenance records are available. 
 The effect of no maintenance being done increases outage durations.  
 The shortage of manpower hampers maintenance programs. 
 Adverse weather conditions have a major impact on the FCR overhead 
line. 
 The FCR overhead line does not comply with the 30% and 60% NRS 
categories. 
 
13.10 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To improve power system reliability the following points are recommended: 
 
 Improve maintenance initiatives, namely, inspection, replacement of 
equipment, servicing of equipment, tensioning of conductors, doing 
vegetation control and installing animal and bird guards; 
 Reprogram ARC to 4 shots (1 instantaneous and 3 delayed trips); 
 More surge arrestors should be installed on every second or third pole. 
 The manpower and skills shortages should be addressed.  This can be 
done by developing the skills of internal staff; 
 Investigate alternative communication options; 
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 Fuse blowing technology versus fuse saving technology should be 
investigated.  Fuse blowing will reduce the voltage dips and fuse saving 
reduce the outage time; 
 Replace the CT’s with 10P15 10VA, ratio 300/1; 
 The relay settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 100% 
 TMS  = 0.1; 
 The sensitive earth fault settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 3% 
 TMS  = 10 s; 
 The earth fault settings should be as follows: 
 Plug setting = 20% 
 TMS  = 0.1; 
 Fuses should be installed as per the Protection and Digsilent sub-
headings as follows: 
 FCR 45 – Install 10K fuse 
 FCR 58 - Install 10K fuse 
 FCR 70 - Install 10K fuse 
 FCR 72/4 - Install 20K fuse 
 FCR 74 - Install 25K fuse 
 FCR 75 - Install 10K fuse, and 
 In the design and planning phase of a network, the weather conditions 
should be taken into consideration. 
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CHAPTER 14 
CONCLUSION 
 
14.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary object of this dissertation was to analyse the NMBM 22kV 
distribution power system using the criteria below.  Literature in terms of the 
criteria was consulted, namely: 
 
 Power System Reliability 
 Power Quality 
 Power System Protection 
 Digsilent Power Factory 
 SCADA 
 Maintenance and Manpower 
 Weather Conditions 
 NRS Data Analysis 
 
Case studies were identified by determining the weak networks using the 
available fault data.  The fault data was captured onto spreadsheets and 
graphs were drawn from it.  5 case studies were identified, namely, FBH, 
SGP, KKG, MWN and FCR.  The case studies were analysed in terms of the 
literature review.  From the results of the analysis findings, recommendations 
and conclusions were formulated 
 
14.2 POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
 
The electricity industry is capital driven.  As more electricity is required to 
maintain the growing demand and more emphasis is placed on reliability 
evaluation.  The electricity industry is a major contributor in the economy and 
hence the social interest of the world.  Government organisations and political 
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structures are becoming involved.  It is due to these conditions that the need 
for reliability techniques, methods and concepts are being developed.       
 
Power system reliability in this dissertation evaluates the power network in 
terms of system adequacy, system security, reliability calculations and 
reliability indices.  There are many factors which affect the smooth operation 
of power systems, namely, overloading of cables, radial networks, weather 
conditions, failure of equipment, et cetera.  These factors increase the 
duration of the outages, which impacts on the cost of power outages. 
 
14.3 POWER QUALITY 
 
Utilities have to deal with numerous complaints of poor power quality.  Voltage 
dips and interruptions are the most common complaints of poor power quality.  
This dissertation concentrates more on voltage dips, as it is causing more 
problems for the industry.  Harmonics, flickering, voltage swells and 
regulation, although covered in the dissertation does not pose a power quality 
problem for the NMBM power system. 
 
The causes of voltage dips include the following: 
 
 Faults; 
 Lightning; 
 Vegetation; 
 Bird and animals; 
 Failure of equipment; 
 Reclosing and sectionalising during fault conditions; 
 Motor starting, and 
 Arc furnaces. 
 
The weak networks were identified and power quality instruments installed to 
measure the voltage dips.  The results were compared to the dip categories in 
the NRS documents.  It is evident from the literature review and the analysis 
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conducted that voltage dips can be reduced if maintenance is performed 
regularly, bird and animal protection guards are fitted to equipment, co-
ordination of protection equipment is reviewed, reclosing and sectionalizing 
practices are revised and more surge arrestors and fuses installed,  
 
14.4 POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION 
  
Power system protection covers a major section of this dissertation.  If the 
protection equipment does not function optimally, the power system will fail in 
terms of power system reliability.  The purpose of protection equipment is to 
detect the fault and to reduce the risk of damage to plant connected to the 
power system.  It must also ensure continuity of supply to all the customers 
connected to the power system.  Therefore it is imperative that protection 
equipment function properly.  Many factors affect the severity of faults, 
namely, power system configuration, type of faults, source conditions, 
earthing, et cetera. 
 
Current transformers are the most important component of a protection 
system.  Faulty current transformers are many times the causes of power 
outages.  It is important that current transformers remain accurate, therefore 
maintenance must be done regularly. 
 
Fuses cover a major section of this dissertation because the analysis of the 
case studies focus primarily on overhead lines.  Co-ordination of fuse with 
each other and relays were found incorrect.  The sizes of the fuses were also 
incorrect and more fuses were recommended to be installed. 
 
Fault levels must re-calculated to determine the correct setting of relays and 
the co-ordination of protection equipment.   
 
It is evident from the research that protection equipment and philosophies are 
outdated.  The incorrect fuse sizes were installed and many of the lateral lines 
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were not protected.  Maintenance is not done regularly, thus the calibration 
and setting of relays were not revised. 
 
It is important to regularly calculate the ALF of a current transformer as it will 
determine the maximum current the current transformer can withstand.  To 
calculate the ALF, the ALC and fault current must be known.  Therefore, these 
calculations must be done regularly when maintenance is performed. 
 
14.5 DIGSILENT POWER FACTORY 
 
Digsilent in this dissertation form part of the analysis in the case studies.  The 
Digsilent circuits were built and the different functionalities applied, thereafter 
engineering decisions and recommendations were made to improve the 
reliability of the power network. 
 
In studying the reliability of the power network it would be advantageous to 
use Digsilent to perform loadflows studies, re-calculate short-circuit 
calculations, connecting subsystems, open point simulations, setting up 
simulations, protection co-ordination calculations, reliability analysis et cetera.   
 
Digsilent is a practical tool currently under-utilised in the NMBM.  The system 
is only available to certain sections, therefore not all the functions of this 
system are utilised effectively.  The use of Digsilent must be expanded to 
improve power system reliability in the NMBM.  
 
14.6 SCADA 
 
Control and monitoring of power networks become more and more important 
in the distribution of electricity.  A MicroSCADA system was installed at the 
NMBM to monitor and control the transmission and certain sections of the 
distribution network.   
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The current SCADA system has limitations in terms of the ability to monitor 
and control only the feeder substations.  The communication network also 
does not assist the supervisory system as it is limited in the transport data 
events.   
 
SCADA is an important part of power system control and in order to provide 
good service to the customers our SCADA system must function well, 
maintained and expanded to other power networks.  In the FBH and SGP 
case studies the networks cannot be monitored and controlled via SCADA.  It 
is utmost important to install SCADA at these two substations. 
 
14.7 MAINTENANCE AND MANPOWER 
 
The purpose of preventative maintenance and testing is to identify faulty 
equipment and provide corrective measures.  In a preventive maintenance 
program, potential hazards can be discovered and repaired or replaced.  This 
will extend the life of the equipment.  A well structured maintenance program 
should consist of routine inspection, testing, repair and service of electrical 
equipment under the supervision of management. 
 
The impact of maintenance and manpower requirements were analysed and 
found that it impacts severely on power system reliability.  Many of the 
maintenance plans and programs discontinued due to shortage of skills.  This 
is a corporate issue, which needs to be addressed.  Unless maintenance and 
shortage of skills are addressed, the power system will fail to operate within 
the NRS requirements, resulting in poor power system reliability.        
 
14.8 WEATHER CONDITIONS 
 
The impact of adverse weather conditions on power systems was investigated 
in this dissertation.  Weather conditions impact on power and service delivery 
and it is the duty of the utility to increase the reliability of power systems.  
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Radial topology are mostly affected, therefore the design of parallel systems 
for highly populated and industrial areas must be encouraged.   
 
The conductors used in all the case studies are predominantly bare overhead 
lines.  These conductors are more vulnerable to adverse weather conditions.  
In designing power networks, particularly overhead lines, the impact of the 
weather must be taken into account. 
 
14.9 NRS INTERRUPTION DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The NRS Data Interruption Analysis spreadsheet can provide constructive 
information that could be utilized to improve power system reliability and 
customer services.  The data captured onto the spreadsheet was used to 
evaluate the case studies.  Combined with the other engineering techniques 
the spreadsheet was used as a tool to identify weak systems which reduced 
the many unwanted and unnecessary power interruptions. 
 
14.10 SUMMARY 
 
It is evident from the research that outdated equipment and technologies 
should be replaced with more contemporary equipment and technology.  
Protection equipment and philosophies are outdated.  Power quality was 
extensively covered, because power system reliability is directly linked to 
power quality.  Most of the power quality events were the direct result of 
adverse weather conditions in the NMBM.  Maintenance and manpower 
remains a challenge for the electricity supply industry.  Change in terms of 
maintenance and manpower is needed. 
 
The NRS documents provide valuable benchmarks based on international 
standards.  Although some of the equipment has been replaced during the 
investigation and testing phase of this project, more work will be done as the 
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budget is available.  The SCADA supervisory system is a valuable tool to be 
extended to incorporate the rural lines.  Digsilent is a powerful engineering 
tool to assist power system operators, technicians and engineers in optimising 
power systems.  Planning plays a critical role in increasing power system 
reliability. 
 
14.11 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The further research possibilities are: 
 The study and the effective use of surge arrestors, and 
 The earthing of power system infrastructure, namely, overhead lines, 
sub-station earth mats etc.  
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Abstract 
Power system reliability problems are very difficult 
to solve because the power systems are complex and 
geographically widely distributed and influenced by 
numerous unexpected events.  It is therefore 
imperative to employ the most efficient optimization 
methods in solving the problems relating to 
reliability of the power system.  This paper presents 
a reliability analysis and study of the power 
interruptions resulting from severe power outages 
in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM), 
South Africa and includes an overview of the 
important factors influencing reliability, and 
methods to improve the reliability.  The Blue 
Horizon Bay 22kV overhead line, supplying a 6.6kV 
residential sector has been selected.  It has been 
established that 70% of the outages, recorded at the 
source, originate on this feeder. 
 
Keywords: Power System, Reliability, 
Security, Power Quality, Voltage 
Sag/Dip, Outage, Interruption 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Interruptions to the electrical supply network are one 
of the oldest and most severe power quality 
concerns.  The demand for power has increased 
tremendously over the last decade as a result of 
increased investments in infrastructure due to 
industrialization trends, fast urban growth, changing 
lifestyles and advancements in technology.  The 
ability to provide electricity to satisfy these factors 
above is influenced by the power quality the utility 
provides.  In particular, voltage dips are the major 
contributor, which aggravate the provision of 
reliable electricity supply.  Following the pace of the 
increasing demand, power systems have grown to 
immense sizes and complexities in terms of design 
and operating practices.  The question is; how 
reliable is the power system to resilient unexpected 
outages.  For this reason system security and 
reliability levels have become of utmost importance, 
especially in the present situation that calls for 
efficient utilization of electricity and encourages 
energy conservation. 
 
It can be safely assumed that reliability is one of the 
most important factors to be considered when 
planning and designing power systems.  In order to 
design and plan power systems correctly, 
appropriate reliability information must be available 
to firstly, evaluate and secondly, to apply the 
improvements to the design based on the result of 
the evaluation.  Over the years, power system 
reliability evaluation has been significantly 
developed using probabilistic methods.  From these 
methods appropriate indices were determined [1]. 
 
The reliability of power systems is dependent on the 
reliability of the components, the configurations of 
the network and the capability of the network to 
provide an alternative power supply to the customer.  
In reality power networks funding is influenced not 
only by reliability, but the cost to fund the building 
of the network, losses of energy sales and 
maintenance.  All these factors must be considered.  
To achieve this, adequate outage data must be 
available to make informed decisions.  To calculate 
the total cost to build a reliable power network, the 
formulae below can be applied.  The non-distributed 
power is directly related to the reinforcement cost as 
shown in (1) [5]:  
 
 CoCmClCiC   
 
Ci  =  Cost of Investment  
Cl  = Cost of Losses 
Cm = Cost of Operation and      
Maintenance 
Co  = Cost of Outages 
 
C  = Total Cost 
 
If the non-distributed power is reduced by W, the 
cost/benefit ratio can be defined as: 
 
(Ci + Cl + Cm – Co)/W            (2) 
(1)
(2)
  
The cost/benefit saving could take into consideration 
the saving P (in kW) not supplied.  The equation 
will be as follows: 
 
)()( bPaWCoCmClCi    
 
a  and b  are coefficients dependant on the 
importance to customers, the load loss and time of 
outage.  
 
This paper presents practical methods to increase 
power system reliability by optimization of the 
power network components.  Various methods will 
be applied using the case study.  The proposed 
methods are based on a combined contingency 
analysis and reliability evaluation scheme. 
 
2. Reliability analysis 
 
In principle, the reliability analysis for distribution 
networks is quite simple because networks are 
usually radially operated.  Basic input data for the 
analysis is the failure rate of each component and 
the network topology.  However, other information 
is also needed from the equipment which affects the 
results of the analysis e.g. interruption times and 
automation devices installed, which makes analysis 
more difficult to model. 
 
In the radial reliability analysis, as in this case study, 
networks are analyzed feeder-by-feeder, zone-by-
zone.  A zone refers to a part of the feeder, which 
can be isolated by one or more switches from the 
rest of the network.  The expected number of 
failures in a zone is calculated as a sum of the 
individual network component failures in the zone.  
The basic formulae to calculate or to evaluate power 
system reliability is as follows [2]: 
 
Series Components 
 
s  = 21                          (4) 
 
s   = System Outage Rate 
 
1   =   System Outage Rate for  
  component 1 
 
2    =   System Outage Rate for  
  component 2 
 
rs =  
21
2211



 rr                         (5) 
 
rs   =   System Average Outage  
 
r1   =   System Outage duration for 
  component 1 
 
r2   =   System Outage duration for  
  component 2  
 
Us = rs s                         (6) 
 
Us =   System Average total outage
 time 
 
Parallel Components 
 
p  =  2121 rr                         (7)
   
p    =    System Outage Rate 
 
rp = 
21
21
rr
rr
                        (8) 
 
 
rp  =   System Average Outage  
  duration 
 
Up = rp p                       (9) 
  
Up   =   System Average total outage
 time 
 
Reliability indices are used in terms of the NRS 
(National Regulatory Service) [4] to measure 
reliability and availability of electricity supply.  The 
reliability indices applied in this paper are based on 
the following: 
 
SAIDI =  System Average Interruption  
    Duration Index 
  
SAIDI =   
TNC
SCID
                                                    (10) 
 
SCID =  Sum of Customer Interruption  
    Durations 
 
TNC  = Total Number of Customers 
 
SAIFI =  System Average Interruption 
    Frequency Index 
 
SAIFI =  
TNC
TNCI
                                       (11) 
 
 
TNCI =  Total Number of Customer 
(3)
     Interruptions 
TNC =  Total Number of Customers 
 
CAIDI =  Customer Average Interruption 
    Duration Index 
 
CAIDI =  
TNCI
SCID
                                      (12) 
 
SCID =  Sum of Customer Interruption 
                  Durations 
 
TNCI =  Total Number of Customer 
    Interruptions 
 
ASAI =  Average Service Availability Index 
 
MAIFI =  Momentary Average Interruption 
    Frequency Index 
 
Reliability of a power system can be evaluated 
against Table 1 [2], which is used as the bases of 
reliability analysis evaluation in this case study.   
 
Table 1. Customer Based Indices 
 
SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI ASAI 
95.9 
min/yr 
1.18 
int/yr 
76.93 
min/yr 
.999375 
int/yr 
 
87 interruptions were recorded on this feeder over a 
five-year period.  55 of these interruptions recorded 
were trips at the source substation, 27 were fuse 
openings in conjunction with the breaker switch at 
the source substation and 32 were fuse openings at 
the lateral lines.  The outage data was analyzed, 
reliability calculations were applied and 
improvements were introduced to reduce the outages 
in terms of duration and numbers.  This information 
is summarized in Table 2.  In comparing the 
information of Table 2 “Before” column with that of 
Table 1, it is evident that the calculated reliability 
results of all the indices exceed the customer based 
indices in Table 1.  However, if the disconnecting 
devices operated correctly, i.e. the 27 fuse openings, 
without tripping the source breaker, the indices 
would have been improved.  The technology to be 
utilized is the fuse blowing technology.  This means 
that when a permanent fault occurs, the expulsion 
fuse will blow before the source breaker trips.  Only 
the SAIFI result is still below the benchmark, but it 
reflects a 51% improvement. 
 
Table 2. Results of Reliability Calculations 
 
 SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI 
Before 2773.4 11 252.13 
After 20.68 5.4 3.43 
T-Off 13.1 0.073 354.05 
 
Table 3 [7] is a comparison of the reliability of 
different distribution configurations developed by 
the New York City’s Consolidated Edison.  The case 
study is in the simple radial category.  It is again 
evident that the results exceed the indices.  
However, after interventions were affected, the 
results improved except for the SAIFI.  SAIFI will 
increase moderately if storm data is included and 
long circuits lead to more interruptions [7].  It is 
difficult to avoid interruptions on long radial 
overhead lines.  By designing overhead lines, which 
are able to withstand adverse weather conditions 
with more reclosers, fuses and automated switching 
equipment, SAIFI will decrease [7].    
 
It was determined that reducing the number of trips 
at the source by 10, the SAIFI indices improved by 
20%.  It is evident that network improvements and 
optimization are required to improve the quality of 
supply and the interruption index of this specific 
power system. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Different Distribution 
Configurations 
 
 SAIFI 
Int/Yr 
CAIDI 
Min/Int 
MAIFI 
Mom  
Int/Yr 
Simple 
Radial 
0.3 to 1.3 90 5 to 10 
Primary  
Auto-loop 
0.4 to 0.7 65 10 to 15 
Under-
ground 
Residential
0.4 to 0.7 60 4 to 8 
Primary 
Selective 
0.1 to 0.5 180 4 to 8 
Secondary 
Selective 
0.1 to 0.5 180 2 to 4 
Spot 
network 
0.02 to 0.1 180 0 to 1 
Grid 
network 
0.005 to 
0.02 
135 0 
 
3. Power Quality 
 
Power is the rate of energy that is delivered and is 
proportional to the product of the current and the 
voltage.  Standards are developed to control the 
voltage within certain limits.  Any deviation in the 
 50Hz sinusoidal voltage waveform could cause 
potential power quality problems.  A close 
relationship between the current and the voltage is 
evident as the current resulting from a short circuit 
causes the voltage to dip/sag.  Current from 
lightning strikes cause high-impulse voltages.  These 
high-impulse voltages lead to flashovers, and 
breakdown of insulation.  The current generated 
from harmonic-producing equipment causes the 
voltage waveform to be distorted.   
 
Transmission line faults and the subsequent opening 
of the protective devices rarely cause an interruption 
for any customer because of the interconnected 
nature of most modern-day transmission networks.  
These faults do however cause voltage dips.  
Depending on the equipment sensitivity, the device 
may trip, resulting in substantial monetary losses to 
the customer. 
 
3.1 Voltage Dips 
 
Over the last decade utilities had to deal with 
increasing numbers of complaints relating to power 
quality due to voltage dips and interruptions.  The 
crucial issue is that voltage dips affect sensitive 
loads and the influx of digital computers and 
electronic control systems is at the heart of the 
problem.  Due to these problems the NRS 048 
specifications provide targets for each dip category 
i.e. Y, X, S, T and Z and the utility is assessed in 
terms of this.  In table 7 [9] the compatibility levels 
for voltage dips are given in the form of the 
maximum number of voltage dips per annum for 
defined ranges of voltages.  The NRS 048-2:2007 
introduced a revised table (table 5) to categorize 
voltage dips according to duration and depth.  Table 
4 explains the dip category in terms of its duration 
and depth.  Table 4 and table 5 must be read in 
conjunction to understand the dip categories.  For 
instance according to table 4 the duration of a S-dip 
is between 150ms and 600ms and the depth of the 
dip is between 20% and 60%.  Reading this in 
conjunction with table 5 it is apparent where it fits 
into the dip categorization chart and the impact it 
will have on the power system. 
 
Voltage dips are geographically dependent on the 
different environmental conditions, which have an 
effect on power quality [8].  In the case study many 
of the voltage dips were caused by lightning, storms, 
wind, birds, animals, vegetation, lack of 
maintenance, old equipment, protection 
malfunctioning  and outdated philosophies. etc.  
 
Table 4. Dip Categories 
 
Dip 
Category 
Values of duration and depth 
Y Duration: >20ms to 3sec 
Depth: 30%, 20%, 15% 
X1 Duration: >20ms to 150ms 
Depth: 30% to 40% 
X2 Duration: >20ms to 150ms 
Depth: 40% to 60% 
S Duration: >150 ms to 600 ms 
Depth: 20% to 60% 
T Duration: >20ms to 600ms 
Depth: 60% to 100% 
Z1 Duration: >600ms to 3sec 
Depth: 15% to 30% 
Z2 Duration: >600ms to 3sec 
Depth: 30% to 100% 
 
3.2 Calculating Voltage Dips  
 
It is however important for utilities and even 
customers, especially industrial customers to 
understand the impact of voltage dips.  Voltage dips 
can completely shut down a large industrial 
manufacturing plant, having tremendous financial 
implications to the company.  Utilities on the other 
hand want to provide a good service and therefore it 
is important to both parties to understand and know 
the impact of voltage dips.  A voltage divider model 
for radial power systems can be used to calculate 
voltage dip magnitudes [3].  The model is simplified 
but useful to forecast voltage dips (figure 1).   
 
Vsag  = 
ZfZs
Zf
 E                              (13) 
 
Zs - Source Impedance at point of 
   coupling 
Zf - Impedance between pcc and 
 fault 
E - Voltage at source 
 
ppc - point of common coupling 
 
 
It is assumed that the pre-event voltage is 1 pu, thus 
E = 1.  Therefore, 
 
Vsag   =      
fs ZZ
Zf
                                         (14) 
 
It can be deduced that Vsag becomes deeper for 
faults closer to the customer (Zf becomes smaller) 
and for smaller fault levels (Zs becomes larger). 
  
Equation 14 can therefore be used to calculate 
voltage magnitudes as a function of the distance of 
the fault. 
 
Vsag  = 
zLZs
zL
                      (15) 
 
z - Impedance of feeder per unit           
length in km   
 
L - Distance between fault and 
pcc per km 
 
Figure 1: Voltage Divider Model 
 
Table 5. Characterization of voltage dips according to depth and duration 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Range of dip 
depth 
U 
(expressed as a 
percentage of 
declared voltage 
Ud) 
Range of residual 
voltage 
Ur 
(expressed as a 
percentage of 
declared voltage 
Ud) 
Duration 
T 
20 < t   
150ms 
150 < t   600ms 0,6 < t   3s 
10 < U   
15 
90 > Ur   85  
Y 
 
15< U   20 85 > Ur   80 
Z1 20 < U   
30 
80 > Ur   70 
S 30 < U   
40 
70 > Ur   60 X1a 
Z2 40 < U   60 
60 > Ur   40 X2 
60 < U   
100 
40 > Ur   0 T 
NOTE:  In the case of measurements on LV systems, it is acceptable to set the dip threshold at 0.85 pu. 
a   A relatively large number of events fall into the X1 category.  However, it is recognized that dips with 
complex characteristics (such as phase jump, UB, and multiple phases) might have a significant effect on 
customers’ plant, even though these might be small in magnitude.  Customer might not have the means to 
mitigate the effects of such dips on their plant. 
 
4. Analysis of case study 
 
The case study is a combination of 22kV radial 
overhead line, approximately 20km supplying a 
22/6.6kV, 1 MVA transformer as depicted in figure 
2.  18 22kV customers, mainly farming activities 
are supplied from the 22kV overhead line, while the 
6.6kV cable network supplies five distribution 
substations.   The oil circuit breaker installed at the 
source substation was manufactured in 1952.  The 
Micom relay provides overcurrent and earth fault 
protection and auto-reclosing.  The transformer and 
the 6.6kV cable network is not protected, therefore 
a transformer or cable fault will cause the source  
 
breaker 20km away to trip.  The fuse technology 
used is the fuse saving technology, therefore the 
source breaker will trip before the fuse blows.  
Because the auto-reclose function of the source 
breaker is inoperative this will result in extended 
outage time, poor power system reliability and 
power quality and a negative impact on the 
reliability indices. 
 
It is evident from the Vector-Graph recorder 
information presented in table 6 that voltage dips 
are a major concern.  Comparing table 6 to table 7 it 
is obvious that the number of voltage dips in table 6 
exceeds the values in table 7. 
 
Figure 2: Line Diagram of Network 
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Symbol relating to figure 2 
 
A - Auto-recloser at source substation 
FBH - Fitches Corner Blue Horizon Bay 
F1–F11 - Expulsion fuse 1 to 11 
R1 - Relay in distribution sub 1 
R2 - Relay in distribution sub 2 
S1 - Sectionalizer 1 
S2 - Sectionalizer 2 
 
Figure 3 represents an actual voltage dip recorded 
on 11 November 2008 on the Blue Horizon Bay 
feeder.  From figure 3 it can be deduced that the 
depth of the voltage dip is 50%.  In other words it is 
50% below the threshold of 90%.  According to the 
NRS 048 the duration of a voltage dip is measured 
from the moment voltage decreases below 90% up 
to when the voltage rises above 90% of declared 
voltage [9].  The duration of the dip is 0.93s.  The 
duration is measured from the time the voltage 
reduced below 90% to the time the voltage rises 
above 90%.   
 
This voltage dip is recorded on all three phases, but 
the blue phase is regarded as the most severe 
because of the depth.  The most severe dip is used 
to determine the category in which the dip will be 
classed.  Using both tables 4 and 5 it is obvious that 
this is a Z2 voltage dip.  On 11 November 2008 the 
weather conditions were fine, but the wind was 
reasonably strong.  No faults were recorded on 
neighbouring networks.  It can be safely assumed 
that the strong wind or faults on the customer 
farming activities could be the cause of this voltage 
dip. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Actual Voltage Dip 
 
 
Table 6 depicts the voltage dips over a period of 
twelve months.  It must be noted that the last 
column indicates the percentage time the Vecto 
Graph recorder was inactive.  The data was 
compared with the outage information for the case 
study area.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Voltage Dips – Jan 08 to Dec 08 
 
  S T X1 X2 Y Z1 Z2 % Not  avail 
Jan 3 0 3 0 24 1 0 13.3
Feb 5 0 19 2 40 2 4 6.6 
Mar 1 0 2 1 6 2 0 92 
Apr 1 6 1 2 21 3 1 4 
May 2 0 2 0 17 3 0 0.4 
June 0 0 1 0 10 0 0 45.2
July 3 1 1 1 18 0 0 0.6
Aug 3 1 7 1 14 0 0 66.8 
Sep 2 5 1 1 22 1 0 0.5 
Oct 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 68.0 
Nov 6 0 3 0 37 1 5 0.7 
Dec 4 2 3 5 29 1 0 80.6
Tot 30 15 43 13 241 14 10 
 
 
In table 7 [9] the compatibility levels for voltage 
dips are given in the form of maximum number of 
voltage dips per annum for defined ranges of 
voltages. 
 
Table 7. Characteristic values for the number of 
voltage dips/year 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Network 
voltage 
range 
(nominal 
voltages) 
Number of voltage dips per year
Dip window category 
X1 X2 T S Z1 Z2 
6.6kV to 
44kV ext 
oh 
13 12 10 13 11 10 
6.6kV to 
44kV 7 7 7 6 3 4 
44kV to 
220kV 13 10 5 7 4 2 
220kV to 
765kV 8 9 3 2 1 1 
 
Faults on municipal equipment are also responsible 
for voltage dips.  Approximately 70% of faults on 
the municipal networks occur on overhead power 
lines.  The common causes of the faults are birds, 
animals, lightning and insulator failures.  Voltage 
dips could be generated when load is transferred 
e.g. from the municipal grid to a standby generator 
to secure power to critical essential equipment 
(used by the farmers).  Figure 4 represents the  
starting and shutting down of loads to generators, 
which could cause significant voltage dips or swells 
[6]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Voltage Dips due to generator application 
 
In comparing the data in table 6 to that of table 7 it 
is clearly evident that the Blue Horizon Bay 22kV 
feeder line is under-performing in terms of the 
number of voltage dips. 
 
As stated before birds, animal life, vegetation, 
wind, rain, lightning and insulator failures could 
cause many of these voltage dips.  Evidence of 
these factors was discovered when inspecting the 
overhead line and many of the unknown voltage 
dips could be ascribed to these factors. 
 
Table 8. Summary of Voltage Dips 
 
 No of Dips Perc 
Unknown 201 55% 
External Source 119 32.5% 
Fitches Corner 
Feeder
46 12.5% 
Total 366 100%
 
It is not always straightforward to determine if 
lighting was the cause of an outage or voltage dip 
as lightning can affect power systems through 
direct or indirect strikes.  These strikes cause 
flashovers that cause short circuits.  
 
 Many of the transformer structures are fitted with 
surge arrestors, which will reduce the effect of 
voltage dips on equipment.  Surge arrestors should 
be fitted to every second or third pole [4].  The 
surge arrestor would absorb the lightning strike 
current, which will flow along the overhead line.  
The amount of current the surge arrestor would 
absorb depends on the earth resistivity.  The higher 
the earth resistivity, more surge arrestors are 
required.  The magnitude of the lightning strike 
current determines the magnitude of the voltage 
dip.  Ultimately if surge arrestors were fitted to 
every pole, the voltage dips would be significantly 
reduced and the reliability would increase.  It is not 
always financially viable to install surge arrestors 
on all the poles.  Where it had been determined that 
the load was highly critical, more surge arrestors 
should be installed.   
 
Many of the unknown voltage dips are Y-dips.  The 
duration of Y-dips is between 20 ms and 3 seconds 
and the depth is between 15% and 30%.  Hence, the 
Y-dips are what we would term in the industry as 
“insignificant” and according to the NRS 048-
2:2007 customers are mainly responsible for 
protecting their equipment against the effects of the 
Y-dips.  Many of the Y-dips and also a significant 
number of X-dips might be caused by faults on 
neighbouring remote power networks.  Only 12.5% 
of the voltage dips recorded on this feeder have 
been caused by faults on this network.  The cause 
of the voltage dips range from adverse weather 
conditions due to lightning, storms and strong 
winds, lack of vegetation control, animal and bird 
life along the overhead line, protection 
malfunctioning and lack of maintenance.  The cable 
network supplying approximately 1800 customers, 
predominantly holiday homes and retired citizens is 
approximately twenty years old.  The number of 
faults recorded on the cable network is 
insignificant.  Therefore, it is evident that the 
majority of the faults, which were recorded, 
occurred on the overhead line.   
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Faults are the main reason for voltage dips on the 
overhead power lines.  A voltage dip may cause 
tripping of sensitive loads if its magnitude is below 
the critical voltage that equipment can sustain.  It is 
therefore imperative to improve the power system 
reliability on the Blue Horizon Bay feeder by 
applying corrective measures as listed below.  The 
lessons learnt from this case study could be used to 
reduce the impact of voltage dips on other power 
systems.  These lessons include the following: 
 
 Radial topology increase the outage time which 
impacts on reliability indices. 
 Cost effective power networks are more 
unreliable.  The use of more disconnecting 
devices will improve the reliability. 
 Overhead power lines are more unreliable than 
cable network because adverse weather 
conditions, vegetation and animal life is one of 
the major causes of voltage dips. 
 Improved maintenance planning and the 
network configuration of the power system can 
reduce voltage dips. 
 Old outdated equipment cannot be used with 
contemporary technology. 
 Fuse saving technology cause many voltage 
dips and extended outage time.    
 
The two main strategies to improve power quality is 
[7]: 
 
1. Reduce the effects of faults 
2. Eliminate faults  
 
The above can be achieved by applying the 
following: 
 
 Fit animal guards were animal life is prevalent 
along the overhead line. 
 Study the bird life along the overhead line.  
Determine the wingspan of the birds.  Compare 
this with the distance between phase 
conductors and phase and earth conductors.  If 
the wingspan is longer than the distance 
between the conductors, the spacing should be 
revised. 
 Improve preventative maintenance initiatives, 
i.e. pole top, cross-arm, insulator, surge 
arrestor inspections, tensioning of conductors, 
vegetation control, switchgear and protection 
maintenance etc. 
 Install more surge arrestors. 
 Revise protection philosophies, etc. 
  
It is therefore recommended: 
 
 To replace the auto-recloser (A) in figure 2 at 
the source substation as it is faulty and very 
old. 
 Introduce sectionalizers (S1 and S2), fuse-
blowing technology (F - F11) and revise the 
discrimination of the protection equipment in 
figure 2. 
 Downstream at the 6.6kV network install 
OCB’s with relays (R1 and R2) as the primary 
protection for the 6.6kV distribution power 
system in figure 2. 
  Install more surge arrestors.  
 Maintenance programs should be reviewed.  
From the site inspections it is evident that more 
drastic tree maintenance and animal protection 
replacement programs are needed.  
Preventative maintenance programs works well 
if it is structured and well managed.  This 
would include checking jumper clearances, 
replacement of old fuses and expulsion surge 
arrestors and damaged insulators.  Cutting 
away and trimming of trees, and the fitting of 
animal guards would certainly reduce the 
effects of voltage dips on any power system. 
 
Finally, voltage dips will never be completely 
eliminated, but it can be significantly reduced if 
both the customer and the supplier invest in better 
practices and equipment.  Dip proofing equipment 
is available on the market.  This equipment is 
expensive.  The decision to purchase this equipment 
depends on how severely the customer’s operations 
are affected and how important the supplier 
perceive voltage dips as a phenomenon which 
impacts on its power quality indices and customer 
service. 
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Abstract. This paper presents a comparative analysis of the effects of expulsion fuse operations in 
distribution systems on power quality and power system protection.  This analysis includes the two 
widely used technologies namely, fuse-saving and fuse-blowing.  The most effective and efficient 
method to improve power quality should be applied.  The application of fuse technologies should be 
carefully selected to provide an optimum solution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The basic function of a power system is to continuously 
maintain an adequate and reliable power supply to 
customers within the limits of the standards and 
regulations.  However, performing these functions is not 
always possible because various types of failures occur 
randomly beyond the control of power system operators.  
Power system operators are generally concerned with the 
reliability of their systems and the determination of 
realistic availability targets for their systems. 
 
Residential customers and industries are increasingly 
dependant on power; therefore power utilities are 
expected to provide reliable, dependable, and more 
affordable power.  Utilities recognised the consequences 
of long-term unavailability and persistent interruption of 
power that could directly translate into a loss of power to 
customers.  Utilities over the years have had to deal with 
the increasing number of complaints relating to power 
quality due to voltage dips and interruptions.  The crucial 
issue is that voltage dips affect sensitive loads and the 
influx of digital computers, electronic controls and 
equipment, are at the heart of the problem.  Voltage dips 
are the most general power quality abnormality, 
accounting for almost 80% of power quality problems.  
Voltage dips are a common cause of power related 
computer systems failures, stalling of motors, reduced 
motor life and flickering of lights [1]. 
 
As a result, utilities and researchers are constantly 
developing improved methods and technologies for 
power distribution systems that will enhance the system's 
reliability.  Many power utilities around the world use 
expulsion fuses on their lateral lines.  In addition to fuses, 
utilities may employ auto-reclosers for restoration of 
supply.  Generally, when auto-reclosers are used in 
conjunction with expulsion fuses, they are configured in a 
variety of philosophies.  For example, the auto-recloser 
may be configured for fuse-saving mode or fuse-blowing 
mode.  
 
It would thus be to the advantage of the utility to develop 
apparatus, philosophies and methods for providing 
automated restoration of power distribution systems that 
do not place the power restoration time and components 
at risk during a fault.  These apparatus, methods and 
philosophies developed must reduce the negative effect 
on power quality, power system reliability and the 
operation of protection equipment. 
 
2. DISTRIBUTION RELIABILITY 
 
Reliability is the ability of the power system to supply 
energy within accepted standards and in the quantity 
desired.  Reliability is measured using various indices 
characterising frequency, duration, and magnitude of 
adverse effects on the power supply [2]. 
     
The primary causes of faults on a distribution circuit are 
lightning, tree contact, animals and equipment failure. A 
survey from thirteen utilities over a two-year period 
indicates that 79% of the faults are phase to earth, 85% of 
the recorded faults are temporary and the outage rates on 
laterals are greater than the main feeder [3].  
Approximately 70% of all power system outages occur 
on overhead lines.  Lightning, vegetations, birds, animals 
and failure of equipment etc cause these faults.  In 
attempting to clear the faults by reclosing and 
sectionalising devices cause voltage dips on the power 
system [4]. 
 
Transient faults are temporary faults such as branches on 
the line and flashovers.  Once the fault is cleared the 
power is restored.  Some transient faults are self-clearing; 
others are cleared by automatic reclosing devices.  
Permanent faults are faults causing damage to equipment 
that requires technical staff to repair [5]. 
   
Reliability indices are sensitive to the number, type and 
location of protective devices as well as the restoration 
practices of the utility.  A circuit breaker or auto-recloser 
will minimise the number of customers affected by a 
permanent outage and automatically restore power for a 
temporary outage.  
 
Finally, an expulsion fuse does not have automatic 
reclosing capabilities and thus, temporary faults are 
treated the same as permanent faults.  The additional time 
required for replacing a blown fuse must be included in 
the restoration times.  Reliability improvement must 
focus on reducing the number of faults.  This strategy 
applied to long duration interruptions will reduce the 
number of voltage dips. 
 
2.1 Reliability Indices 
 
Reliability indices were developed to benchmark utilities.  
The most commonly used indices to benchmark power 
system reliability are SAIFI and SAIDI [6].  The basic 
formula for evaluating radial power systems is as follows: 
Us = rs λs                      (1) 
 
System average interruption frequency index (SAIFI) is 
the average frequency of sustained interruptions per 
customer over a predefined area.  SAIFI is the average 
failure rate.  It quantifies how many sustained 
interruptions an average customer experience in one year. 
 
 
SAIFI = 
Customers No Total
onsInterrupti Customers ofNumber  Total         (2)   
 
System average interruption duration index (SAIDI) is 
commonly referred to as customer minutes or customer 
hours of interruptions.  It is designed to provide 
information regarding the average time the customers are 
interrupted.  SAIDI calculate the average total duration of 
interruptions.  It quantifies how many interruption hours 
an average customer will experience in one year. 
 
SAIDI = 
Customers No Total
Durationson InterruptiCustomer  of Sum
    (3) 
 
Customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI) is 
the average time needed to restore services to the average 
customer per sustained interruption.  CAIDI is a measure 
of how long an average interruption lasts.  It is used to 
measure the utility’s response time to interruptions [7]. 
CAIDI =
SAIFI
SAIDI
                     (4) 
 
In order to design more reliable power systems the cost 
will increase.  It is apparent from figure 1 that designs 
incorporating more reliable power systems will increase 
the cost of the power systems.  Therefore, reliable power 
systems are more expensive than less reliable power 
systems.  The total cost curve is a resultant of the two 
curves and will show a minimum, which is an indication 
of the optimal reliability [8]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cost vs Reliability  
 
Interruption costs consist of a number of terms, namely: 
direct cost, indirect cost and non-material inconvenience.  
It is almost impossible to quantify non-material 
inconvenience cost.  One way to determine this cost is to 
calculate the amount of money the customer is prepared 
to pay to avoid the outage [8].  
 
Different methods are used to determine outage costs.  
The method employed also depends on the type of 
customer.  An industrial customer would use a different 
method from a domestic customer.  The only accepted 
method is to conduct a survey among customers [8].  The 
responses given by the customers will determine the 
average cost of an outage.  The cost per interrupted kW 
can be defined as: 
 
Li
Ci(d)                 (5)
 
d  = duration  
Li  = load of customer 
Ci  = cost per kW 
Li(P) = θ VICos3       (6) 
 
3. POWER QUALITY 
 
Power quality is concerned with deviations of the voltage 
or current from the ideal single frequency sine wave of 
constant amplitude and frequency.  The quality of the 
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power supply delivered by utilities varies considerably 
and depends on a number of external factors.  Factors 
such as lightning, industrial premises which switch large 
loads, non-linear load stresses, inadequate or incorrect 
wiring and grounding or short circuits caused by animals, 
branches, vehicle accidents and human accidents 
involving power systems can create problems to sensitive 
equipment if it is designed to operate within narrow 
voltage limits, or it does not have adequate ride-through 
capabilities to filter out fluctuations in the electrical 
supply [8]. 
 
As stated above voltage dips are the most common power 
quality phenomenon and account for 80% of power 
quality problems.  Voltage dips are characterised by the 
measurement of the dip duration below the dip threshold, 
and by the dip magnitude.  The duration of a voltage dip 
is the time measured from the moment the r.m.s. voltage 
drops below 0,9 pu of declared voltage to when it rises 
above 0,9 pu of declared voltage. 
 
For classification purposes, the magnitude of the dip is 
given by the maximum r.m.s. deviation from declared 
voltage and the duration of the dip is given by the 
maximum duration of the worst affected phase in each 
case [9]. 
 
3.1 Causes of voltage dips 
 
A minimum of 10 700 animal-related outages with a total 
duration of 25 630 hours were reported in SA, affecting 
approximately 136 533 customers over a 16 year period.  
Birds caused two thirds of these outages [10]. 
 
Birds, especially raptors, are vulnerable to electrocution 
on certain types of structures.  The causes of these 
electrocutions have been studied and the broad consensus 
currently is that it is a function of the physical dimensions 
of the bird coupled with the design of the particular 
electricity structure.  The following are indications that 
bird electrocutions are a problem [11]: 
 
 Unexplained auto-reclosing occurring in clear weather 
conditions and no vegetation problem. 
  The presence of large birds in the area where the faults 
occur. 
 Absence or scarcity of alternative roosting and 
perching substrate like cliffs, trees and buildings. 
 Agricultural activity, especially irrigation and fallow 
lands. 
 Arid habitat with water reservoirs coupled with pole 
transformers in close proximity. 
 The presence of bird carcasses lying directly under the 
pole. 
 
Squirrels, monkeys, baboons etc are the cause of many 
outages in SA.  These outages usually occur in fair 
weather conditions.  Many of these faults caused by 
animals are classified as “unknown.”  The following 
problem areas can lead to animal faults [12]: 
 
 Transformer bushings and arrestors – faults across 
bushings arrestors cause outages and voltage dips.   
 Expulsion fuses sometimes installed where there is low 
clearance between phase conductor and grounded 
object. 
 
Ensuring that the trees along an overhead line are 
regularly trimmed is one of the most successful 
techniques of reducing the number of faults on an 
overhead line.  Insulator washing is critical at the coast 
and in dusty regions.  Routine pole, line and insulator 
inspections will identify possible faulty equipment, which 
could be replaced to reduce outages.  The overhead lines 
tensions should be inspected and re-tensioned to reduce 
kissing of conductors. 
 
Misco-ordination of reclosers, sectionalisers and 
expulsion fuses cause longer outage time and more power 
quality problems for customers [12].  Improving co-
ordination of protection equipment is critical for power 
system reliability and the reduction of voltage dips.  More 
protective devices that can assist with sectionalising, 
automating of operation, faster fault clearing time and a 
reduction in outage time is paramount.   
 
Figure 2: Circuit for impedance increase or decrease 
Neighbouring networks with sensitive loads are severely 
affected by voltage dips.  It is sometimes possible to 
reduce the magnitude of the voltage dip by connecting 
more impedance between the fault and the sensitive load.  
In figure 2 the magnitude of the voltage dip depends on 
the operation of the lines between the source and the load.  
Closing the open point B4 will have the result that the 
power supply to the load is not interrupted during fault 
conditions, but it increase the risk of having voltage dips 
on the sensitive loads connected to the source. 
   
The frequency voltage dips to the source is the same, but 
the voltage dip magnitude increase if B4 is closed.  A 
three phase fault with B4 closed will result in voltage dip 
of 0.65 pu. 
.u.p65.0
1.0j4.0j3.0j
)1.0j4.0j(*)3.0j(
1.0j
1.0j4.0j3.0j
)1.0j4.0j(*)3.0j(
*0.1sV 




        (7) 
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Opening B4 will eliminate the parallel path, but it will 
increase the impedance and reduce the voltage dip 
magnitude on the sensitive equipment. 
25%dip          0.75p.u.
j0.3j0.1
j0.3
*1.0Vs              (8) 
The decision to operate the power system with B4 open 
or close depends on the importance of continuity of 
supply versus the impact on sensitive loads. 
   
If more fuses are installed to smaller sections of 
networks, fewer customers will be interrupted.  To reduce 
outages it is important that utilities increase the number 
of fuses. 
 
4. EXPULSION FUSE PROTECTION 
 
Expulsion fuse are the most commonly cost effective 
protection device used on distribution power systems.  It 
is easy to change and the interruption is relatively fast 
and can occur in a half of a cycle for large currents.  Two 
types of expulsion fuses are generally used, i.e. K and T 
types.  The K type is faster than the T type. 
 
Normally reclosers are used in conjunction with 
expulsion fuses.  The size of the expulsion fuse will 
determine the curve.  The trip coil of hydraulic reclosers 
limits the curve adjustment; therefore it reduces the 
options in terms of co-ordination with fuses.  On the 
other hand electronic reclosers are more flexible.  The 
recloser can co-ordinate over a wider range currents and 
the sensitivity can be increased to co-ordinate better with 
downstream fuses [12]. 
 
In terms of co-ordination of expulsion fuses, a few 
aspects are relevant to power quality [5]: 
 
 Employing fuse-saving technology on transient faults, 
the recloser must have a time-current characteristic to 
the left of the minimum melting curve. 
 For permanent faults the recloser must have a curve to 
the right of the maximum clearing time curve. 
 Repeated faults, inrush currents and lightning activity 
particular using fuse-saving technology will shift the 
time-current characteristic to the left.  This is what is 
called degrading the fuse. 
 
4.1 Selecting fuses 
 
Transformers with a capacity rating less than 2500 kVA 
are normally protected by means of fuses [13].  High 
voltage fuses are installed on both the HV and LV sides 
of 33/11kV transformers rated up to 5 MVA [14]. 
 
The following factors are to be considered when selecting 
fuses [15]: 
 
 The fuse must be capable of carrying maximum 
currents. 
 The inrush current of a transformer is 10 to 12 times 
the rated full-load current for a duration of 100 ms. 
 Faults in a transformer are to be cleared fast and the 
current needed in the 10 s region should be as low as 
possible. 
 The minimum fusing current of the primary circuit 
should be as low as possible to ensure that many 
internal faults are cleared. 
 Correct discrimination between the fuse and other 
protective devices is critical. 
 
The characteristics of a high voltage fuse will differ from 
a low voltage fuse.  Generally, the high voltage fuse will 
operate at higher current levels than that of a low voltage 
fuse with similar time changes.  Figure 3 below show the 
different time/current characteristics to be observed when 
selecting and grading fuses [15]. 
 
 
Figure 3: Time-Current (TC) Characteristics 
 
Where: 
 
a-  Full-load current 
b- Permissible overload 
c- Magnetising inrush equivalent current 
d- HV fuse characteristic 
e- LV fuse characteristic (referred to HV side) 
f- Characteristic of source circuit breaker relay  
g- Maximum current on HV side with fault on LV side 
 
4.2 Fuse-saving technology 
 
Fuse-saving technology is used in conjunction with auto-
reclosers.  At the source substation an auto-recloser is 
installed and slow expulsion fuses protect the lateral 
lines.  The expulsion fuse must not trigger during 
transient faults beyond the fuse, which will be cleared by 
the auto-recloser.  For permanent faults the expulsion 
fuse must clear the fault, resulting in a sustained outage 
for some customers.  Fuse-saving technology is achieved 
by using the two settings on the auto-recloser, i.e. 
instantaneous trip and delayed trip.  The instantaneous 
trip must be set to be faster than the expulsion fuse and 
the delayed trip slower than the recloser [8]. 
 
It is difficult to make fuse-saving technology work.  It is 
not always easy to co-ordinate a recloser relay with a 
fuse, using fuse-saving technology if the fuse is installed 
near the source substation.  The fault current at the start 
of the feeder is normally very high. Since the auto-
recloser is slower than the fuse, the fuse will blow, 
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leaving customers off for an extended time.  One way to 
overcome this is to either block the instantaneous 
operation or using fuse-blowing technology.  Another 
method to use is to install automatic sectionaliser, which 
makes the installation expensive [16]. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that for very high fault currents of 
short durations the fuse will always operate, which would 
be a problem for temporary faults.  Therefore, as per 
figure 4, there will be areas when the fuse will always 
operate, never operate or operate optimally.   
 
 
Figure 4: Fuse-saving 
 
It is evident that fault current is a major factor, therefore 
in order to optimise the power system it is important to 
know the magnitude of the fault current.  The calculating 
of the fault current can be done by using the following 
approach: 
 
sourceZ  = 
trfMVA
bMVA       (9) 
baseZ   = 
 
bMVA
2
bkV     (10) 
trfZ   = 100
Z%
x
trfMVA
bMVA    (11) 
actZ   =  R + jxL    (12) 
lineZ   =  
baseZ
actZ     (13) 
faultZ   =  22kVlineZtrfZsourceZ    (14) 
pufault I  =  
faultZ
1
               (15) 
bI   =  
bxkV3
x1000bMVA                 (16) 
faultI   =  pufault I x bI                 (17) 
 
For fuse-saving technology to work, the protection 
devices must function correctly. 
 
 Use bigger and slower operating fuses near substations 
 Use faster auto-reclosers and circuit breakers 
 
 
4.3  Fuse-blowing technology 
 
In using the fuse-blowing technology the instantaneous 
trip on the auto-recloser is disabled.  During transient or 
permanent faults beyond the expulsion fuse, the fuse will 
operate before the auto-recloser operate.  This minimises 
the number of instantaneous trips and the number of 
customers affected, but these customers will suffer 
sustained interruptions until such time the fuse is 
replaced.  This impact negatively on the reliability 
indices.  40% of utilities indicated that they solved 
customer problems by using fuse-blowing technology [5]. 
 
Using fuse-blowing technology, the number of 
momentary interruptions will decrease.  One third of the 
utilities use fuse-blowing and one-third use fuse-saving 
and the other third use a combination of the two 
technologies.  The number of fuse operations increase 
from 40 to 500% using this technology, increasing the 
frequency of sustained interruptions from 10 to 60%.  
Customers on long lateral lines have more sustained 
interruptions [12]. 
 
Faults can last long for 0.5 to 1 s, resulting in damage to 
equipment eg. 
 
 Conductor burn downs 
 Damage to inline equipment 
 Evolving faults 
 Damage to transformers 
 
5. MITIGATION TECHNIQUES ON THE 
POWER SYSTEM 
5.1 Power System Reliability 
The Rockland 22kV feeder was used to apply the 
literature.  This power system is considered to be 
reasonably reliable, but in terms of the outage duration 
and the number of power quality event which will be 
discussed in the power quality sub-heading, the feeder is 
not reliable.   
 
Calculating the power system average outage time 
 
Us   = rs λs       (1) 
   = 28 x 94.5 
   = 2646/5 yrs 
   = 529.2 hrs/yr 
Calculating the average outage cost 
 
P   = 860.8 kW        (6) 
Cost per kW  = 0.363 (Calculated 
over 5 years) 
  Annexure C 
  
Outage cost = R 0.0399 per kW   (5) 
  = 3.99 cents/kW 
 
Calculating Reliability Indices 
 
Calculated SAIDI = 1133.4 min/yr    (3) 
Calculated SAIFI = 5.6 int/yr    (2) 
Calculated CAIDI = 202.4 min/yr    (4) 
The power system under-performed in terms of the 
calculated reliability indices.  The current capacity of 
conductors can sustain the load requirement.  The 
structures and power system equipment are in a 
reasonable condition.  If preventative maintenance is 
done, the power system reliability can improve.  In terms 
of system security the power system fails.  The protection 
equipment is not reliable as the ARC, on investigation, 
was switched off and there is no alternative power supply 
to the system. 
 
In terms of the factors influencing the reliability of the 
power system, the following is noted: 
 
 The customers connected to this power system are 
supplied from lateral lines and there is no possibility of 
an alternative supply when an outage occurs. 
 Weather conditions have a major impact on the power 
system. 
 Many of the outages are caused by vegetation, birds 
and animals. 
 The duration of the outages do not comply with the 
standards in terms of the calculated average outage 
time. 
 Protection equipment mal-operation. 
 Lack of maintenance. 
 
5.2 Power Quality 
 
The voltage dips recorded on this power system in all the 
dip categories, are more than the NRS standards.  These 
dips cause major problems to the industrial processes and 
electronic equipment.  241 Y-dips were recorded.  The 
magnitude of these dips were shallow and the duration 
normally not longer than approximately 100 ms.  Many 
of these dips were caused by neighbouring networks.  If 
the principle in figure 2 is applied, the impact of the 
voltage dips in terms of Y-dips will be reduced.  Y-dips 
are regarded as insignificant in terms of the NRS 
standards.  The customers are responsible to protect their 
equipment against Y-dips, but no dip improvement 
equipment has been installed on the customer’s 
equipment.     
 
5.3 Expulsion Fuse Protection 
 
Considering figure 3, curve f depicts the characteristics of 
a normal inverse curve.  This curve does not follow a 
similar format of the fuse, which makes grading difficult.  
Figure 3 will be used for fuse-saving technology, which 
will work, but when used for fuse-blowing, grading 
becomes more complicated.  In figure 5 an extreme 
inverse cure is used.  It is evident that this curve is similar 
to that of the fuses.  Therefore for improved grading 
between fuses and circuit breakers, extreme inverse 
curves should be used. 
 
It is evident from figure 5 that the K-type fuse is faster 
than the T-type and can sustain higher fault currents for 
longer periods.  The calculated fault current is 1105 A 
using the equation 9 to 17.  From figure 5 the K-type will 
operate in 0.7 seconds and the T-type fuse in 2 seconds.  
It would therefore be better to use T-type fuses nearby the 
source as the fault currents are higher at the source. 
 
It is important to note that the fuses do not protect the 
transformer and the relay only protects the transformer at 
fault currents which exceed of 65 A.  Hence, fuses 
although selected using the criteria in 4.1 cannot protect 
the transformer, but protect the conductor.  To protect 
transformers would require additional relays on every 
lateral line.  This is very expensive and therefore not a 
viable option.  It is cheaper to replace the transformer 
than procuring protection equipment. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Fuse/Relay Grading 
 
The grading margin between the relay and the fuse 
depends on the size of the fuse and the relay settings.  
The grading margin will increase as the fuse size 
increase.  The settings of the auto-recloser are critical in 
the grading of fuses, i.e. the uses of instantaneous trips or 
delays trips. 
 
According to the investigation conducted approximately 
30% of all sustained interruptions on rural lines are due to 
incorrect expulsion fuse/auto-recloser operation, selection 
of fuse size or co-ordination between the fuse and the 
recloser.  By improving this using fuse-saving technology 
SAIDI and CAIDI improved significantly and SAIFI 
improved reasonably.   
 
5.3.1 Impact on Reliability 
 
There are many schools of thought regarding fuse-saving 
and fuse-blowing techniques.  Customers are more 
sensitive to voltage dips in urban areas than in the rural 
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areas.  Domestic customers complain more about 
sustained outages, but in most cases short momentary 
voltage dips have negligible effect on them.  Fuse-
blowing technique will probably not eliminate all the 
power quality problems industrial customers face.  As a 
rule of thumb, fuse-blowing will eliminate one-third of 
the power quality problems of industrial customers.  The 
best choice in terms of fuse-saving or fuse-blowing 
depends on the application and the type of customers 
connected to the power network and the philosophy of the 
utility [5]. 
 
Auto-reclosers are designed for fuse-saving applications 
and the most common models are (1) one fast and three 
delayed operations or (2) two fast and two delayed 
operations.  The auto-recloser at the main substation can 
clear permanent faults, but it will lead to long outages for 
all the customers connected to that feeder.  Instead 
expulsion fuses on lateral lines can clear permanent 
faults.  In order to achieve proper auto-reclosing with 
fuse-saving features, there must be a trade-off, i.e. a short 
outage for all the customers instead of long outages for 
some customers.  The alternative would be more long 
outages and not all short outages would become long 
outages. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Neither a fuse-saving nor a fuse-blowing protection 
scheme is the best choice for all applications.  One 
scheme is better in some applications than others.  The 
best choice depends on many factors, including fusing 
practices, conductor sizes and location of customers on a 
circuit and the philosophy of the utility.  It is helpful to 
review the choice made (even on a network-by-network 
basis) because many situations would be better served by 
a different choice. 
 
Many unexplained operations of the protection equipment 
were detected.  All the causes of voltage dips described in 
3.1 were evident on this power system.  Hence, 
maintenance programs must drastically be implemented, 
animal and bird protection installed, more fuses installed 
and co-ordination of protection devices revised. 
 
Reviewing current philosophies and practices will only 
benefit both the customer and the utility in terms of 
power system reliability.  Utilities generally apply one of 
the two expulsion fuse co-ordination philosophies on a 
given distribution feeder, fuse-blowing or fuse-saving.  
When fuse-saving works, it benefits both the utility and 
its customers.  Power is automatically restored to all 
customers and utility staff does not have to travel to the 
expulsion fuse location to replace a blown expulsion fuse.  
However, fuse-saving practices have co-ordination 
limitations at higher fault currents.  This is common for 
the upstream device to trip and the expulsion fuse to 
operate at the same time.  This results in frequent 
momentary outages for many customers and blown 
expulsion fuses, even for temporary faults.  These 
challenges have led some utilities to discard fuse-saving 
and instead use fuse-blowing technology. 
 
The conventional fuse-saving practice has an inherent 
tradeoff of sustained interruptions improvement at the 
expense of increased momentary activity, which causes 
SAIFI and SAIDI improvements. 
 
Fuse-blowing is obviously less problematic and easier to 
coordinate.  Most utilities use a mix of fuse-blowing and 
fuse-saving on different feeders depending on the 
customers and the fault currents.   
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